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The prevailing scholarly consensus holds that national ideas are exclusively modern 
phenomena which had no role in a pre-modern age of dynastic monarchy. And yet, during the 
Wars of Louis XIV (1667-1714), French and German political pamphleteers regularly mobilized 
national rhetoric to persuade audiences, mobilize military support, and justify the political 
decisions taken by their monarchs. These wars were undeniably dynastic conflicts in the midst of 
an age of absolute monarchy, but in repeated clashes between France and the Holy Roman 
Empire pamphleteers regularly clothed their political arguments in rhetoric of Germanness and 
Frenchness. This rhetoric combined the dynastic and national, treating both Louis XIV and the 
Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor, Leopold I, as national leaders and exemplars; collapsing 
distinctions between the political boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire and the national-cultural 
boundaries of Germany; and posited lasting ideas of intrinsic Germanness and Frenchness that 
imbued one’s culture, territory, personality, and duty.  
This dissertation eschews teleological definitions of the exclusive modernity of national 
ideas to instead analyze this rhetoric in its own context. In doing so it reveals that national ideas 
were both common and politically significant in pre-modern Europe, where they fundamentally 
shaped the public discourse around five decades of war. This dissertation, therefore, argues for a 
more expansive understanding of the national. Rather than treating the “nation” as a singular 
entity with a singular definition, it should be viewed as a set of evolving ideas, capable of vastly 
 
 iv 
different uses in different contexts. This approach bridges the previously irreconcilable divide 
between scholars arguing over a modern or a pre-modern “invention” of the nation by 
acknowledging that national ideas have a much longer history of importance and change. This 
realization is crucial to open the space for a full appreciation of the diversity of both pre-modern 
and modern national ideas, as well as to prepare us for the ways that national thinking will 
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 A political pamphleteer writing at the outbreak of yet another war with France called 
upon all those with “still one spark of a true German spirit” to stand up and fight for their 
country.1 Several years later, another pamphleteer wrote that “a good Frenchman can sleep 
tranquilly and without worry for the fortune of his patrie” as their armies would surely emerge 
victorious.2 Both pamphleteers mobilized national rhetoric to encourage and reassure their 
audiences amid conflict and warfare. These words were not written in the midst of either World 
War, nor at the height of the Franco-Prussian War, nor during the long years of the Napoleonic 
Wars. These words were written a full century earlier, during the Wars of Louis XIV, a series of 
conflicts which spanned the last decades of the seventeenth and first decades of the eighteenth 
century (1667-1714).  
The wars of Louis XIV were undeniably dynastic conflicts in the midst of an age of 
absolute monarchy; prevailing historiography insists that national rhetoric either did not yet exist 
or had no political significance in such a context. Most scholars have accepted a “modernist” 
understanding of national ideas, which holds that nations and nationalism are purely modern 
inventions and that national thinking had no relevance prior to the dawning of the modern age of 
industrialization, democratic popular politics, and mass media – transformations that occurred 
                                               
1 Teutsch-Lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungs-Rede, An Seine untreuen und verrätherischen Kinder, Sambt 
Beyfügung Einer Aufmunterung der redlichen Teutschen Patrioten zu Ergreiffung der Waffen wider des Kaysers und 
des Reichs in demselben der Zeit tyrannisirende Feinde, 1673, 13. 
2 Jean de La Chapelle, Lettres d’un Suisse à un François ou l’on voit les véritables interests des princes et des 





around the turn of the nineteenth century. Although this modernist interpretation has pointed out 
the fundamental shifts in understanding and use of national ideas in the modern era, it has also 
obscured scholars’ view of the many different ways in which national ideas were relevant and 
useful in the premodern era. There are hundreds of examples like the two above of early modern 
pamphleteers mobilizing national ideas as political rhetoric during the belligerent reign of a 
theoretically absolute monarch in a largely dynastic era. By widening our perspective, we 
suddenly notice that despite the current historiographical consensus, national ideas flourished 
long before the nineteenth century. These ideas and their uses do not conform to modern 
definitions and understandings. By expecting them to, we anachronistically impose modern 
concepts on a premodern age. This dissertation seeks to uncover and unpack the understandings 
and motivations underpinning one episode in a much longer and more diverse history of national 
ideas in Europe.  
In this dissertation I argue that understanding the role national ideas played in this 
historical moment is important both for scholars of nations and nationalism broadly and for 
scholars of early modern Europe more specifically. As will be shown, national ideas were 
incredibly common in early modern Europe. These ideas do not conform to modern definitions 
of nations and nationalism imposed by scholars. Regardless, as the continued use by political 
pamphleteers over a fifty-year period shows, these ideas were politically relevant. It makes no 
sense to ignore or dismiss the following examples because they do not conform to anachronistic 
standards, and, worse still, it occludes both an important moment in the history of national ideas 
and an important factor in the Wars of Louis XIV. The strictures of the modernist thesis of 
nations and nationalism have precluded a full understanding of the ways that early modern 





has limited our ability to understand a key factor in the political and military battlefield of the 
Sun King’s reign: the war of words and ideas. This dissertation works to bring together the all-
too-often separate realms of politics, culture and ideas in early modern German history, while 
encouraging early modern French history to look beyond the borders of the French kingdom. For 
the intellectual battle for national ideas during the Wars of Louis XIV was one that shaped 
understandings of the conflicts, responses to Louis XIV’s aggression, and ideas about what it 
meant to be French or German.   
 
Historiography & Methodology 
 
 Now-classic theories of nations and nationalism, which emerged in the wake of World 
War II, sought to undermine the power of the primordial nation by uncovering how recently 
modern ideas of nation were constructed and invented. Nineteenth and early twentieth century 
national ideologies extolled the nation as natural and eternal; scholars instead emphasized the 
relatively recent construction of modern ideas of the political nation-state and all-encompassing 
nationalist programs. For most of history, these scholars pointed out, the nation had not been the 
central organizing principle of community or political life. Only in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, with the onset of industrialization, the disintegration of older community and political 
structures, the rise of the modern state and the influence of mass politics, mass literacy, and mass 
media, scholars argued, did the modern idea of a nation, the modern nation-state, and modern 
nationalism emerge through deliberate nation-building projects.3 Nationalist ideologies of 
                                               
3 The very first blows to primordialist, essentialist thinking about nations came in the wake of national socialism 
after 1945 from Hans Kohn and Carleton Hayes, who highlighted the role of intellectuals in spreading nationalist 
ideas, see the excellent summary in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, Becoming National: A Reader (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), especially 3-5. The true founders of the modernist thesis, however, came several 
decades later. Ernest Gellner argued that nationalism was a reaction to widespread changes brought about by the 
forces of modernization, especially the industrial revolution, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1983). Eric Hobsbawm added to this thesis the importance of cultural elites and the role that 





organic, primordial, eternal nations were ex post facto mythical inventions intended to give this 
modern construct the air of long-standing tradition.4  
The deconstruction of nationalist ideological claims is important and valuable. But in 
doing so, scholars assumed that the “nation” was a singular entity with a singular definition.5 
These scholars defined the “nation” in reference to their own intellectual priorities: explaining its 
political and cultural power in the modern age. In doing so, however, these thinkers imposed a 
self-fulfilling prophecy on the concept which proved their own argument. If the nation is by 
definition modern, then it cannot possibly exist apart from modernity.6 Benedict Anderson, for 
example, lays out a three-part definition of the nation as a “political community… imagined as 
both inherently limited and sovereign.”7 The first part of Anderson’s definition is not at all 
exclusive; there have been many imagined political communities, both nations and otherwise. 
Nor is the second part particularly troublesome, as all communities have borders and thus are in 
some way limited. It is the third component that irrevocably fixes Anderson’s definition to the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The nation as a community can only be considered sovereign 
within a historical context that recognizes the possibility, much less the preferability, of the 
                                               
Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Benedict Anderson disagreed with 
Gellner’s economic determinism, instead focusing on the influence of mass literacy and vernacular printing 
combined with the breakdown of traditional dynastic religious structures, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. Ed. (London: Verso, 1991). All of these scholars, however, located the 
starting line of nations and nationalism in the decades around the industrial and French revolutions, which has been 
the dominant timeline since. 
4 See Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983). 
5 If one looks closer at many of these definitions, one realizes that they are often ambiguous, contradictory, and 
rarely used with any consistency across scholarly works. For a detailed discussion of this see, Joep Leerssen, 
National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press, 2010), 14, 15–16. 
6 For an excellent and in depth analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these theorists’ arguments see, Caspar 
Hirschi, The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 8–10, 20–33. 





“people” as the basis of political legitimacy. This historically specific political theory emerged in 
full only over the course of the eighteenth century. The nation, thus defined, cannot be anything 
other than modern. To then use this definition to exclude other iterations of national thinking 
outside of modern, sovereign imaginings is to impose a tautological inevitability on the topic. 
What these theorists are actually discussing is the creation and invention not of the idea of 
nation, but of the modern nation-state as the political embodiment of popular sovereignty and 
nationalist agitation surrounding it.8  
Modernists are correct in arguing that nation-states and nationalism are uniquely modern 
inventions, dependent on numerous historically specific concepts like mass mobilization, popular 
sovereignty, and even uniquely modern ideas of explicitly delineated borders. Furthermore, 
modernists are certainly correct that the idea of national identification as “somehow so natural, 
primary and permanent as to precede history” is a construction.9 But these are not the only 
possible expressions of national thinking throughout history, nor are they strictly true for even 
the modern era.10 More recently, a growing number of scholars have produced studies discussing 
                                               
8 Too often the terms “nation” and “nation-state” are conflated. The first is neither necessarily political nor 
necessarily sovereign, the latter is an exclusively modern construction which usually requires both. The same care 
needs to be taken with “nation” and “nationalism” which are in no way synonymous. I take care to use the term 
“nationalism” to refer only to modern programs of political agitation (for cultural homogeneity, for political 
sovereignty, for territorial independence, etc.) Unlike “nation,” “nationalism” is an anachronistic term prior to the 
1790s and therefore is very much a modern invention. None of the examples found in this dissertation can or should 
be classified as nationalism.   
9 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 14. 
10 In addition to Eugen Weber’s well-known study, number of more recent works on “national indifference” have 
shown that modernist definitions and the triumph of nationalism was far from standard or complete even well into 
the modern era, see Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976); Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local 
History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Pieter Judson, 
Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2006); Chad Bryant, Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2007); Tara Zahra, Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian 
Lands, 1900-1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); James Bjork, Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism 





a wide variety of ways in which ideas of nation were widespread and significant in the pre-
modern era. From medieval uses of national imagery to shore up struggling dynastic power, to 
renaissance humanist debates framed as national competition, to early modern use of national 
stereotypes to perform diplomatic negotiations, ideas of nation crop up all over premodern 
Europe.11 From the fifteenth century on, the Holy Roman Empire’s full official name, to take one 
glaring example, was the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. All the definitions that 
scholars impose on a concept cannot negate historical realities that overwhelm their neat 
categorizations. It is true that none of these pre-modern examples correspond to modern 
definitions of nation(-states) and nationalism, but it is also true that national ideas were clearly 
                                               
11 On medieval uses of national ideas and imagery to shore up dynasty in times of crisis see, Colette Beaune, The 
Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France, ed. Fredric L. Cheyette, trans. Susan 
Ross Huston (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Len Scales, The Shaping of German Identity: 
Authority and Crisis, 1245-1414 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Hirschi, The Origins of 
Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany. In the Renaissance, humanist 
intellectual competition was often framed in terms of national rivalry, particularly between Germany and Italy, see 
Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, Volume I: Maximilian to the Peace of Westphalia, 1493-
1648, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 50–57, 102–16; “A German Nation? National and 
Confessional Identities before the Thirty Years War,” in The Holy Roman Empire, 1495-1806, ed. R.J.W. Evans, 
Michael Schaich, and Peter H. Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 303–22; Christopher B. Krebs, A 
Most Dangerous Book: Tacitus’ “Germania” from the Roman Empire to the Third Reich (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 2011), 21, 81–128. National ideas were also significant literary and symbolic political concepts 
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Myriam Yardeni, La Conscience Nationale En France 
Pendant Les Guerres de Religion, 1559-1598 (Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1971); Hans-Martin Blitz, Aus Liebe 
Zum Vaterland: Die Deutsche Nation Im 18. Jahrhundert (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000); Timothy Hampton, 
Literature and Nation in the Sixteenth Century: Inventing Renaissance France (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 2001); Marcus Keller, Figurations of France: Literary Nation-Building in Times of Crisis (1550-1650) 
(Newark: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Ellen R. Welch, “National Characters: Playing Against Type in the Ballet 
Des Muses (1666-67),” Seventeenth-Century French Studies 32, no. 2 (2010): 191–205; Ellen R. Welch, “Dancing 
the Nation: Performing France in the Seventeenth-Century Ballets Des Nations,” Journal for Early Modern Cultural 
Studies 13, no. 2 (2013): 3–23; Peer Schmidt, Spanische Universalmonarchie oder “teutsche Libertet”: das 
spanische Imperium in der Propaganda des Dreissigjährigen Krieges (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2001). This brief survey, of 
course, only focuses on works concerning France and Germany; there are many similar studies done for other pre-
modern national ideas, such as the contributions covering identity categories throughout the British Isles in Brendan 
Bradshaw and Peter Roberts, eds., British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain, 1533-1707 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, rev. ed. 





not exclusively modern, nor were they political, culturally, or intellectually insignificant in a pre-
modern era dominated by dynastic politics.12 
The singular focus on the modernity of national ideas has restricted the way that 
historians have looked at the early modern era. In the words of Hobsbawm, the nation “is a social 
entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the ‘nation-state’, and 
it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it.”13 This attitude 
has foreclosed scholarship into alternate understandings of national ideas as scholars try to 
grapple with the preponderance of pre-modern examples within confines set by the modernist 
thesis.14  
Applications of this modernist image of the nation to the early modern period have 
chiefly fallen into one of three categories. The first is driven by the desire to push the “timeline” 
of national invention earlier, usually in order to claim the gold star of anointing one or another 
country as the “first” nation.15 This approach too often clumsily imposes modern categories on 
                                               
12 Throughout this dissertation I only use the term “nation” in quotations when contemporaries also did. I do not 
translate other terms, such as “Volk” or “peuple” as nation, preferring instead the literal translation for these terms as 
“people.” 
13 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 10.  
14 This grappling has at times led to some astounding mental gymnastics as scholars try to force the reality of pre-
modern national ideas into the confines of modernist demands. For example, Colin Kidd dismisses the idea that 
there was a common British identity under the later Stuarts for the simple reason that there were too many British 
identities. He looks for a singular, all-encompassing, (read: modern) definition and therefore dismisses the diverse 
examples he does find as less-than, “Protestantism, Constitutionalism and British Identity under the Later Stuarts,” 
in British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain, 1533-1707 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 321–42. Or look to Nicholas Vazsonyi’s otherwise excellent article, in which he counterintuitively interprets 
an eighteenth century writer’s insistence that the German nation exists as evidence that it does not exist, because 
nations “by sheer historical reasoning are a phenomenon of modernity,” “Montesquieu, Friedrich Carl von Moser, 
and the ‘National Spirit Debate’ in Germany, 1765-1767,” German Studies Review 22, no. 2 (May 1, 1999): 234. 
See also terminological avoidance such as that in James Sheehan’s article arguing that we cannot speak of 
“Germany” prior to the nineteenth century because it was not yet a unified, centralized, (again, read: modern), state, 
despite the fact that contemporaries had used the term “Germany” for centuries, “What Is German History? 
Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography,” The Journal of Modern History 53, 
no. 1 (1981): 1–23.  
15 Georg Schmidt, for example, rightly acknowledges the important connections between the Holy Roman Empire 
and ideas of the German nation, but then uses that evidence to argued that the Holy Roman Empire was the first 





early modern societies and treats ideas of nation as if they were an unchanging object, akin to the 
printing press or the steam engine, with a singular moment of invention. It has also created a 
largely irreconcilable debate over the “beginning” of “the nation” that largely eschews attention 
to the particularities of historical context and aggravates modernists as much as it does early-
modernists.  
The second approach has tried to rescue the significance of pre-modern ideas of nation, 
but by discussing them in terms of “proto-nationalism” or inventing entirely new, acceptably pre-
modern terminology, such as Anthony Smith’s “ethnies.”16 This approach unnecessarily 
complicates discussions with the imposition of new academic jargon and reaffirms the telos of 
modern definitions by treating the word “nation” as unspeakable prior to 1789 and by positing a 
primordial, embryonic form just waiting through the centuries to become the modern nation. 
Contemporaries, however, did speak of the nation for centuries prior. We should not be afraid of 
using their own terminology, but we do need to pay attention to what they meant when they 
spoke. 
 The third approach attempts to trace the gradual development of modern ideas of nations 
and nationalism.17 This approach is valuable for understanding how those specifically modern 
concepts were invented, primarily over the eighteenth century, with attention to historical context 
                                               
Staat und Nation in der frühen Neuzeit; 1495-1806 (München: Beck, 1999). See also his English language summary 
of this thesis, “The Old Reich: The State and Nation of the Germans,” and a rebuttal by eminent imperial historian 
Karl Otmar von Aretin, “The Old Reich: A Federation or Hierarchical System?” in R.J.W. Evans, Michael Schaich, 
and Peter H. Wilson, eds., The Holy Roman Empire, 1495-1806 (London: Oxford University Press, 2011). One of 
the most glaring examples of claiming the mantle of “inventor” is Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to 
Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). For a good critique of the problems with 
Greenfeld’s approach see, Carla Hesse and Thomas Laqueur, “Introduction,” in Special Issue: National Cultures 
before Nationalism, Representations 47, 1994, 1–12.. 
16 Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1986).  
17 The two most well-known examples are David A. Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 





and detail. But it focuses on just one component of a much more diverse early modern picture. 
What is needed now are studies that uncover the rest of this pre-modern diversity. As Carla 
Hesse and Thomas Laqueur called for twenty-five years ago, we need to “recover a history for 
nation and national identity that has been lost when a single way of representing the people and 
the characteristics that make them a people – specifically that envisaged by nationalism – is 
taken to be the only possible one.”18 A quarter century ago they summarized the problem still 
facing the field today: “the overvaluation of [modern] nationalism occludes other histories of 
national identity that are not connected with the nation-state.”19 This statement of course is 
precisely the state of the field that Hobsbawm’s above quote envisioned. 
Regardless of the definitions imposed by modernist theorists, national ideas are clearly 
not exclusively modern, nor were they politically, culturally, or intellectually insignificant in the 
pre-modern era. The key to understanding this fact and escaping the problematic strictures 
outlined above is to realize that “nation” is an idea, and, like all ideas, its meaning, valences, 
associations, and uses have changed over time.20 Benedict Anderson’s description of the nation 
                                               
18 Hesse and Laqueur, “Introduction,” 1.  
19 Hesse and Laqueur, 2. 
20 Joep Leerssen also advocates for a similar treatment of what he calls “national thought” – “a way of seeing human 
society primarily as consisting of discrete, different nations, each with an obvious right to exist and to command 
loyalty, each characterized and set apart unambiguously by its own separate identity and culture.” Unfortunately, he, 
too, is chiefly concerned with tracing the development of modern nationalism, and still insists on discussing pre-
modern national ideas under the unclear term “ethnotypes.” Thus the full possibilities of this theory of “national 
thought” are left unexplored in his study. See, Leerssen, National Thought in Europe, 15. To fully explore the 
diversity of national ideas and national thinking it is necessary to apply a cultural-intellectual approach to history. 
My understanding of intellectual history thus differs from both the approach of Arthur Lovejoy and the Cambridge 
School of Quentin Skinner by highlighting the reciprocal relationship between political, diplomatic, or cultural 
occurrences and intellectual developments. On Lovejoy’s legacy see Darrin McMahon, “The Return of the History 
of Ideas?,” in Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History, ed. Darrin McMahon and Samuel Moyn (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 14–28. On Skinner’s approach see “Meaning and Understanding in the History of 
Ideas,” History and Theory 8, no. 1 (January 1, 1969): 3–53. Instead my approach is closer to that of Judith Surkis, 
who has convincingly argued for an end to the standoff between cultural and intellectual history, calling for a 
supplementary relationship based on complementarity and eclecticism, Judith Surkis, “Of Scandals and 
Supplements: Relating Intellectual and Cultural History,” in Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History, ed. 





as an “imagined community,” for instance, unintentionally recognizes that imagination is a 
fundamentally individual activity. The idea of a nation is simply an individual’s belief that there 
is a community of people who identify with whatever your nationally defining features are – 
language, myths, history, character, laws, politics, etc. The nation is a concept that individuals 
can believe in, reject, challenge, identify with, mobilize and transform. This understanding 
allows for the definition of “nation” to change depending on the historical context and the 
actions of the individuals doing the imagining. For the modern period, large numbers of people 
came to understand the nation as a political, sovereign, community, as Anderson and others have 
shown. Prior to the modern moment – and likely after that moment has ended - the nation may 
just as easily be understood in any number of different ways. Anderson’s definition does not 
need to be changed or rewritten; scholars simply need to properly historicize national ideas. To 
understand the national as ideas does not deny their very specific impact on the modern world, 
but it also does not dismiss earlier examples as irrelevant simply because they do not conform to 
a tautological definition of the nation’s modernity. Hobsbawm was right when he stated that “the 
basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity,” but 
here we are concerned with the basic characteristics of the early modern nation, to which 
modernity was entirely irrelevant.21    
Ironically, the theorists who argued for the modernity of nationalism and the nation(-
state) originally intended to historicize the nation. They wanted to historicize the claims of 
nationalists themselves in order to remove the mythic superiority of national ideas and 
undermine ideologies founded on them. In doing so, however, the modernist thesis has 
unintentionally reconfirmed this mythic aura of the nation, not as a primordial entity, but as a 
                                               





quintessential hallmark of modernity. To “be nationalized” is now discussed as if one is 
unlocking a civilizational achievement. To highlight the pre-modern diversity of national ideas, 
how they differed from modern iterations, and how those ideas have - and will continue to - 
transform in response to historical context and need, is not to deny the work of modernist 
theorists, but to continue their project to realize that the national is not inherently privileged. 
Rather it is just another idea.  
 
Background on Era & Pamphlets 
 
 The examples used to open this study came from published political pamphlets – 
important forms of propaganda during the Wars of Louis XIV. This series of wars spanning the 
closing decades of the seventeenth century and the opening decades of the eighteenth often pitted 
Louis XIV’s France against various constellations of imperial German powers. During these 
conflicts a staggering number of political pamphlets were written and disseminated discussing 
every aspect of contemporary politics and mobilizing a wide variety of rhetoric in service of the 
authors’ polemical goals. Among this rhetoric, pamphleteers again and again chose to mobilize 
national ideas of Germany and France – of Germanness and Frenchness – in order to argue for 
political unity, support, mobilization, or neutrality. At the height of absolute monarchy in 
Europe, amid some of the most dynastically-motivated conflicts ever fought, pamphleteers chose 
national ideas as one of the most effective ways to convince and rally European audiences.22  
 Louis XIV (1638-1715) first came to the throne in 1643, at the tender age of four. For the 
next eighteen years, the French government was dominated by his mother, Anne of Austria, and 
                                               
22 On contemporary theories of divine right and absolute monarchy see Nannerl Keohane, Philosophy and the State 
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Jouanna, Le Pouvoir absolu: Naissance de l’imaginaire politique de la royauté (Paris: Gallimard, 2013); Le Prince 





his personal mentor, Cardinal Mazarin. In 1661, following the death of Mazarin, Louis XIV 
assumed personal rule of his kingdom for the first time. Not long after the beginning of his 
personal rule, Louis XIV began the first of many wars, conflicts, and crises to mark the last five 
decades of his incredibly long reign.23 Of the last forty-eight years of Louis XIV’s life, France 
was at war for at least thirty. Much of this belligerence targeted the Holy Roman Empire. During 
the War of Devolution (1667-8) and the Franco-Dutch War (1672-8), France was not ostensibly 
targeting imperial territories, but contemporaries viewed the former as an act of aggression that 
should worry all in Europe and Louis XIV used the latter as a pretext to march his troops through 
German lands. This led many in the empire to warn that Germany was as much a target of 
French ambition as anything else. Louis XIV emerged from the Franco-Dutch war at the height 
of his power and international prestige. The victorious and celebratory paintings that adorn the 
ceiling of Versailles’s Hall of Mirrors attest to this. The Sun King’s reputation – and France’s by 
extension - as an unpredictable, formidable, and ambitious foe was solidly established for the 
decades to follow.  
The next decade was the most peaceful of Louis XIV’s personal reign, but it was fraught 
with a series of international crises. Almost immediately after the end of the Franco-Dutch War, 
France began to pursue a controversial policy of seizing and forcibly annexing imperial 
territories on France’s eastern border. These so-called “reunions” were based on specious 
historical and legal claims, granted by French courts, and intended to help create a more 
defensible natural border for France.24 These seizures resulted in the short-lived War of the 
Reunions (1683-4), a conflict chiefly between France and Spain, with support from the Holy 
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Roman Emperor, Leopold I. These reunions caused outrage across the empire, but the imperial 
powers were largely preoccupied with a massive Ottoman invasion that reached the gates of 
Vienna and forced the emperor and his family to flee up the Danube (1681-3).25 France not only 
used the Turkish invasion as cover to pursue its territorial aggrandizement, it was also the only 
major European power to refuse to send aid to defeat the “Turkish menace.” To make matters 
even worse, in these years Louis XIV carried out horrific persecutions and forced conversions of 
French Huguenots, eventually outlawing Protestantism in France altogether in 1685 and further 
horrifying protestant and catholic powers alike.26 Finally, in 1688, despite a supposed twenty-
year truce with the Empire signed a mere four years earlier, Louis XIV viciously attacked the 
Palatinate in a “defensive” strike that kicked off the Nine Years War (1688-97). This war ended 
with the eyes of Europe already turned towards the next conflict. The War of the Spanish 
Succession (1701-1714) was long in the making and broke out only after years of diplomatic 
wrangling and attempted negotiation at the highest levels. Like many of the Wars of Louis XIV, 
this conflict was primarily a fight over dynastic jockeying and territorial inheritance. The ensuing 
fourteen years of fighting served as a capstone to Louis XIV’s belligerent and expansionist reign 
in which the cultivation of dynastic power and royal gloire were defining features of domestic 
and international policy. 
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 States, armies, and especially pamphleteers across Europe rose up in outrage, criticism, 
and protest against Louis XIV and his seemingly never-ending belligerence.27 It is impossible to 
say exactly how many pamphlets were published or how many copies, editions, or reprints were 
circulated during this period.28 Pamphlets were ephemeral documents, often published cheaply 
and hastily. Their survival at all is thanks only to the interest of individual collectors and 
librarians. They were not the type of documents automatically and systematically archived. Yet, 
the numbers that we can count for pamphlets during the Wars of Louis XIV are astounding. 
Jeffrey Sawyer identified 4,503 pamphlets in the Bibliothèque national de France alone.29 P.J.W. 
van Malssen surveyed 800 pamphlets found in Dutch libraries.30 Martin Wrede analyzed over 
300 different German pamphlets writing against Louis XIV and the French.31 The sample in the 
present study is more limited, as it is concerned only with pamphlets that mobilized national 
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rhetoric. Still, the number exceeds 175 pro- and anti-French pamphlets from the Wars of Louis 
XIV alone, plus more from the later eighteenth century, with no claims whatsoever to being an 
exhaustive analysis.32 Indeed, due to the unsystematic way in which pamphlets were collected 
and preserved, any attempt at a systematic or exhaustive analysis of the actual body of literature 
in circulation at the time is impossible.  
The sheer number of surviving examples tells us several things. These publication 
numbers were massive for the period and the vast majority in all languages were anti-French. 
This reveals a consistency and vehemence of condemnation of the French that speaks to the fear, 
outrage, and political anxiety caused by Louis XIV’s power and bellicosity. These numbers can 
also hint at the audience for these pamphlets. Unfortunately, we will never be able to exactly 
define the readership of these documents, simply due to a lack of data and information. From the 
limited documents that can be found in archives, it is clear that the imperial court, and 
presumably its allies, encouraged pamphlet production by granting privileges, helping to 
disseminate information, and directly commissioning authors. They most likely did so because 
they saw pamphlets as a way to target politically influential classes across the empire and 
encourage support among potential allies.33 Quality, numbers, and internal evidence from 
pamphlets, though, show that they also reached farther. Based on their content and style, some 
writers specifically addressed elites, but the majority targeted a broader reading public. 
Pamphlets were cheap yet profitable for early modern publishers. They formed a genre of 
                                               
32 I employ the terms “pro-French” to mean those pamphlets whose arguments supported the policies of Louis XIV, 
and “anti-French” to mean those pamphlets whose arguments opposed the policies of Louis XIV. This is more 
accurate than referring to the pamphlets as simply “French” or “German” – pamphlets on both sides were written in 
both languages as well as, at times, Latin. It is also more accurate than terms like “pro-Habsburg” as not all anti-
French pamphlets actively supported Habsburg policies, sometimes disagreeing with the emperor’s actions but more 
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popular literature that was accessible to a broad swathe of the literate public – a relatively large 
percent of those living in early modern Germany – as well as many non-literate publics who may 
have heard these pamphlets read out loud.34 Even from inside a silent and dusty library, one 
cannot help but imagine the rousing, emotional, polemics of many of the pamphlets shouted in a 
town square or other public place. Pamphlets did not comprise the only form of written 
communication or propaganda in the early modern era.35 But, in a time before the dominance of 
newspapers, pamphlets constituted the closest thing to written “mass media” that the late 
seventeenth century had.36   
 The early modern political pamphlet is a fascinating genre of writing. Since the earliest 
days of the printing press pamphlets were rife in Europe. They contained everything from the 
simple reporting of current events to sophisticated juridical argumentation.37 They are devilishly 
hard to define in terms of form or style, but they chiefly focused on current events in relation to 
politics, religion, and society. Some were literary, some contained fables and parables, but most 
employed programmatic argumentation based on varying forms of contemporary rhetorical 
strategies.38 Their purpose was to persuade. They were political tools to shape public opinion, 
and as such provided an editorial voice that was absent in the few newspapers and periodicals of 
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the time.39 In the Wars of Louis XIV, the vast majority of pamphlets were published 
anonymously, with no (or faked) location and publishing information, and sometimes lacking 
even a date.40 Authors that we can identify are predominantly well-known writers whose style 
readers recognized despite publishing anonymously. They include the likes of Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz, famous mathematician and court historian, Johann Joachim Becher, respected for his 
discoveries in alchemy, natural philosophy, and economics, and Gatien de Courtilz de Sandras, 
best known as the literary inspiration for Alexandre Dumas’s Three Musketeers.41 Pamphlets 
may have been printed on the impetus of a ruler or private individual – from within a court or 
beyond it – or on behalf of a publisher or individual printer.42 Pamphlets were also a large source 
of profit. This explains why there are so many examples of popular pamphlets being reprinted, 
with expanded and corrected editions, and even series of pamphlets bound together and reprinted 
as collector’s items. Pamphlets could be one-off productions, or published as part of longer 
series, with installments ranging from two to several dozen. Pamphlets often responded directly 
to previous publications, creating an internal dialogue among pamphleteers building on, 
responding to, and debating the claims of their fellows. The fact of their usual anonymity, 
                                               
39 On public opinion and the public sphere at the time see, Sawyer; Andreas Gestrich, Absolutismus und 
Öffentlichkeit: politische Kommunikation in Deutschland zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1994); James Melton, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge ;New York: 
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Christian King’s Taking up Arms Against the Christians (London: Printed for R. Bentley, and S.Magnes, in Rassel-
Street in Covent Garden, 1684); Johann Joachim Becher, Machiavellus Gallicus: Das Ist: Verwandelung Und 
Versetzung Der Seele Des Machiavelli in Ludovicum XIV. Dem König von Frankreich, Vogestellet Durch Hundert 
Politische Frantzösische Axiomata, In Welchen Der Frantzosen Staats- Und Kriegs-Maximen Und Practicquen, 
Welcher Sie Sich Gebrauchen, Jedem Offentlich Zu Sehen Vorgestellet Werden, 1675; Gatien de Courtilz de 
Sandras, L’Alcoran de Louis XIV. ou le testement politique du Cardinal Jules Mazarin... (Maurino, 1695). 
42 Gillot, Le règne de Louis XIV et l’opinion publique en Allemagne, 4. On censorship and the publication process 






especially among anti-French pamphlets, contributed to much wider freedom of expression. In 
contrast to a royal decree, diplomatic correspondence, or even official publications more 
common in later wars, there was no need to create a façade of respect or civility in an 
anonymous pamphlet. Anonymity meant plausible deniability, allowing unnamed pamphleteers 
to get away with invective and polemic wholly unacceptable in official channels. This translated 
into more creative argumentation and a wider variety of rhetoric, as authors seized on any topic 
they thought provocative and persuasive.  
Throughout the early modern period such forms of propaganda did not represent 
continuous campaigns, but rather sporadic efforts to court public opinion when necessary and 
useful. The Wars of Louis XIV were no exception. Pamphlet publication spiked most in the run 
up to and early years of a new conflict or other crisis, with a similar, if usually smaller spike 
during the resulting negotiations. Such spikes corresponded to frantic moments of diplomatic 
negotiation surrounding declarations of war or neutrality, response to new attacks or 
developments, formation of alliances, and negotiation of cease-fires and peace treaties. That is, 
they spiked when there was a concrete need to convince people of one side or another (see 







Figure 1: Number of Pamphlets Published by Year, 1667-1715. This chart features three sets 
of data: 1. Pamphlets cited by Martin Wrede (2004) in his more comprehensive look at anti-
French political rhetoric (Total: 311), 2. Pamphlets cited in the present study focusing 
specifically on national rhetoric in anti-French pamphlets (Total: 105), 3. Pro-French pamphlets 
cited in the present study (Total: 70).43 
 
 
 Other scholars have studied aspects of this body of pamphlet literature, but none have 
looked at both pro- and anti-French pamphlets in comparison. While the source base for each 
side is uneven and the circumstances of publication were quite different, one cannot understand 
the battle without looking at the forces marshalled on both sides. There are several reasons for 
the unevenness in number of pamphlets. These include the priorities and political needs of Louis 
XIV and his ministers, but also the nature of publishing and the French state under the Sun King. 
The kingdom of France was, theoretically at least, an absolute monarchy.44 Louis XIV was, in 
                                               
43 Note, the pamphlets of Eustache Le Noble are not included in this chart as they are difficult to classify as wholly 
pro- or anti-French. For more on Le Noble see, Chapter 5: The French Counterattack. 
44 While contemporaries vaunted theories of absolute monarchical power, many scholars have shown that the reality 
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theory, the last authority for all political decisions, specifically relating to the military and 
foreign policy. In addition, he and his state apparatus maintained relatively tight control over 
publishing in France. There was always an illicit book trade, predominantly via cross-border 
smuggling from the Netherlands, but, within France, censorship was strong, and getting 
stronger.45 From 1661 on, Louis XIV’s chief minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, made a concerted 
effort to crack down on illicit printing, to bring printing presses under royal control, and to limit 
the number of presses in operation in France. Works required official permission to be published. 
Indeed, the majority of pro-French pamphlets proudly display such a license. This meant that the 
production and publication of pamphlet propaganda was much more tightly controlled and 
centrally directed in France than elsewhere. 
 None of this was true for the Holy Roman Empire. The empire, composed of well over 
1,500 semi-autonomous states, principalities, cities, and religious territories, with a complicated 
and confusing mass of overlapping jurisdictions, territories, and levels of authority, was anything 
but centralized.46 This meant that censorship was largely nonexistent. The lack of centralization 
also shaped imperial politics. The entire institution was nominally ruled by the Holy Roman 
Emperor, a de facto dynastic crown of the Austrian Habsburgs since the fifteenth century, but the 
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position of the emperor in no way guaranteed unquestioning support from the imperial estates.47 
This was especially true after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) confirmed the right of each 
imperial prince to conclude treaties with foreign powers.48 The empire was, and had long been, 
an incredibly divided entity – with fractures along religious, political, and historical lines. 
Support for the emperor shifted as quickly as the winds of individual political interest. Unlike 
Louis XIV, therefore, the emperor and his supporters had to constantly curry favor and campaign 
for support among imperial powers. When confronted with the looming threat of Louis XIV’s 
belligerence, political pamphlets were an effective way to justify anti-French positions, impress 
on imperial audiences the urgency of countering French aggression, and rally allies and military 
support across the empire. In the late seventeenth century, national ideas emerged as a 
particularly effective rhetorical tool in this fight.49 
 While proponents of the modernity of national ideas have long viewed France as one of 
the “first” nations, they have perceived Germany as the opposite. For France, scholars point to 
their strong, centralized monarchy and the mistaken but often-repeated idea that early modern 
France’s political borders aligned with French cultural and linguistic borders.50 Essentially, the 
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modern characteristics of a nation-state seem at first glance to map well onto the contours of 
early modern France.51 The decentralized and confusing structure of the Holy Roman Empire 
appears the antithesis. German historians for generations derided the empire as a bumbling, 
archaic, detrimental behemoth which impeded a “national awakening” in Germany and caused 
the Germans to be national “late starters.”52 More recently, however, scholars have begun to 
reevaluate the empire on its own terms, eschewing modern standards like centralization and 
rational bureaucracy, to realize that the empire was actually a relatively well-functioning body 
that was admired and celebrated by contemporaries even after its eventual dissolution in 1806.53  
Far from being an impediment to national ideas, I argue that it was precisely because of 
the decentralized structure of the empire and the many political, religious, and historical 
divisions that national ideas proved to be so popular and effective to encourage mobilization 
against France. From the late seventeenth century, certain constellations of religious and dynastic 
rivalries and power political interests were common, including a consistent resistance to growing 
Habsburg power. Even against the Reichsfeind [Imperial Enemy], France, a cast of usual 
suspects continued to refuse support to the Habsburgs for fear of imperial power increasing at the 
expense of their own.  Rhetoric appealing only to the personal or dynastic position of Leopold I, 
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then, would only ever reach so far. Political divisions were often enhanced or exploited with 
reference to continuing religious fractures that cut across the Empire. After almost a century and 
a half of conflict and strife culminating in the Thirty Years War and Westphalian settlement, 
most contemporaries in the late seventeenth century realized that religious unification was 
unrealistic, but they still feared persecution, forced conversion, and loss of rights. Some 
pamphleteers did try to mobilize religion biconfessionally, in defense of a shared Christendom 
against the French anti-Christ, but suspicions and confessional antagonisms meant this rhetoric 
would only ever be so effective. With ideas of a shared “Germanness,” particularly in the face of 
an expansionist, centralized France under Louis XIV, pamphleteers could unite imperial 
inhabitants across these various divisions. There was a long history of conceptually linking the 
political structure of the empire with the national-cultural idea of Germany.54 Pamphleteers drew 
on this history to appeal to readers in terms of a shared national concept that was larger than their 
particular family, history, confession or class. This rhetoric was possible because ideas of 
Germany and Germanness were familiar to seventeenth-century readers, but also because their 
chief enemy was a strong, clear outsider, a foreign power, a national “other.”55 Pamphleteers 
used national ideas, unlike more programmatic rhetoric of legal right, political justification, or 
religious protection, because they wanted to elicit an emotional response. Like most propaganda 
and polemic, the use of national ideas was pathos-driven in order to achieve a specific goal. In 
this precise moment, national rhetoric emerged to unite the empire behind the idea of 
Germanness and German duty against the threat of the French menace posed by Louis XIV’s 
                                               
54 The conceptual link between the Empire and Germany dates back to the late medieval period, Scales, The Shaping 
of German Identity. 
55 There were three important “others” for Germany in this period, France, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire. See, 





massive military and political strength. In the process, pamphleteers forged new connections 
between ideas of Germany, the empire, and the emperor, that would shape the history of German 
national ideas throughout the eighteenth century. 
The chapters of this dissertation analyze the use of national rhetoric in both pro- and anti-
French pamphlets. The chapters are arranged thematically, but also follow a loosely 
chronological order. Chapter One lays out the content and origins of pamphleteers’ 
understandings of national character – how they defined Frenchness and Germanness - 
specifically looking at how anti-French pamphleteers manipulated stereotypical characteristics of 
the French to paint their opponents as dishonorable, effeminate, and, most of all, untrustworthy. 
Chapter Two examines patriotic rhetoric in pamphlets, which was regularly twinned to national 
ideas of Germany, and used, particularly during the Franco-Dutch War, to shame imperial 
princes who did not ally with Leopold I against France. Chapter Three explores the projection of 
historical ideas of Germanness. It looks at how history was manipulated to support claims of 
territorial restitution, especially in the aftermath of Louis XIV’s policy of reunions, and how 
pamphleteers then used a constructed historical idea to shame contemporary Germans for failing 
their brave, honorable, and martial ancestors. Chapter Four examines a strain of national rhetoric 
that dominated in the tense years of the 1680s, when the lack of open warfare eliminated other, 
easy, pathos-driven rhetoric of imminent invasion and conquest. Instead pamphleteers invented a 
new threat – the danger of becoming French in body and soul through the over-consumption of 
French culture and goods. This cultural infiltration, they argued, was just another strategy of the 
perfidious French and spelled the eventual destruction of the empire itself. Chapters Two, Three, 
and Four focus primarily on anti-French publications, because for the first four decades of the 





changed beginning in the Nine Years War, and increasingly during the War of the Spanish 
Succession. Chapter 5 explores the reasons for this change, as well as what happened when 
France did wade into the international war of words. Their pamphleteers, too, mobilized national 
rhetoric, but carefully navigated between dynastic and national ideas to isolate the Habsburgs 
from the idea of Germany, and thus appropriated rhetoric of Germanness to suit their own 
interests.     
In each of these examples, it is important to realize that the use of national ideas was 
limited and contextually specific. It did not deny other categories of identification, whether 
religious, social, political, regional or other. Nor is it evidence that every aspect of culture and 
politics was nationalized, as it would become in the nineteenth century. Rather, national rhetoric 
in the wars of Louis XIV mobilized ideas of Germanness and Frenchness for specific political 
purposes – justifying positions, mobilizing support, and gathering allies. This is not evidence of 
the early invention of modern nationalism nor the early creation of modern nation-states. While 
many of the ideas underpinning this national rhetoric seem familiar to a modern eye, its use is 
not. These were pamphleteers writing in an age before ideas of popular democracy or 
republicanism had taken hold and before universal education and literacy. It was the zenith of 
dynastic monarchy and theories of absolute royal power. The use of these ideas reflects that 
political and intellectual context. In this period, national ideas were used in support of dynastic 
territorial claims and the conflicts they sparked. National ideas supported the rule and authority 
of divine-right monarchs. Importantly, national ideas raised no intellectual quandaries about their 
precise borders, definitions, social extent, or political agendas.56 These were ideas wholly 
                                               
56 For the development of these questions as “problems” see Kirsten L. Cooper, “Power and Politics: Political 
Sovereignty between Dynasty and Nation,” in A Cultural History of Memory in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Patrick 





embedded in their own historical time. Yet they were also ideas with remarkable political 
significance and cultural resonance in that time. To ignore them for not conforming to modern 
definitions is to ignore an entire facet of political rhetoric which helped to characterize, shape, 
and define half a century of war and conflict across Europe.  
To ignore these ideas in this period is also to artificially abrogate the history of national 
thinking, giving a distorted view of their developmental trajectory. The epilogue looks at how 
ideas of Germany developed and shifted over the course of the eighteenth century, while 
demonstrating how a wider perspective and acknowledgement of earlier iterations of national 
ideas reshapes what we thought we knew about modern shifts. The “national” is not a singular 
entity to be quickly fixed in a dictionary as well as in history. Rather, it is an idea, or a set of 
ideas, that has transformed and mutated numerous times already in response to historical context 
and contingency. Recognizing this longer trajectory helps us to realize that national ideas will 
continue changing in the future, as they always have in the past. As we face what some have 
called a neo-national future, this realization can help us to think critically about current changes 
and reinventions, and perhaps help us to shape future iterations of national thinking, instead of 







CHAPTER 1: FRENCHNESS & GERMANNESS 
 
National stereotypes and ideas of national character appear frequently in the early modern 
period.1 This is rarely disputed, even by proponents of the modernist national thesis, as the 
evidence is far too widespread to deny. Tables such as the Völkertafel of Styria show just how 
detailed and developed ideas of national characters could be for a wide variety of different 
“nations” in Europe (see Figure 2). These characters and stereotypes, however, have long been 
dismissed as politically insignificant in isolation from modern nationalist projects. David Bell, 
for example, acknowledged that “it hardly needs saying that national stereotypes… long predate 
the eighteenth century.”2 But for him, these pre-modern stereotypes were primarily “a simple and 
comforting way for people to come to terms with the array of human diversity.”3 It was not until 
these stereotypes became part of a larger program of nationalism that their political significance 
grew. As this chapter will show, however, that was far from the truth. In the early modern period, 
national characters functioned as evidence of state behavior. They provided a framework within 
                                               
1 The word “stereotype” is not used in the pamphlets as it is a neologism of the late eighteenth century, but I use it to 
refer to the widely held but simplified ideas of specific types of people that pamphleteers regularly employed. For 
explorations of national stereotypes and ideas of national character in the seventeenth century see Ellen Welch’s 
series of explorations on their intellectual and political significance in French court ballets, “National Characters”; 
“Dancing the Nation”; “National Actors on the Ballet Stage (1620s-30s),” in A Theater of Diplomacy: International 
Relations and the Performing Arts in Early Modern France (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017). 
See also, Krebs, A Most Dangerous Book; Leerssen, National Thought in Europe; Whaley, “A German Nation?”; 
Ruth Florack, ed., Nation als Stereotyp: Fremdwarhnehmung und Identität in deutscher und französischer Literatur 
(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2000); Tiefsinnige Deutsche, frivole Franzosen: Nationale Stereotype in 
deutscher und französischer Literatur (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler Verlag, 2001); Herbert Grabes, ed., Writing the Early 
Modern English Nation: The Transformation of National Identity in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001). 
2 Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 143. 





which to understand past actions and predict future ones. As such, pamphleteers manipulated and 
mobilized national stereotypes and ideas of national character to achieve maximum rhetorical – 
and political - impact. 
 
 
Figure 2: Völkertafel of Styria. Artist unknown, early 18th century. Volkskunde Museum Wien. 
 
This analysis of national stereotypes in the Wars of Louis XIV builds on recent research 
that emphasizes the paradoxical nature of such stereotypes: they need to be both stable and 
variable. Like ideas of nations themselves, ideas of national character need to have an air of 
permanence and primordial constancy to be believable. As such, regardless of reality, national 





nation or of an “other” more broadly, and they projected an air of permanence by appealing to 
historical and universal examples. But national characters and stereotypes must also remain 
relevant for their audiences, and therefore require flexibility. Recent scholarship on the 
psychology of stereotypic thinking emphasizes its “context-dependence.”4 That is, the content, 
valuation, and strength of stereotypes depends on the individual’s experiences, the larger social 
and intellectual context of the time, and also the immediate context within which the particular 
stereotyped group is referenced. This latter context could affect perceptions of both the “out-
group” – the foreign nation – and the “in-group” – one’s own nation.5 For example, while France 
and French culture may have been greatly admired in some contexts, anti-French pamphleteers 
could invert stereotypes of the French character by placing them in opposition to positive 
celebrations of the German.  
This chapter finds that, in the early modern era, pamphleteers ensured the stereotypes 
they mobilized were relevant to their readers, but also to their own political arguments, while 
still projecting permanent and unchanging foundations. They argued that national characters and 
their associated stereotypes stemmed from immutable influences like climate, humors, law and 
language, but they actually constructed their ideas of national character on the basis of history 
and contemporary events. Political utility, however, proved the most influential factor in which 
national stereotypes pamphleteers used and how they portrayed a nation’s character. Ideas of 
national character needed to both align with familiar tropes and support the author’s political 
                                               
4 James L. Hilton and William von Hippel, “Stereotypes,” Annual Review of Psychology 47 (1996): 238; Nick 
Hopkins and Neil Murdoch, “The Role of the ‘Other’ in National Identity: Exploring the Context-Dependence of the 
National Ingroup Stereotype,” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 9 (1999): 321–38; Stephanie 
Madon et al., “Ethnic and National Stereotypes: The Princeton Trilogy Revisited and Revised,” Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin 27, no. 8 (2001): 996–1010. See also the comprehensive overview provided by Michael 
Pickering, Stereotyping: The Politics of Representation (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 





argument. Since national characters and stereotypes were seen as predictors of a state’s political 
and military decisions, authors picked and chose which characteristics to highlight, dispute, or 
manipulate in the service of their own political aims.  
This chapter establishes the outlines of the national stereotypes common in the period and 
argues that pamphleteers used these sometimes-paradoxical ideas of French and German 
character to advocate for particular political ends in the context of repeated dynastic conflict. 
Most significantly, we see how these contemporary events in these conflicts were manipulated to 
serve as “proof” for claims of primordial, unchanging, national characters. For example, anti-
French pamphleteers in particular drew on historical ideas of Germanness, Frenchness, and 
foreign “others,” manipulated those ideas in light of the actions of Louis XIV, and deployed 
them to paint the French as naturally immoral, ambitious, and perfidious. Pamphleteers put these 
supposed national qualities to work in order to support their arguments to oppose the French. 
 
Early Modern Ideas of National Character 
 
 It is no coincidence that national characters were referred to as a peoples’ “nature” – 
these stereotypes and characteristics were projected as unchanging facts as natural as the climate 
that caused them. To be effective, they needed to be deployed as if incontrovertible and 
unchanging. To be believable, they needed to build on an air of truth, but also familiarity, 
whether real or constructed. Pamphlets discussed behaviors, traits, and characteristics thought 
“natural” to peoples as various as the Portuguese, Spanish, French, Italian, English, Irish, Scots, 
Germans, Swedish, Dutch, Poles, Danes, Turks, and Persians.6 Indeed, discussion of national 
                                               
6 Jacques de Jant, La Meduse. Bouclier de Pallas ou deffence pour la France. Contre un libelle intitulé le Bouclier 
d’Etat..., 1668, 11–12; Apologie pour les Francois. Ou verification de leur constance (Cologne: Pierre du Marteau, 
1670); Der Erfährte Hahn, oder Kurtze Vorstellung des jenigen, was muthmassentlich von dem außgang dieses 





characters was so common in pamphlets that one author even complained about the practice, 
writing “I cannot tolerate when one insults entire nations in publications.”7 Another wrote of the 
difficulties of speaking in such broad terms, explaining that when one looks closely one always 
finds exceptions and that such “general portraits” often “do not please anyone.”8 And yet, the 
same author concluded, “it is necessary to treat [these matters] universally” in order to 
understand the positive and negative qualities of a certain people.9 It was “necessary,” the author 
thought, precisely because contemporaries considered ideas of national character and national 
stereotypes crucial to understand and explain the politics of a country, and, even more 
importantly, to predict future state behavior.  
Many pamphleteers demonstrated this importance by discussing national character as 
information on par with the style of government, chief resources, or primary political interests of 
a state. In one literary pamphlet, a tutor explained to his young charge that one must learn 
everything useful about a foreign country, from “how a kingdom or a republic is ordered and 
                                               
von Teutoburg. Cassiodor. Var. III, 3. Superbiam divinitati exosam persequi debet generalitatis assensus (Freystatt, 
1678), 62–63; Curiosorum, nec non politicorum vagabundi per Europam... Das ist: Der ersten Classen Dritter 
Theil, Des in der Europäischen Welt über all zu Hause sich einfindenden, so genannten Ratio-Status... Itzo von 
neuem wohl übersehen, und nicht allein wegen der Materie, als auch mit schönen Kupffern herrlich vermehret und 
erweitert, vol. 1.3, 1678, 37–41; Curiosorum, nec non politicorum, vagabundi per Europam... Das ist: Der Ersten 
Claß Vierdter Theil, Des in der Europäischen Welt überall zu Hause sich einfindenden, so genanten Ratio-Status... 
Jetzo von neuen wohl übersehen, und nicht allein wegen der Materie, als auch mit schönen Kupffern herrlich 
vermehret, und erweitert, vol. 1.4, 1678, 34; Europäischer Glücks-Topf, oder das spielende Glücke der im Kriege 
und Frieden interessirten Souverainen Printzen von Europa... (Franckfurt und Leipzig: Christian Weidmann, 1687); 
Jean de La Chapelle, Lettres d’un Suisse à un François ou l’on voit les véritables interests des princes et des nations 
de l’Europe qui sont en guerre, 8 vols. (Basel, 1704); Dialogue entre le Marechal de Turenne et le Prince 
d’Auvergne, Dans les Champs Elysiens, Sur l’Etat des Affaires Générales de l’Europe, vers la fin de cette Année 
1710 (Cologne: Pierre Marteau, 1710), 158–59, 165–66. Pamphlet also discussed the same ideas of specific 
characters for Castillians, Liègeois, Muscovites, and Hollanders, showing once again that the existence of ideas of 
nation does not negate more local or regional levels of identification. See, Jant, La Meduse. Bouclier de Pallas, 11–
12; Send-Schreiben eines Lüttischen Edelmans, an die Herren Lüttisch, sampt einer Antwort eines Bürgers von 
Lüttisch an den Edelman, 1672; Europäischer Glücks-Topf.  
7 Jean de La Chapelle, Lettres d’un Suisse à un François ou l’on voit les véritables interests des princes et des 
nations de l’Europe qui sont en guerre, vol. 2 (Basel, 1708), Letter VII, 25. 
8 Portrait de la Nation Françoise par C.G.d.M, 1704, unpag. 1-2. 





ruled,” to “what they have for neighbors and enemies, [and] how far their power extends,” but 
also, “the people and the subjects’ natures and customs, and to what they are most inclined.”10 A 
people’s character and proclivities could be just as important for understanding that country as its 
government structure and political interests. A pamphlet written in 1687 provided an assessment 
of different states and powers in and around Europe, their histories, their current political 
interests and affairs, and their characters. The people of England, according to this author, were 
“brave… [and] proficient in manufactures… [but] their pride and laziness moderates their 
temperament.” 11 Still, the author argued, the English were the Germans’ best bet for a future 
ally.12 The people of Poland “almost exceed the Germans in drinking,” and “the nation itself is 
proud, magnanimous, knowing little of shams or dissembling,” and “in war they never lack 
courage.”13 Similarly, the Swedish “nation is honest, warlike, industrious, and knows well how 
to accommodate itself with foreigners,” but while “in war they are unflinching… their nature is 
also mixed with some savagery, which they let loose in the lands of their enemies.”14 National 
stereotypes were forwarded to determine one’s preferred allies, predict one’s behavior in battle 
and explain seemingly inexplicable atrocities. Moreover, this author, and many others, spoke 
matter-of-factly not just about different national characters, but also various examples of “hatred 
and natural aversion” between two nations.15 The Spanish and the French, the Swedish and the 
                                               
10 Der Teutsche Frantzoß, Worinne Mit sinnreichen Lehren und lustigen Exempeln gründlich vorgebildet wird, der 
Teutschen allzubegierigen Nachahmung in denen Frantzösischen Sitten, Kleydung, Sprache, Reisen, und andern 
Vanitaeten; So dann Der Nutz und Verlust, Welcher dem Römischen Reiche Teutscher Nation hierauß erwachsen, 
1682, 158–59. 
11 Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 51. 
12 Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 51. 
13 Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 108. 
14 Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 129. 





Danes, English and the French, the Spanish and the Portuguese, and of course the Germans and 
the French were all described at one time or another as having “inborn” or “deep-rooted national 
hatred[s].”16 Such beliefs would of course color interpretations of geopolitics, and perhaps even 
influence decision making. 
Since the idea of national characters was so widespread in early modern Europe and since 
pamphleteers ascribed such importance to them, historians should consider the intellectual basis 
for these characters, or the belief in these characters. Early modern Europeans built on several 
different schools of thought to explain why a particular nation or people supposedly had certain 
characteristics and not others. One of the most common was the belief in geohumoral influences 
– that climate impacted the humoral makeup, and therefore the behavior and tendencies of a 
certain people. Another was the influence of language. Different languages were believed to 
have different characters and tendencies, which were often portrayed as both reflecting and 
influencing the national character of the people who spoke that language. Finally, as 
Montesquieu would most famously explain in the eighteenth century, the influence of laws and 
style of government was important to understand and explain the character of people living in a 
certain area.  
                                               
16 Quotes from Der Erfährte Hahn, 44; Gründliche Anzeige Warum Die Krohn Frankreich in so Mächtigem Flor 
Das Römische Reich Auf Dem Falle Und Die Vereinigte Niederlande Auf Dem Verlust Durch Einen Übel 
Getroffenen Frieden Stehen. Endekket Durch Polidorum Warmund (Freiburg, 1683), unpag. 1. See also, Trajani 
Boccalini Gespräch und Discursen von Gegenwärtiger Staats-Beschaffenheit deß Heiligen Röm. Reichs, Teutscher 
Nation, und der Cron Franckreich, Nach dem zu Nimwegen geschlossenem Frieden. Auß der Warheits-Burg, 1680, 
417; Das Regiersüchtige Franckreich. Worinnen Der Europäischen Welt, sonderlich aber Franckreichs 
Regiersucht, und dahero entstehende vielfältige Kriege... &c. von langen Zeiten her unpartheyisch vorgestellet 
werden..., 1684, 34–36; Wieder-Schall Deß Frantzösischen Cabinets aus dem klingenden Pallast der sausenden 
Fama. Worinn die Anschläge der Frantzösischen Cron in allen Europaeischen Höfen... vernommen werden, 1684, 
unpag. 27; Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 129; Franckreichs hinckende, stinckende und sterbende Fama, bey seinen 
bißhero geführten unrechtmäßigen und unglücklichen Kriegen, 1705, 14–15; Schöne Raritäten einiger vornehmen 
Höfe (Geneva, 1705), 35–36; Dialogue entre le Marechal de Turenne et le Prince d’Auvergne, 157; Réponse de 
Monsieur le Marquis ***, à la Lettre qui lui a été envoyée de Valenciennes sur un Livre Intitulé les Soupirs de 





 Geohumoralism refers to the idea, widespread throughout premodern and even modern 
history, that climate affects one’s temperament and behavior. Contemporaries chiefly based this 
framework on the medical theories of Hippocrates and Galen, who posited that the physical and 
emotional disposition of a person was determined by the relative ratios of their four humors: 
blood, yellow bile, black bile, and phlegm. Excess or lack of any one humor could cause physical 
health problems, but it could also influence one’s temperament. Relative to national characters, 
the general climate of a region was thought to influence the natural balance of these humors, and 
thus the character of the people living there. This relationship can still be seen in many 
descriptive words for emotions that we use today: an excess of blood made one passionate or 
“sanguine;” an excess of yellow bile (cholos in Greek) made someone “bilious” or “choleric;” 
and excess of black bile made someone “melancholic;” an excess of phlegm made someone 
“phlegmatic.”17  
We can clearly see the belief in geohumoral influences and their links to national 
character in one detailed and thorough pamphlet from 1670. The pamphlet was entitled, Apologie 
pour les francois [Apology for the French]. To support his theory of “the conduct of the passions 
of each nation,” the author marshalled the writings of ancient authorities including Hippocrates, 
Galen, and Aristotle on the influence of climate and nature.18 As the author explained, “it is 
necessary for the soul to be subjugated to the body [and] the body to accommodate itself to the 
                                               
17 On humoral theory and its influence on temperament see, Leerssen, National Thought in Europe, 57. For a 
discussion of how Montesquieu viewed climate’s relationship to humoral theory and temperament, see Krebs, A 
Most Dangerous Book, 159–60. 





air and, since the air is always changing, all the turmoil that arrives in this small world must 
necessarily be caused, for good or for bad, by the quality of the air that we breathe.”19  
 Writing in defense of the French character and French politics, the author “reject[ed]” the 
“erroneous opinion” of his opponents that “the poor influence of the air could not have accorded 
to France the privilege of giving birth to reasonable people.”20 Rather, according to this author, 
the climate of France was so temperate that the exact opposite was true.21 He explained that, 
“there is no nation in the world in which mores are so well regulated and so constant as that of 
the French nation, as it is true that France is the most temperate region of all the earth, and that 
whichever way she turns, she finds beyond her frontiers, whether hotter or colder, the 
constitutions of countries who tend to some extremity and the humors which are carried along, 
too.”22 The temperance of the French character was caused by the temperance of the French 
climate.  
By the same logic, excessive heat or excessive cold elsewhere influenced the character of 
those peoples just as strongly. Explaining this logic launched the author on a global tour of 
stereotypes. 
In the same way that the disposition of the air of France produces such gentle effects, so 
the very great heat or the excessive cold spoils and clearly squanders all the actions of the 
soul. It is this which makes it so that all the Asiatics are soft, effeminate and without 
heart, the Africans traitorous, cunning, and barbaric, the Scythians wild, the Indians 
savages, the Chinese polite, which further makes perfidy and all other vices seem to be 
the nature of the Italian.23 
                                               
19 Apologie pour les Francois, 42. See also, [Eustache Le Noble], La Pierre de Touche Politique. Fevrier 1690, vol. 
7 (Leiden? William Newking, 1690), 8; Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 77. 
20 Apologie pour les Francois, 6. 
21 Apologie pour les Francois, 44. 
22 Apologie pour les Francois, 44–45. 
23 Apologie pour les Francois, 53–54. Climatic and other theories of difference – national as well as racial - were 
also used to underpin centuries of slavery, imperialism, racism, and persecution – especially after the addition of 






While France is treated as the ideal, extremes of bad climate everywhere else in the world 
supposedly produced equally bad effects on the character of all other categories of people.  
The author continued to pronounce upon the characters and traits of those closer to home, 
including the English, the Spanish, the Danes and the Germans. He then turned to the political 
implications of all of this information: characters suggested who could be trusted as an ally – in 
political “friendship” - and, more commonly, who could not.  
I do not believe that all of these vile qualities could persuade anyone that a Spaniard is 
capable of a sincere friendship… [their] bad habits make appear the virtue of the French, 
whose good nature, assisted by the good temperament of the air, produces admirable 
affects. Ambition, avarice, malice, suspicion… the Spaniard is a true peacock puffed up 
with pride like a poisonous toad, [but] arrogance is incompatible with friendship, the 
founding principle of which is softness and equality of mores, qualities directly contrary 
to pride… Brutal stupidity [and] disagreeable ponderousness, which are the appanage of 
the Germans, could not render them susceptible to friendship such as is desired in civil 
life. Suspicions and tyrannical jealousies and torturers of love [bourreaux de l’amour] 
and of friendship are inseparable from an Italian; whose soul is always a receptacle of all 
vices and a cloak infected with all the bad qualities which could render a man odious to 
heaven and earth. The good constitution of France exempts its inhabitants from such 
misfortunes.24  
 
France, unsurprisingly, came out the best in this description. But perhaps most interesting was 
the evaluation of England, whose vices, the author argued, were tempered by “their constancy in 
friendship.”25 This generosity is less surprising when one considers that France had been 
courting an alliance with England since the end of the War of Devolution two years prior.26  
                                               
Germans, were not politically unified in any way at this point in history, and yet come up time and time again as a 
“nation” with a particular character.  
24 Apologie pour les Francois, 59–60. It should also be noted in both of these examples that from the French 
perspective, the Italian still maintained many of the negative, immoral qualities of the “other” that the Germans of 
the time ascribed to the French. 
25 Apologie pour les Francois, 60. 
26 Indeed, the same year the pamphlet was published the two countries signed such an alliance, in secret, in June 
1670, but Lynn reports that rumors had spread by the end of the summer, with a public “cover” treaty signed in 





 Of course, the precise details of a certain people’s climate and its particular influences 
often depended upon the speaker’s perspective. For example, while this writer claimed France as 
the most temperate land, many others referred to the excessive heat of the French character. The 
French were “full of bile,” making them violent and impetuous.27 The spirits of “all French 
people” were “hot-tempered,” which explained why “they attack with great fury in the first 
blow," but lacked determination and follow-through.28 Their blood was “very heated” leading to 
an excess of “fiery lust.”29 And again, “their hot-tempered nature,” meant they were “very 
inclined towards vindictiveness.”30 To these ideas, however, the author of Apologie countered 
that though “fire is the lightest element… it is not therefore the most inconstant… but the most 
active… [and it is] this fire which makes beautiful souls.”31 Besides, he retorted, “if the 
Frenchman is full of fire, all the people of the north have a great deal of sea, they have coldness, 
                                               
27 Conference Infructueuse de Windisgratz, ou Violence de la France, à Retenir la Lorraine. Avec ces qui s’est passé 
là dessus de plus remarquable. Treuhertzige Warnung an Alle Christliche Potentaten und Stände Europae uber die 
vom Aller Christlichsten König in Franckreich bißherige gewaltsame Vorenthaltung deß Hertzogthums 
Lothringen..., 1672, 40. 
28 Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 78. See also, Wahrsagerischer Welt-Spiegel, Seiner Königlichen Mayest. in 
Franckreich... Worinnen wegen der genauer gesuchten Freundschafft und Hülffe den Krieg wider die Teutschen und 
Holländer fortzusetzen..., 1674, 23. 
29 Der Abgezogene Frantzösischen Staats-Rock, und Teutsche Schutzmantel. Das ist Der bißhero der gantzen Welt 
verkauffte, nunmehro aber redlich entlarvte Frantzösische Blaue Dunst und Deß fast schwachscheinenden 
Teutschlands Erhaltungs-Kunst, 1675, unpag. 40. 
30 Der Teutsche Frantzoß, 119. See also, Das Regiersüchtige Franckreich, 60; Das von Franckreich verführte 
Teutschland, worinnen klärlich vorgestellet wird, Wie Franckreich... Sonderlich... die Teutschen, Durch allerhand 
Ankörnungen, Galanterien, und andere ersinnliche Staats-Streiche, an sich gelocket, nachgehends verführet, und 
nicht nur um das Geld, sondern auch zum Theil um ihre Länder und Freyheit endlich gebracht, dagegen aber seine 
Monarchische Herrschafft erweitert hat (Franckfurt und Leipzig: Christian Weidmann, 1686), 86, 91–92; 
Europaeische Rath-Stube, oder Curiöse Beschreibung des gegenwärtigen Staats von Europa (Franckfurt und 
Leipzig: Moritz Weidmann, 1686), 9; Franckreichs hinckende, stinckende und sterbende Fama, 9; Curiosorum, nec 
non politicorum, vagabundi per Europam... Das ist: Der Anderen Classe Dritter Theil, Des in der Europäischen 
Welt überall zu Hause sich einfindenden, so genanten Ratio-Status... Der neulich mit Kupffern herausgegebenen und 
vermehrten Edition in allen gleich gehalten., vol. 2.3, 1679, 10; Curieuser Staats-Mercurius, welcher Der 
vornehmsten Staate in Europa weit-außsehende Maximen, Und insonderheit Den gefährlichen Zustand Deß H. 
Römischen Reichs, Allen Teutsch-gesinneten Patrioten, zu reiffern Nachsinnen, eilfertigst entdecket durch 
Fridericum Sincerum. Auff dessen eigene Unkosten., 1684, 50. 





dampness… and inconstancy… [thus] the Germans ordinarily go back on [their word]… the 
English, the Danes, the Swedes, and all the northern peoples… the Poles, the Muscovites, and 
the Hungarians are those in the entire universe who keep their word the least.”32 Thus, even 
allowing for the more heated nature of the French character, this author manipulated that idea to 
argue that the other peoples of the world were still worse off.  
While some pointed to the influence of climate in shaping national characters, others 
focused on the role of language. Languages were thought to have a direct relationship to national 
qualities and characteristics.33 An oft-repeated illustration of this was the belief that different 
languages were more suited to different tasks: “A wise man said… that if one wanted to speak 
with God, such could happen in Spanish, due to its peculiar reputation; whoever wants to deal 
with rulers and sovereigns, should employ Italian; whoever has to do with ladies and courtship, 
should use French; but, whoever wants to speak with their enemy, he should thunder along with 
the hearty German language.”34 Many authors agreed that languages both reflected the national 
character of those who spoke it and influenced that same character with the unique traits of the 
language itself.  
                                               
32 Apologie pour les Francois, 71. 
33 This was not an idea isolated to the pamphlets. See for example the debates over French or German linguistic 
superiority and their relationship to many of the national characteristics under discussion here in Harold Mah, “The 
Epistemology of the Sentence: Language, Civility, and Identity in France and Germany, Diderot to Nietzsche,” ed. 
Carla Hesse and Thomas Laqueur, Representations 47, no. Special Issue: National Cultures before Nationalism 
(1994): 64–84. In Germany an interest in language as a key factor in national identity especially developed in the 
early seventeenth century, see Krebs, A Most Dangerous Book, 129–52. It should also be noted that while there were 
many seventeenth-century language societies, especially in Germany, these languages were still not standardized in 
the modern sense, nor did anywhere near all inhabitants of France or Germany speak one unified version of French 
or German. However, along with other ideas of homogeneity and rationality in territories and populations, these 
realities were simply not seen as problems in the seventeenth century. For more on this see, Chapter 3: Mobilizing 
History and Failing the Ancestors.  
34 Die Waagschale der Frantzosen, oder das auff die Schaubühne gestellte Franckreich, darinne... dieser 
beschriebenen Nation grosse Untreue, erschröckliche Gottlosigkeit, Höchststraffbarer Meyneyd, Hochmuth, 
Tyranney, und andere dergleichen abscheuliche Haupt-Laster... Woraus der bevorstehende Untergang Ludewigs 
des XIV. oder Bösen gantz leichte zu vermuthen... Allen auffrichtigen Teutschen Patrioten, zu Liebe und Nachricht 





Political pamphlets in the Wars of Louis XIV reflect a deep belief in the role of language 
to shape national character. Learning a foreign language was often criticized, as contemporaries 
thought it likely to alter one’s character and intrinsic qualities.35 Scholars traced the linguistic 
history of a nation as one of the most important factors in explaining that nation’s identity and 
trajectory.36 In one pamphlet, for example, the author wrote that French was “not much better 
than a miscarriage of the Latin tongue” that had been “mutilated.”37 The author then compared 
the ancient “French” with their Roman counterparts, explaining “the French nation [die 
Frantzösische Nation], as they were under Roman sway, had to use the Roman or the Latin 
language, which, at times due to the quickness of the tongue, at times due to the difficulty, they 
could not grasp so clearly and completely.”38 In time, therefore, the original Latin became “so 
contracted and corrupted,” signaling of the inferiority of modern French.39 To arguments like this 
the author of Apologie retorted that change and evolution was what distinguished civilized 
beings from beasts, and also pointed out that not only Latin, but God himself – in the form of 
nature – underwent regular change.40 This author felt it necessary to rescue the French language 
from the derision of his opponents precisely because the quality of the French language was 
thought to be a direct reflection of the quality of the French character. 
Language was also often imbued with the same qualities ascribed to that nation, 
providing a reciprocal feedback loop of influence and evidence of that nation’s particular 
                                               
35 For more on the relationship between language and character see, Chapter 4: French Cultural Infiltration. 
36 For more on historical construction of the French & the Germans see, Chapter 3: Mobilizing History and Failing 
the Ancestors 
37 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 21. 
38 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 21. 
39 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 21. Another pamphleteer similarly argued that French was a corrupted 
version of German, see Die Waagschale der Frantzosen, 8. 





character. Just as the German people were praised by some for their honesty and forthrightness, 
so too was their language. Everybody could be sure of the truth of what was heard “in good 
resolute German.”41 Indeed a character in a pamphlet from 1689 knew he could implicitly trust 
another for the simple reason that he addressed the former in German.42 Pamphleteers frequently 
praised German as “such a beautiful and grave language” that matched the same character in the 
German people.43 
Anti-French pamphleteers, on the other hand, criticized French as convoluted and 
artificial, a language of dissimulation.44 An author from 1686 criticized efforts by fashionable 
people to learn “this language, made deliberately difficult and contracted,” to the detriment of 
their own “pure German mother-tongue.”45 German, this author continued, was “an independent, 
pure, brave language, more suited to serious things.”46 At the time, as is still true today, many in 
Europe praised the French language for its beauty; it was considered “much daintier and more 
concise than German.”47 But this author heartily disagreed with that assessment. Sure, French 
had its admirers, but the truth, he argued, was that “German has more daintiness, is more pure, 
and does not have so many detours in its figures of speech.”48 A writer in 1689 specifically 
criticized all of the silent letters in French, a sentiment that most students of the language can 
                                               
41 Der abgezogene frantzösische Staats-Rock, 52. 
42 Das an der Teutschen Colica Danieder liegende Franckreich, Worinnen... der merckwürdigsten Intrigues des 
Frantzösischen Hofes aufgelöset und vorgestellet werden... Durch den Mercurius im Traum entdeckt Dem 
Musastraeo dell Montunione (Freystatt, 1689), unpag. 6. 
43 Teutschlands Macht gegen Angräntzende Königreiche und Länder, Wenn es solches thun will, 1674, 14. 
44 Debates on this continued from the seventeenth through the eighteenth century, see especially Mah, 
“Epistemology of the Sentence,” 69–74. 
45 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 19, 20. 
46 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 21. 
47 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 23. 





sympathize with. The writer described how some of his contemporaries “scorn their native 
mother-tongue, which is incomparably higher than the mangled French chatter [Parlieren], in 
which one cares to pronounce in some words only one letter and in an entire line only a few 
syllables.”49 He also described French as a “feminine language,” referencing gendered ideas of 
superficiality, dissimulation, and weakness often attributed to the French character.50 A true 
“honest, hearty German needs [the French] language… not at all.”51 Other pamphlets made fun 
of French for being unnecessarily wordy and consequently those who spoke it for unnecessary 
loquaciousness. One pamphlet depicting a conversation between a Frenchman and a Spaniard 
jibed, “the Spaniard would have long broken off the Frenchman’s speech and interjected 
something, but the French mouth went so swiftly that he [the Spaniard] more than once had to 
alter his undertaking, and let the Frenchman continue.”52 The wordiness, convolutions, and 
superficiality of the French language mirrored the dissimulation, dishonesty, and frivolity of the 
people who spoke it. 
 Law comprised the third foundation often referenced by the pamphlets as a determinant 
of national character. As Montesquieu would famously argue several decades later, a certain 
state’s form of government and laws influenced the character of the people living there, and vice 
versa.53 As Hans Jakob Wagner von Wagenfels explained, “it must then follow, that a kingdom 
will never change or end, as long as the same remains [true] with the people [Volck], and, vice 
                                               
49 Die Waagschale der Frantzosen, 83. 
50 Die Waagschale der Frantzosen, 83. 
51 Die Waagschale der Frantzosen, 83. 
52 Curiosorum, nec non politicorum vagabundi per Europam... Das ist: Der ersten Class Erster Theil, Des in der 
Europäischen Welt überall zu Hause sich einfindenden, so genannten Ratio-Status... Itzo von neuem wohl 
übersehen, und nicht allein wegen der Materie, als auch mit schönen Kupffern herrlich vermehret und erweitert., 
vol. 1.1 (Nurnberg: Leonhard Loschge Buchhändlern, 1678), 69–70, also vol 1.3, 30.  
53 Charles Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel 





versa, that it will change and end in the moment when it is brought [to bear] over a different 
people [Volck].”54 As long as the people remain the same, in all of their vices, virtues, and 
characters, the government and laws, the state itself, will remain so as well. But as soon as the 
people change, or that system of government and laws is imposed on a new people, it will alter 
the entire nature of the state itself.55 
A pro-French author demonstrated this way of thinking when they celebrated the French 
character and argued that “a constant and religious observance of the laws produced such fine 
effects.”56 This author emphasized what he saw as the longevity and endurance of the French 
monarchy and praised “the Salic laws,” a legal code compiled in the year 500 by the Frankish 
King, Clovis, later used to justify the male-only inheritance of the French crown.57 These laws, 
“were born with the monarchy… [and] still endure today,” the author argued. They “completely 
retain their initial force and their vigor, and after being empowered by an antiquity of almost 
thirteen centuries, they still have such an importance that their alteration could not come without 
extreme peril and inevitable danger of the ruin and destruction of this flourishing kingdom.”58 
The author argued that these fundamental French laws were the foundation of the monarchy, the 
kingdom, and the French people. Change, especially the introduction of new and foreign laws, 
                                               
54 Hans Jakob Wagner von Wagenfels, Ehren-Ruff Teutschlands, der Teutschen, und Ihres Reichs. Durch Hannß 
Jacob Wagner von Wagenfels, rittern des Ordens Christi, der Römischen Königlichen Majestät Historicum, und 
Politicum. Cum Gratia & Privelegio Sacrae Caesareae Majestatis, Nec non cum consensu & approbatione 
antiquissimae & celeberrimae Universitatis Viennensis (Vienna: Johann Jacob Mann, Universität Buchdrucker, 
1691), 609. For more on Wagenfels and his work see, Chapter 3: Mobilizing History and Failing the Ancestors 
55 Pamphleteers would later use this same logic to argue that by not protecting their Germanness against French 
influence they were placing the entire structure of the imperial state in danger. See, Chapter 4: French Cultural 
Infiltration. 
56 Apologie pour les Francois, 22. 
57 Apologie pour les Francois, 23. 
58 Apologie pour les Francois, 23. The pamphleteer of course conveniently explains away the various upheavals 





could cause untold harm to the nation, their “nature… [and] mores.”59 The author then warned 
his audience with a parable about a society that changed its laws with such frequency that they 
“lost all of their vigor and all of their strength… so that the scorn… destroyed, and rendered 
them useless.”60 The French on the other hand, “had prudently recognized this important truth 
and the good order which they have taken to prevent all such changes, is one of the most 
powerful marks of solidity and one of the most assured proofs of their constancy and their 
steadfastness.”61 It was the French legal and political system, and its people’s adherence to it, 
that both demonstrated and assured a strong and upright national character. 
Following this same logic, other pamphleteers pointed to the influence of laws and 
governance in order to oppose Louis XIV’s conquest of new territories. As one author wrote, 
“the various languages, customs, and tempers are that which distinguishes the Germans, the 
Spanish, the Dutch and the Italians, etc. from each other and from the French, [and are that 
which] would never let them be reconciled to the rule of their King [Louis XIV] nor to be ruled 
in just one manner.”62 The language, character, and spirits of all of these different people meant 
that they could never all be ruled by one prince and system of laws, much less a foreign, French 
one. As proof, one need only look to all the trouble that Spain had in trying to rule the 
Netherlands, the author argued. Another pamphleteer asked the question of national character 
and sovereignty specifically: “you would like to know… if it would be better if in future a 
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French leader [Haupt] on the [Holy] Roman throne?”63 To this possibility the author protested 
that the French and German characters were far too different: “the French complexion, mores, 
and proclivities… [are] completely different from the German, and one can hardly tolerate the 
other,” much less trust each other.64 If a French imperial succession were to arise, such a state 
would “cause nothing but continuous dislike, discord, murder and manslaughter.”65 Having 
developed under two distinct sets of laws and governance, the French and German characters 
were simply too dissimilar to ever allow one to impose their laws on the other.  
Interestingly, unlike Montesquieu’s later thorough analysis of the laws and government systems 
of various states, almost no pamphleteers offered much detail on the subject. Their arguments 
were presented as if the reader would simply take for granted that the French and German legal 
systems were diametrically opposed, just like their national characters. This proved especially 
true as these assumptions provided a convenient argument to protest French annexation of 
German territories.  
 
Mutability of National Characters 
 
By focusing on aspects such as climate, language, and law, pamphleteers imbued national 
characters with a sense of immutability, permanence and inevitability. In truth, however, national 
characters and stereotypes were context-dependent. Pamphleteers manipulated raw material 
found in “historical” accounts to present relevant traits with an air of historical permanence. 
They also followed seventeenth century conventions on rhetorical “types,” which influenced 
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Theil, Des in der Europäischen Welt überall zu Hause sich einfindenden, so genannten Ratio-Status... Der neulich 
mit Kupfern heraus gegebenen und vermehrten Edition in allen gleich gehalten, vol. 2.4, 1680, 72. 
64 Curiosorum (2.4), 2.4:73. 





both the content and the method of stereotypic writing. Finally, ideas of national character were 
shaped by the oppositional relationship that pitted Frenchness as the inverse of Germanness. 
Thus, despite the air of immutability, national stereotypes were regularly manipulated to fit 
contemporary contexts.  
Christopher Krebs demonstrates the duality of permanence and impermanence within 
ideas of the German national character. His study of the use of Tacitus’s Germania over two 
millennia shows writers in each new era reading, and just as often misreading, Tacitus’s 
“historical” account to suit their own priorities and contexts.66 The citation of Tacitus’s ancient 
“ethnography” provided the requisite authority of unchanging permanence and familiarity, even 
as readers misinterpreted the words of the same text in ever-changing ways.  
Likewise, interpretations of Tacitus underpin many of the ideas of German character seen in the 
pamphlets.67 While Tacitus’s original text was quite ambivalent about the Germanic tribes he 
described, later writers, including pamphleteers, cherry-picked traits – often manipulating 
Tacitus’s original message in the process – to suit their own positive or negative evaluations of 
the Germans.68 Authors praised the Germans for their characteristic “loyalty [Treue],” “honesty 
                                               
66 Cornelius Tacitus was a Roman historian whose short work, Germania (98 CE), was the only comprehensive 
account extant from ancient times about Germanic peoples. As such, from the time of its rediscovery in the fifteenth 
century, through the twentieth, it was vaunted as a “history” of the German past. As Krebs shows in detail, however, 
the original work was neither about the Germans, nor even truly about the ancient Germanic peoples. Rather it was a 
summary of previous works on Germanic tribes, summarized by a Roman who likely never visited the area in order 
to be a commentary on contemporary Roman politics. Nor were these Germanic tribes at all the same as the 
Germans who inhabited the same geographic area 1,500 years later when the Germania was rediscovered. Krebs is 
very careful to distinguish between the ancient German tribes described by Tacitus, which he refers to throughout 
his work as the “Germanen,” and the “Germans” who inhabited the same territory throughout the early modern and 
modern periods. These realities did not stop later readers from treating the Germania as an eyewitness ethnography. 
They read, and just as often misread, whatever they wanted to see about contemporary Germans into Tacitus’s text 
about an entirely different era and entirely different people. A Most Dangerous Book. 
67 This is unsurprising both due to the importance the Germania held for imagining the German character from its 
rediscovery in the fifteenth century through the Nazi era of the mid-twentieth, and because the seventeenth century 
especially was mad for Tacitus, such that it has been called the age of “Tacitism.” Krebs, on “Tacitism” see 54. 





[Aufrichtigkeit],” “steadfastness [Beständigkeit],” “power [Macht],” “strength [Stärke],” 
“courage [Mut],” “virtue and valor [Tugend und Tapferkeit],” “respectability [Ehrbarkeit],” 
“godliness [Gottseligkeit],” and “integrity [Redlichkeit],” borrowing many of the qualities 
mentioned by Tacitus . In his original text, however, Tacitus described the steadfastness of the 
Germanic tribes as verging into obstinacy, and, of course, the godliness he discussed was not 
Christian piety, but devotion to Germanic pagan gods.69 Pamphleteers did not concern 
themselves with these original meanings.  
While claiming to be rooted in Tacitus, many pamphleteers also wanted to “update” the 
concerns of the original text for the contemporary context. Germans were praised again and 
again for their natural martial ethic and prowess, more Tacitean traits. But in a clear appeal to 
seventeenth century needs, pamphleteers also praised Germans for their “healthy passion for all 
arts and sciences… [and] thriving commerce.”70 Another author simply summarized his 
conclusions by stating “we are Germans/ that is:/ good people.”71 Pro-French authors, too, used 
updated Tacitean traits in order to insult the German character. These stereotypes included that 
Germans were by nature “fools [Narren],” “brute[s] [Grobianer],” “simple farmers [plumpe 
Bauern],” “awkward [Ungeschickt],” and “cowardly [Verzagt].”72 Those reading Tacitus in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries predisposed against the Germans had similarly described them 
as brutish, beastly, and barbaric.73 Writers in the seventeenth century updated these stereotypes 
                                               
69 Krebs, on the Christianization of Tacitus’s original see, 95; for a discussion of loyalty see 118-119.  
70 Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 186. 
71 Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, uber das gefährliche Hahnen-Geschrey, 1673, unpag. 6. 
72 One anti-French author appropriated the “simple [plump]” critique, signing off his pamphlet as “a simple German 
truth from an un-French simple German Simpleton [ein plumpe teutsche Warheit von einem unfranzösischen 
Plumpen Teutschen Plump],” Die unteutsche Freyheit, Oder Teutsche Gefangenschaft Etlicher Französisch gesinten 
Subtilen Teutschen, Durch Ein plumpe teutsche Warheit von Einem unfranzösischen Plumpen Teutschen Plump, 
untereinander vorgetragen, 1674.  





for their own context, recasting them in terms of prevailing modes of sociability and fashionable, 
French refinement. Barbaric became uncivilized and unrefined. At the same time, these 
stereotypes maintained the air of historical familiarity – either through direct quotation of Tacitus 
or simply through repetition of Tacitean tropes that had saturated early modern thought. Thus, 
through subtle manipulation, pamphleteers could employ Tacitus to appeal to his historical 
authority and ensure his relevance to their own time. 
Authors also mobilized the authority of “history” when describing the French national 
character. Many authors referred to Caesar, either citing or disputing his characterization of the 
French as “Gallos mobilitate & levitate ingenii novis semper Imperiis studere; that the French 
out of the inconstancy and frivolity of their dispositions again and for all time exert 
themselves… to bring new kingdoms … under their rule.”74 Some referenced other ancient 
writers, such as Livy, who supposedly spoke of the femininity of the French; or Tacitus, Florus, 
and Seneca who allegedly described the French as not naturally warlike.75 Several anti-French 
pamphleteers also quoted the sixteenth-century political theorist Christoph Besold’s (1577-1638) 
description of the French:  
It is the habit of the fraudulent French nature, that it never lacks ostensible pretexts, with 
which they take care to cover up that which they would dearly like to be set in motion… 
but [those] sincerely minded… curse those same pretexts and hold therefore that… 
through evil deceits, the mischievous knavery and perfidiousness will only make things 
worse.76 
                                               
74 Französischer Warsager, An des Heil. Römsch. Reiches Fürsten Abgeschicket dem Deutschem Leser zum bestem, 
auß dem zu Frybourg im Jahr Christi 1671. gedrucketem Lateinischem Exemplar auffs eigentlichste verdeutsched, 
und zum Druck gebracht in selbigem Jahre, 1671, unpag. 2. For an example of somebody disputing Caesar’s 
characterization see Apologie pour les Francois, 67–70. As with the Germans/Germanic tribes, it should be noted 
that the actual peoples referenced in these ancient works were in no way the same as those living in seventeenth 
century France. 
75 Französischer Warsager, unpag. 16; Eberhard Wassenberg, Arifodina Gallica, Ordinibus Imperii Romani: 
Frantzösische Goldgrube welche Den Ständen deß heil. Röm. Reichs eröffnet und Wieder verschlossen vor Augen 
gestellt wird, 1672, on Tacitus see 5-7, 20-21, on Caesar see 6, 9, on Florus see 8, on Seneca see 28, 52-53. 
76 Französischer Warsager, unpag. 2. On Christoph Besold see, Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, 






Pro-French authors, of course, picked their examples from more favorable sources. One, for 
instance, found an ancient source from the time of Constantine (272-337) referring to the ancient 
“Franks” as martial and valiant in war. Another turned to a work on Saint Hilarion (291-371), 
that supposedly wrote of the valor of the French and distinguished them from the “Saxons and 
the Germans [les Saxons & les Allemans].”77 Or, pamphleteers simply reinterpreted ancient texts 
to suit their own needs. While Caesar was a common source of negative French stereotypes, a 
pro-French author also confidently reported that “Sallust, Caesar, and Tacitus, these enemies of 
the French name are obliged to confess that loyalty has always been the natural virtue of the 
French nation [la Nation Françoise].”78 The accuracy of their use of history was much less 
important than the message it conveyed to their readers.79  
 Ancient writers, however, were not the only sources of “proof.” Many anti-French 
authors also looked to more recent history to explain the vices of the French. One author initially 
cited ancient writers as evidence that the French were weak, cowardly and lacked a martial 
nature, but then conceded that his opponents would likely “sing their usual little tune” and claim 
that these ancient accounts were outdated and illegitimate. So the author also provided more 
recent historical examples to prove that the French character had not changed.80 It was easy to 
see, he argued, “that the French in our times have not become braver than they were formerly,” 
namely that their natural cowardice and ignorance of war persisted.81 Another author, arguing for 
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the “insatiable ambition” of the French, summed up the importance of history nicely: “from this 
one can now sufficiently accept, that [the French] will no longer be satisfied with their borders, 
but rather expand the same on all sides through [all] imaginable ways; one has history before 
oneself, in which one can read and recognize… the old French… traits.”82 Ancient authors were 
the “source,” but each characteristic could also be supported with more recent examples – often 
contributing to the update of that characteristic in the process.  
The use of national characters in pamphlets also conformed to seventeenth-century 
rhetorical standards, namely that of the national “type.” The accusation against Germans for 
being naturally brutish and boorish, or “grobian,” is telling, as it refers to an early modern 
satirical genre featuring boorish, uncouth behavior.83 The entire genre of the national “type” was 
influenced by literary and theatrical standards, specifically, the emphasis on sticking to well-
defined, and thus plausible, roles. As Joep Leerssen described, “a male is like this, a female like 
that; a soldier, monk or princess comes with certain pre-programmed, stereotyped personality 
traits… and in many, many cases, the ready-made types that classified personality style were 
categorized by nationality.”84 Many of the national stereotypes used in the pamphlets fell under 
these “types”: Germans as dull and boorish, or martial and honorable; French as refined and 
worldly, or unserious and effeminate.  
But pamphleteers also borrowed the strategy of “types,” even when making newer 
accusations. They repeated again and again the same national traits until, within the literature of 
                                               
82 Der Hoch-Teutsche Reichs-Secretarius, Erwegend und überlegend die heutig-gefährliche Kriegs-Zeiten des Ober- 
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the pamphlets, one could anticipate the exact French or German “character” depending on the 
point of view of the writer. The positive German type was praised for their martial skill, their 
diligence and industriousness, for their nobility, heroism, loyalty and honesty. The negative 
German type was uncouth, unrefined, and stupid. The same is true of the French type. Positive 
depictions celebrated the French for their love of their sovereign, religious devotion, “politesse,” 
“courtoisie,” constancy, candor, temperance, vigor and generosity. But others derided the French 
for their “frivolity [Leichtsinnigkeit],” ambition, “deceitfulness [Betrügerei],” “pride [Hoffart]” 
and “haughtiness [Hochmut],” “malice [Bosheit],” “restless[ness] [Unruhig],” violence, vanity, 
impatience, “pampering [Verzärtelung],” and effeminacy.85 One author described “the constancy 
of the French through the duration of their monarchy, their solidity in the fundamental laws of 
their states, their zeal & their fervor in the holy and inviolable observance of religion, and finally 
their candor and their sincerity in treaties, in alliances, and in friendship.”86 But another painted 
the French as “more ruthless than a bear, more vicious than a lion, more poisonous than a snake, 
more fiery than a dragon, more licentious and dirty than a dog, wilder than a tiger, more false 
than a cat, more arrogant than a horse, more seething than a boar, more prickly than a hedgehog, 
more foul than a pig, more devious than a fox, [and] more thieving than a wolf.”87 The positive 
                                               
85 To take just one example, the concept of Leichtsinnigkeit or Leichtfertigkeit, which I translate as “frivolity” and 
was a critique in anti-French pamphlets, was also considered a central, though positive, attribute of Frenchness 
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Historical Review 106, no. 4 (2001): 1215–35. 
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un-menschliche, ja! fast über-teuffliche Frantzosen, in Sachen, wie innen ausführlich gemeldet, 1689, unpag. 5-6. 
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French type was loyal, but also civilized and refined. The negative was perfidious, vain, and, as 
another author wrote, “among all the peoples of Europe, who bear the Christian name, no nation 
[Nation] is more ambitious, haughty and arrogant than the French.”88   
What emerges from placing the positive and negative French and German “types” next to 
each other is how often the negative traits are simply inversions of the positive.89 The Germans 
were often praised for their honesty, forthrightness, and lack of affectation. But these same 
qualities when viewed negatively become the unrefined, rustic simplicity that led to them being 
called brutish and “crude farmers.”90 Similarly, stereotypically “French” qualities were often 
manipulated and inverted. Among many other critiques in the pamphlets, there were three that 
appeared often and together: the French were liars, atheists, and libertines.91 In addition to being 
generally negative critiques of immorality, these specific qualities were also context-dependent 
inversions of positive traits associated with fashionable ideals of sociability in France – politesse, 
galanterie and honnêteté.92 In the second half of the seventeenth century especially, a new 
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90 See the critiques repeated in the anti-French Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 3. See also the anti-French 
pamphlet Die unteutsche Freyheit.  
91 For a more detailed exploration of these three critiques see, Kirsten L. Cooper, “Liars, Atheists, and Libertines: 
The Politics of Dishonor in the Wars of Louis XIV,” Journal of the Western Society for French History 44 (2016). 
92 For more on these concepts see, Peter France, Politeness and Its Discontents: Problems in French Classical 
Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alain Viala, “Les Signes Galants: A Historical 





culture of sociability emerged, and quickly spread throughout Europe, which emphasized ideals 
of civility that required one to avoid serious subjects of conversation and remain always 
lighthearted and pleasing. Even in France, however, this raised anxieties about where politesse 
ended and falsity or superficiality began.93 If the honnête homme must always please, it is 
perhaps easiest to do so by lying and dissimulating. And how would a German, an outsider to 
these modes of civility, know the difference? Ideals of galanterie prized pleasing sociability with 
women. Unsurprisingly, this could easily be inverted to slavish seduction, womanizing, and 
libertinism.94 Sexual licentiousness was supposedly so widespread in France, according to anti-
French pamphleteers, that a case of syphilis was simply referred to as having caught “the French 
galanterie.”95 Finally, this lighthearted, false, libertinism of honnêteté and galanterie acted also, 
in inversion, as proof of French atheism. One author simply described Paris as a “horrifying 
mass of atheists.”96 God and religious devotion were far too serious subjects for the honnête 
homme to concern himself with.  
Of course, the French liars, atheists, and libertines were also always portrayed in 
opposition to the honest, devoted, and honorable Germans. In reverse, the uncivilized and brutish 
Germans were always portrayed in contrast to the civilized and refined French.97 The importance 
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93 On the inherent fragility of these concepts, see especially Louis C. Seifert, Manning the Margins: Masculinity and 
Writing in Seventeenth-Century France (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009). See also the discussion of 
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of an “other” in the historical creation of identities is well known.98 In fact, many of the negative 
stereotypes of the French also operated as general critiques of a foreign “other” that had 
“wandered” from the Italians in the sixteenth century to the French in the seventeenth, as the 
latter became a more important national “other” to the German consciousness.99 France’s 
perfidious untrustworthiness was constantly portrayed in opposition to “German faithfulness,” 
“German candor,” and the “honest Germans.”100 Where the French were supposedly weak by 
nature, the Germans were strong. Where the Germans were simple idiots, the French were 
worldly and well-educated. Whereas the Germans were “uncouth,” “the French nation [nation] 
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[was] without blemish.”101 These oppositions ran so deep at times that they extended to the realm 
of petty absurdity, such as the section in Wagenfels’ work where he claimed that even German 
windows were far superior to French ones.102  
This opposition was so important that, for many pamphleteers, Germanness was 
increasingly defined in opposition to Frenchness. In the words of one author, proud of “being 
German by birth,” he later exclaimed that “all of my glory is from not being French.”103 On the 
other hand, numerous anti-French pamphleteers reported that in France, calling somebody a 
“German” was a slur and an insult: “when the French want to describe a witless, boorish and 
pusillanimous person, they call them a German, and when they themselves do something 
awkward, it is already the habit to say j’ay fait comm’ un Alleman, that is, I have acted like a 
German.”104 In other words, when a Frenchman was acting unrefined and ungraceful, 
uncharacteristically un-French, they were said to be acting like a German.  
These oppositions also applied to the gendered valences ascribed to the French and 
German national characters. Of course, within the patriarchal societies of Europe, masculinity 
was imbued with numerous positive connotations, and femininity the opposite. Thus, it is no 
surprise that in the mass of anti-French pamphlets the brave, martial, honest, forthright Germans 
                                               
101 Apologie pour les Francois, unpag. preface iv-vi. The author of this pamphlet continues to praise the French in 
oppoisiton to Germany, as well as England and Spain, throughout the work.  
102 Wagner von Wagenfels, Ehren-Ruff Teutschlands, 58. 
103 L’orateur françois, unpag 1, 6. Interestingly, the pamphlet was written in French, about which the author 
explained, “Fully German as I am, I have undertaken to lay down my sentiments… in the French language,” so that 
“this nation,” France, will understand “the truth,” unpag. 4-5. Emphasis added. See also the proudly “un-French” 
author of Die unteutsche Freyheit. 
104 Teutsch-lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungsrede, unpag. 19. The same insult is referenced in Teutsche Wächter-
Stimme, unpag. 6; Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 52; Frantzösis. Ratio Statûs, oder Rasender Staat deß 
Ehrsüchtigen ruch verlohrner Lilien Königs, Beruhend Auff 43 Grund-Säulen... der von ihm dermalen in lauter 
Confusion und Unruhe gesetzten gantzen Ehrbaren Welt... entdecket und vorgestellet von Teutschmann von 
Waremund, 1702, 20.A pamphlet published c. 1675 celebrated an imperial victory over the French with a quick 





were hailed as beacons of masculinity while the lighthearted, overly refined, fashion-obsessed 
French were denigrated as feminine. But this gendered dichotomy extended even further to the 
gendered valences of the national stereotypes themselves. Many of the characteristics negatively 
attributed to the French nation were traits coded feminine. Dissimulation was one of the most 
important “feminine” traits thought endemic to the French character.105 But they were also often 
criticized for relying on “feminine” tactics such as bribery, espionage, and sowing discord and 
disunity, instead of winning their battles outright through masculine bravery in open war. 
Pamphleteers painted Louis XIV’s diplomacy as particularly representative of the French gender 
imbalance, wherein he resorted to using actual women to achieve his diplomatic goals when his 
soldiers failed. The French were both more likely to use unacceptable ‘feminine’ methods and 
more likely to need to. 
As other scholars have noted, simply thinking of one’s own national character in relation 
to another can have an impact on the content, value, and strength of the stereotypes brought to 
mind.106 By placing negative Frenchness always in relation to positive Germanness, anti-French 
pamphleteers especially primed their readers to feel pride in being German and derision towards 
being French.107 This of course made their national accusations more believable, but also helped 
achieve the underlying goal of trying to convince readers not to trust and to fear French 
intentions. Ideas of national character may have been dressed in trappings of immutability, but 
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especially in the context of political pamphlets, authors selected and manipulated stereotypes 
based on their ultimate political and rhetorical utility. 
 
Political Utility: The Case of Louis XIV 
 
 The context in which the present political pamphlets emerged was that of the belligerent 
reign of Louis XIV. Thus, the Sun King himself, unsurprisingly, acted as one of the biggest 
contextual influences. Anti-French pamphleteers combined ideas of the French character, 
projected as historical and natural, with critical and slanderous evaluations of Louis XIV to 
portray him and the French people as perfidious, ambitious and bloodthirsty. This was then used 
to justify political and military resistance to the French. If national characters were evidence to 
explain and predict state behaviors, then all evidence pointed to France being an untrustworthy 
ally that would stop at nothing to achieve its expansionist ambitions.  
 There were plenty of personal critiques and slander hurled at Louis XIV throughout his 
reign, but the Sun King was also criticized as a national exemplar. This may seem surprising if 
one considers the national as necessarily democratic and thus opposed to dynastic monarchy, but, 
as will be seen throughout the following chapters, in this period, dynasty and nation were often 
inextricably intertwined.108 Between his massive armies and larger-than-life self-promotion, 
Louis XIV cut a very imposing figure on the European stage, and he earned more than his fair 
share of personal criticism for it, both domestically and internationally. 109 Critics accused him of 
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insatiable ambition, warmongering, irreligiosity, tyranny, licentiousness, and of trying to create a 
universal monarchy, among much else. These personal failings were then extrapolated and 
applied to the French nation as a whole. Dynasty and nation were elided such that Louis XIV’s 
behavior became both evidence and example of the French national character. In one pamphlet, 
the author discussed at length the vices and faults of “King Louis the Evil,” and then exclaimed 
“when the head is sick, so at the same time the rest of the body cannot be well.”110 For the vices 
of Louis XIV, the head, and the vices of the French, the body, were one and the same. After his 
long discussion of Louis XIV’s misdeeds, the author explained, “from these examples, found 
from among so many hundreds of others, will the sympathetic and German-minded reader be 
able to easily accept, what is to be had from the French nation in general and what an honest 
German can expect from this evil and unfaithful people [Volcke].”111 Louis XIV was a terror 
because he was a Frenchman and the French were terrors because of Louis XIV. 
 This elision between dynasty and nation was also common in the pamphleteers’ 
mobilization of historical “proofs” of the French character. The actions or traits of past 
monarchs, just like those of Louis XIV, then also became both example and evidence for the 
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“deep past” of the French national character. One pamphleteer explained that “Germany had 
experienced more than enough” of French cunning and deceit, from Henry II to Louis XIII, both 
of whom pursued their own expansion and aggression under the guise of protecting protestant 
interests.112 Another writer traced France’s current power and maxims back to Catherine de 
Medici, showing how they had continued through every ruler to Henry IV, Louis XIII, and the 
Sun King himself.113 Numerous pamphlets pointed to Louis XIII’s involvement in the Thirty 
Years War as proof that no German should ever trust the French.114 These dynastic “lineages” 
proved, so pamphleteers argued, that whatever vices they traced were hereditary in the French 
dynasty, just as they were natural in the French nation. 
The most common critique of the French drawn from contemporary and historical 
“sources” was that they were completely untrustworthy in every way. The first facet of the 
perfidious French’s untrustworthiness was in alliances. Anti-French pamphleteers emphasized 
contemporary and past examples of French falsity in their alliances, pointing especially to times 
in which Louis XIV had been less than faithful to his word. Through this, pamphleteers played 
up alleged French national characteristics of deception, ambition, and perfidy in order to 
persuade German princes of the folly of trusting them. It was tempting, especially in the early 
years of the Wars of Louis XIV, for German princes on France’s borders to seek alliance or 
neutrality in conflicts.115 But, pamphleteers warned, while France’s offers seemed tempting, they 
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promised “unity merely of mouth; in [their] hearts however, war is secretly and cunningly 
waged.”116 Even a seemingly beneficial alliance was just another way for France to infiltrate and 
overpower the empire. As one author from 1672 explained about Louis XIV, “let him be an 
example to the Germans… that one can vanquish one’s enemies much better with deceit as with 
open warfare.”117 Such alliances, the author claimed to know from first-hand experience, “are 
spurned as always [being] to the detriment of the Germans, but to the greatest advantage of the 
foreign ruler.”118  For, after all, it was the “ordinary custom of France,” to “embrace their friend 
with one hand, and murder with the other.”119  
This behavior was all part of the French character, these pamphleteers insinuated. It was 
those natural French qualities of “frivolity [Leichtfertigkeit]” and “cunning [Listigkeit],” their 
inability to hold to their word and their supreme selfishness, that made them incapable of acting 
as honorable allies and led them inevitably to seek their own benefit from every situation. Louis 
XIV’s unending quest for personal gloire was a perfect illustration of this national trait. As one 
pamphleteer phrased it, “the French party would keep a promise, only as long as it did them 
good.”120 Moreover, the natural civility and politesse of the French meant that they would speak 
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sweetly to your face and then stab you in the back a moment later. Even in the early years, 
contemporary evidence of this perfidy from Louis XIV abounded. He invaded the Spanish 
Netherlands in contravention of what the Spanish saw as a legitimate treaty. He attacked German 
territories along the way despite professing to maintain their neutrality. He then concluded peace 
with the Dutch in 1668, only to prepare over the next four years to ruthlessly attack the 
Netherlands (which he did in 1672). 
All of these actions reinforced the image of the perfidious French character that 
pamphleteers mobilized. Using all their galanterie, the French might convince a naïve and 
unsuspecting German that they are “sincere and honest chaps” and that they “would share with 
you the heart in their chest, so very willing are they in the performance of their duty.”121 Indeed 
it may even appear impossible “to find a nation [Nation] in the world, which should equal them 
in civility.”122 But “this foolish delusion” was precisely what the French counted on to carry out 
their deceptions. And the “straightforward Germans,” fell for such ruses and “held the vain 
shadow of French civility for the very light of the clearest sincerity.”123 But this was simply 
“French perjury and unfaithfulness in their words and actions,” and it was this flaw in their 
character that meant “one should in no way either trust nor believe them.”124 Indeed by 1705 a 
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pamphlet simply stated, “Whoever believes France’s word,/ Is robbed of their sanity.”125 While 
in reality it was the political word of Louis XIV they referred to, his actions had become stand-
ins for his entire nation. 
This untrustworthiness was exacerbated by the “natural” ambition of the French for 
expansion, conquest, war and conflict. A common refrain in the pamphlets was that France was 
perfectly capable of maintaining alliances, just not with those on its borders: “the French have 
friends, but not as neighbors.”126 These bordering neighbors – conveniently the very same who 
would be most inclined to ally with or tacitly support France’s policies - presented targets too 
tempting not to undermine, invade and eventually conquer. France’s appetite for conquest was so 
insatiable that one pamphlet explained, “the Frenchman would have stopped being a Frenchman, 
when his bottomless, land-hungry stomach let itself be satisfied.”127 Indeed, another pamphleteer 
explained, “the ambition of France is a fire that cannot be extinguished.”128 And “this maxim,” 
the author continued, was “rooted in France, and is the inheritance of Clovis the Great.”129 While 
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many accused Louis XIV of aspiring after a personal universal monarchy, one pamphleteer wrote 
of France, “this uneasy and overambitious nation [Nation] looks to obtain dominion over all 
lands, seas, yes even over the great ocean itself.”130 Louis XIV was merely the epitome of the 
French people, writ large. 
It was not even the end result of conquering foreign lands that seemed to drive the French 
character, the argument went, but the mere act of pursuing war and conflict. As early as 1668, 
one pamphlet cited as common the argument that the French needed “to always maintain foreign 
war, and to exercise their youth at the expense of their neighbors.”131 Another pamphlet simply 
stated that “the spirit of the French is to be uneasy & [an] enemy of peace.”132 Still a third 
employed the geohumoral theories discussed above to explain that since “the French nation 
[Nation] is mercurial… they never sit still when they could instead make war; rather they must… 
have a foreign enemy, against which they can let out the excess and fiery blood.”133 
Pamphleteers used this supposed natural affinity for war and conquest to argue that their readers 
should not trust any agreement made with France, even a peace treaty. Rather, peace was just 
another ruse that the deceitful and ambitious French used to prepare the ground for their 
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inevitable next strike. The French lulled their opponents into a false sense of security and used 
the breathing room this provided to build up their capabilities and pursue their interests in other 
perfidious ways. These warnings increased during the 1680s, in the aftermath of the Franco-
Dutch War and while Louis XIV pursued a variety of other interests in less-straightforward 
ways.134  
A pamphlet published in 1680, shortly after the end of the Franco-Dutch War, presented a 
very evocative scene. The protagonist entered a Roman temple decorated with weapons and 
shields to see a number of beautiful, but bedraggled and injured, women sitting inside, 
awkwardly perched on unstable chairs.135 This temple, the protagonist learned, was the Temple 
of Peace, and the wounded women were the recently concluded separate peace treaties from the 
Franco-Dutch War, all seated around the Peace of Westphalia, by far the most severely 
injured.136 These separate peace agreements, each concluded as Louis XIV successfully 
dismantled the alliance formed against him, already sat on shaky foundations, the pamphlet 
showed, just waiting for one push to topple over completely.137 Indeed, also found in the temple 
were a group of doctors ready and anxious to treat the first, inevitable “Contravention Disease 
[Contraventions-Krankheit]” to emerge among these brand new treaties.138 For it was only a 
matter of time before France injured and violated the new peace treaties as much as they already 
had the Peace of Westphalia. 
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Indeed, by 1680, Louis XIV had arguably already done so. Shortly after the conclusion of 
the Peace of Nijmegen (1678), Louis XIV began forcibly annexing territories along the imperial 
border based on questionable legal claims and his own defensive interests.139 To onlookers it 
seemed that peace had been concluded just in time for France to continue making grabs for 
territory under the legal claim of “reuniting” what “rightfully” belonged to it. This prompted a 
pamphlet written in 1680 to exclaim that “peace was the noblest good in the world, and the 
legitimate end to all wars,” but only “when it is a sincere and enduring peace.”140 When, on the 
other hand, “one arms oneself anew for war,” as France was doing, “one creates with the peace 
only a mockery.”141 Instead, this pamphleteer argued, “it would have been much better… [to 
have] rather continued the war, until the enemy had been brought so far, that he himself much 
more clamored for peace, as allowed it.”142 Germany, and Europe, would be far safer having 
destroyed France entirely than they would ever be suffering a false peace with such an ambitious 
and insatiable enemy. Since they had not, they were stuck in the “unfortunate state at present, 
that one… must search to make peace in peace itself.”143 In other words, that France continued 
its policies of expansion and conquest even in the midst of ostensible peace. 
The French policy of “reunions” reached a climax with the forcible annexation of 
Strasbourg in 1681. One pamphlet remarked that it was as if France “could not or would not… 
allow… European Christendom stable peace and repose.”144 France simply could not rest easy 
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without conflict and conquest and so, despite the treaties it had just signed, it turned its sights to 
further expansion. Spain, backed by the Holy Roman Emperor, declared war on France for these 
reunions in 1683, resulting in a short conflict concluded by the Truce of Ratisbon in 1684. As 
part of this truce, France retained most of the territories it had seized as reunions, but it also 
committed to a twenty-year cessation of hostilities. Almost immediately, pamphleteers decried 
the truce and urged readers in the empire not to trust France’s empty promises; their perfidious 
and ambitious character would never allow it to last. A pamphlet published in 1685 was titled 
Teutschland Traue nicht zu viel. Das ist Was das Röm. Reich Teutscher Nation, bey jetziger Zeit, 
sich… von denen Frantzösischen Messures was zu besorgen habe: Ob dem Armistitio zu trauen? 
(Germany, Trust Not Too Greatly. That is, What the [Holy] Rom. Empire of the German Nation 
in the Present Time… Has to Worry from French Measures: Whether the Armistice is to be 
Trusted?)145 The author’s answer to the last question was a resounding no. Another author 
writing the same year exclaimed, “you err splendidly, [if] you think that France will hold this 
cessation [for] five years, never mind twenty? I say no.”146 The peace, this pamphleteer 
continued, was just a contrived gesture on the part of the French to appear supportive towards the 
Pope and Christianity in the face of the Turkish invasion. But really, it simply provided time in 
which Louis XIV could prepare his armies to further pursue his interests with impunity.147 
Deceit, betrayal, and self-interest were all that one could expect of the French nation. 
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In the end, this author turned out to be quite prescient, as just four years after signing the 
truce, France overran the Palatinate in a “defensive” move that would spark the Nine Years War. 
Thus, were so many predictions based on projections of French ambition, perfidy, and deceit 
seemingly proven true. After the truce was broken, one author wrote of the French, that “the 
stupid dogs, [have] no reason for such barbaric fury, as the truce has been held hard and fast on 
the side of the H. Rom. Empire.”148 But, “one trusted the Most-Christian [Monarch], [and] 
overlooked everything,” and thereby “left him free” to pursue his new schemes.149 Juxtaposition 
with the honest, true, and stalwart Germans highlighted even more strongly the nefarious, 
dishonorable and untrustworthy behavior of the French. While the rest of Europe believed in the 
integrity of the French word and “through the supposed truce just sat in safety,” this meant that 
“France… just got more air, in order to arrange everything within its kingdom, so that afterwards 
with even greater power outside its country [it could] implement its apparently wide designs and, 
if it were possible, would force all of Europe under its sway.”150 The negative national 
stereotypes that had been hurled at France during the Franco-Dutch War were now more 
effective after they were seemingly proven true.151  
With each new event used as supporting evidence, pamphleteers expanded on the base 
stereotypes of untrustworthiness and ambition. The French were accused not just of 
warmongering, but of being naturally violent and bloodthirsty. One pamphlet described the 
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“barbarous Louis XIV… and his inhuman, yea! almost worse-than-demonic French.”152   They 
did not just seek their own benefit during conflicts, they perpetually pursued their own goals to 
the detriment of others through sneaky means such as bribery, espionage, and using women as 
agents of foreign seduction. So powerful did these national stereotypes become, and so 
seemingly reinforced by events, that pamphleteers began to connect even events unrelated to 
France in a grand Franco-centric conspiracy. 
Between persecution of French Huguenots and the violent invasion of the Palatinate, 
pamphlets from the 1680s especially hurled accusations of bloodlust and brutality at the French. 
French troops were described as “barbaric soldiers [Kriegsfolck],” and “a swarm of incendiaries, 
murderers and villains, like entire clouds full of scorpions.”153 Pamphlets lamented “French 
deceitfulness and savagery.”154 One rebuked “bloodthirsty French ambitiousness,” exclaiming 
“what about the French for an ambitious, vindictive, bloodthirsty and arrogant people 
[Volck].”155 Another accused the French of “Schadenfroh,” malicious glee in the pain and 
suffering of others.156 The French were not victorious through “manly courage and bravery,” one 
pamphlet wrote, alluding to stereotypically German qualities, but their nation “was made 
formidable” through their “tyrannical cruelty to other nations [Nationen].”157 These pamphlets 
detailed numerous horrific atrocities allegedly committed by the French, of course often 
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emphasizing their mistreatment of the “innocent” women and children as proof of how far 
beyond the bounds of accepted behavior they were.158 Several pamphleteers revisited historical 
examples to prove that bloodthirstiness was a natural trait of the French.159 One author argued 
that “the memory of the atrocities,” of the “bloody” St. Bartholomew’s Day, “has been imprinted 
and left behind forever in the spirit and temper of this country’s descendants.”160 The French 
were compared to a chimaera because they possessed the “traits” of each “evil” part of the beast, 
“which is clearly to be seen in the savage rage they have committed, their bestial lechery and 
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lasciviousness, and their poison-filled malice.”161 This pamphlet even directly referenced one of 
the classic French stereotypes – frivolity – and turned it into another symptom of 
bloodthirstiness. Such were not the acts of “true heroic bravery in war,” but rather “an 
incendiary, murderous frivolity [Leichtfertigkeit], or a quickly cooling dimwitted audacity [bald 
erkaltende Tumm-Künheit].”162 
When they were foiled in their bloodthirsty plans at outright conflict and warfare, 
however, the French were not above reverting to more underhanded means. Their ambition, 
pamphleteers argued, was so great that they would do anything, no matter how dishonorable, to 
achieve it. The French under Louis XIV did indeed engage heavily in the common contemporary 
practice of providing subsidies to allies. But to the pamphleteers, each of these subsidies became 
bribes with which the French were buying influence and discord in Germany.163 The treachery of 
such a tactic could apparently not be overstated.164 As one author wrote in 1673 addressing the 
recipients of these bribes, “Judas the Betrayer, was a horrid villain, you, however, are still almost 
worse. He betrayed his Lord for 30 silver coins, you however are not content with 30,000 
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guilders.”165 With such “traitor-wage[s]” France was able to pursue its interests in Germany and 
the rest of Europe by letting its “gold bribed” allies do its dirty work.166 One author even 
included a table listing out the supposed payments that the Sun King made to such allies, from 
Germany to Spain to Turkey, Poland, and the Papacy in Rome (see Figure 3). The alleged total 
reached a shocking 481 million tons of gold. This table brought attention to the sheer amount of 
money Louis XIV was supposedly sending to courts across Europe, but it also highlighted the 
perfidy of such a tactic. The French were simultaneously buying off the Ottomans, dreaded 
“enemy” of Christianity, and the Pope, head of the church to which the Sun King owed his 
“Most Christian Monarch” moniker.167 Moreover, their bribery extended from England and 
Spain to countries as disparate and far away as Croatia, Moldova, and the Tartars. More than 
simply the amount of gold involved, the sheer extent of recipients was irrefutable evidence of 
France’s embrace of bribery for political gain as the amount of gold involved. Louis XIV had 
“achieved more through subterfuge than through bravery, and more through gold than through 
weapons.”168 The French were bloodthirsty and warmongering on the one hand, and cowardly on 
the other.  
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Figure 3: Expenditures of the French King to Foreign Courts. From Der Abgezogene 
Frantzösischen Staats-Rock, und Teutsche Schutzmantel… (1675), unpag. 16. The table features 
the “general expenses” that Louis XIV sends to foreign courts including 70 million in Germany, 




There was of course nobody better to execute and secure the influence of all of these 
bribes than French spies, carefully placed in all the capitals and courts of Europe.169 Everybody 
from French ambassadors, servants, and priests to French dance-teachers, language-instructors 
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and wig-makers were accused of working in a grand cabal to ferret out secret affairs of state and 
spread pernicious French interests among unsuspecting courtiers.170 One pamphlet asserted that 
the French strategy of espionage was as simple as sending “people who are robust and who can 
handle [their] wine” to foreign courts as once “the wine begins to work, one says well the things 
that one keeps quiet at other times; as the proverb says In vino veritas.”171 Others proposed far 
more complicated strategies. One of the most interesting was Louis XIV’s supposed use of 
women as spies and agents. As a pamphlet in 1686 warned, “Note how through such binding nets 
of love the souls of great lords, indeed entire families, [are] conquered; bound to the crown of 
France, as long as it serves [France’s] interest; and through such French ladies, who with their 
bewitching caresses frequently figure out the most secret things [and] will betray many important 
affairs and state matters.”172 Indeed, pamphleteers argued that, in France, manipulation of “the 
holy bond of matrimony,” was a central maxim of state.173 With their “caresses and imploring 
manners,” hypersexualized and licentious “French dames,” who “understand well the webs of 
discord,” could infiltrate the most intimate spaces of political power in any European court.174 
                                               
170 Teutsch-lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungsrede, unpag. 15; Der abgezogene frantzösische Staats-Rock, unpag. 
6-7; Threnemann, Der Französische Mord-Brenner, 23; Hanß Knorr, 41–68; Franckreich schäme dich!; Das von 
franckreich verführte Teutschland, 18; Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 81; Das wiederrechtlich von Franckreich 
gebrochene zwantzigjährige Armistitium, 34–35; Teutschlandes Politischer Fliegen-Wedel wider die Französische 
Mucken. Erstertheil., 1689, 44; Raisonnement. Reiff-Erwogenes Staats-Bedencken, Wie Beede Cronen Franckreich 
Und Schweden Unter Dem Praetext Der Im Instrumento Pacis Ihnen Überlassenen Garantie Dem Römischen Reich 
Höchstnachtheilige Dinge Foviren... Gemacht Und Fortgesetzet Worden (Staatsburg?, 1676), unpag. 5-6. On a pro-
French pamphlet defending against these critiques of espionage see, Fayolle, Le Paravent de la France, 13–15. 
171 L’Esprit de la France et les Maximes de Louis XIV. Decouvertes à l’Europe (Cologne: Pierre Marteau, 1688), 28. 
172 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 16. 
173 Der Erfährte Hahn, 30, also 31. See also, Raisonnement, unpag. 4; Gründliche Anzeige Warum Die Krohn 
Frankreich in so Mächtigem Flor Das Römische Reich Auf Dem Falle Und Die Vereinigte Niederlande Auf Dem 
Verlust Durch Einen Übel Getroffenen Frieden Stehen. Endekket Durch Polidorum Warmund, unpag. 8-9; Hanß 
Knorr; Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 16–18; L’Esprit de la France, 31, 72, 101–2; Europäischer 
Glücks-Topf, 28–31; Das Blätlein wendet sich, 10. 
174 Teutsch-lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungsrede, 15; Französischer Warsager, 5. See also, Das von franckreich 
verführte Teutschland, 78–87. There is an interesting related critique of Louis XIV that emerges later in his reign, 





What makes this particular critique so interesting is that in early modern Europe, diplomacy and 
politics were thought to be exclusively masculine spheres. The reality of female political power 
was regularly denigrated as an inversion of the “natural” order of society, a dangerous and 
undesirable upheaval of the status quo.175 By asserting that women were at the very center of 
Louis XIV’s politics, pamphleteers mobilized ideas of “seductive” and “cunning” feminine 
influence, which further supported the characterization of the French as an effeminate nation. 
These women, the pamphleteers argued, gained access to the most intimate spaces of male 
sovereignty and used their feminine and sexual powers to turn princes towards French interests 
and sow disunity in Europe. Deception and dissimulation were already coded feminine in the 
seventeenth century, making even the use of male spies a “feminine” tactic. But the accusation of 
female agents multiplied the effeminacy of French strategies even further. French armies, 
normally one of the highest symbols of masculinity and strength, only succeeded because they 
had spies, and female spies at that, preparing the way. 
The image of France as a perfidious nation who would stoop to any level to achieve its 
goals combined with the fears of the legitimate power of Louis XIV. This combination meant 
that France was accused of secretly masterminding everything bad that happened in Europe. As 
one author explained, “the French nose must be stuck in every single hole.”176 One pamphlet, 
entitled Frankreich schäme dich! [France, Shame on You!] purported to be a “secret and 
                                               
Rabenach], Halt Frantzmann!, 8–11; Schöne Raritäten, 21; Dialogue entre le Marechal de Turenne et le Prince 
d’Auvergne, 16–17. 
175 See Chantal Thomas, The Wicked Queen: The Origins of the Myth of Marie-Antoinette, trans. Julie Rose (New 
York: Urzone, 1999); Dena Goodman, Marie Antoinette: Writings on the Body of a Queen (New York: Routledge, 
2003); Katherine Crawford, Perilous Performances: Gender and Regency in Early Modern France (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2004); “Constructing Evil Foreign Queens”; Carole Levin and Alicia Meyer, “Women 
and Political Power in Early Modern Europe,” in Ashgate Research Companion to Women and Gender in Early 
Modern Europe, ed. Allyson M. Poska, Jane Couchman, and Katherine A. McIver (New York: Routledge, 2016), 
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unexpected discovery of the… very wicked… counsels of the French at almost every European 
court.”177 Pamphleteers argued that the French needed “to be part of all sorts of affairs, left and 
right, and to arbitrate everywhere, by force or by skill, by authority or by surprise, by threat or by 
friendship.”178 As belligerents, as allies, as mediators, or as secret supporters, the French were 
accused of being responsible for everything from the actions of the English monarchs to the 
Ottoman invasion, and always trying to cover their tracks.179 French fashion was even argued to 
be a concerted ploy to drain the coffers and steal the spirits of unsuspecting Germans.180 Granted, 
in many cases Louis XIV or his agents were involved in these events, but pamphleteers portrayed 
France as being secret puppet masters, spinning their webs and controlling everything bad that 
happened in Europe. One pamphleteer even accused the French of intentionally orchestrating the 
infertility of Marie Louise d’Orleans, wife of Charles II of Spain, to ensure the Spanish line 
would die out and Louis XIV could therefore claim the throne for France.181 And all of this was 
done unapologetically, according to the pamphleteers. After an extended discussion of French 
intrigue and espionage throughout Europe between a German and an English character, a 
Frenchman, speaking clumsy German, nonchalantly replied to their allegations: “So eez good… 
our monarch, ee loves zee trahison [treason] and not zee traitors.”182 
                                               
177 Franckreich schäme dich! 
178 Jant, La Meduse. Bouclier de Pallas, unpag. preface x-xi. 
179 Des neulich-verkleideten ietzo abermahl in der Welt verschickten Götter-Bothen Mercurii, fortgesetzte 
Erzehlung, worinnen er, nach durchgewanderter Welt, die wichtigsten Discoursen, Muthmassungen, und 
Meynungen, so bey denen Teutschen, als einigen Benachbarten des Welt-Theils Europä begriffenen, und in jetzigem 
Kriege mit-interessirenden Höffen und Ständen, unter vornehmen und geringen Standes-Persohnen vernommen, der 
Welt zum Nachricht abermahl entdecket, und verlässet, 1674, 76.  
180 For more on this see, Chapter 4: French Cultural Infiltration. 
181 Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 28.  
182 Hanß Knorr, 68. While the English and Dutch characters in the pamphlet have no problem conversing in 
German, all of the Frenchman’s dialogue was written in a comically thick French accent, as further mockery of the 





This monarch was certainly guilty of some of the accusations leveled against him, but 
many of the pamphlets did not focus on Louis XIV’s personal responsibility for the conflicts of 
his reign. Instead they extrapolated his personal vices and combined them with stereotypes of the 
French nation until everything he did became proof of natural French perfidy, ambition and 
bloodthirstiness. The French nation, pamphleteers argued, was so untrustworthy, that even 
seemingly unrelated crises were undoubtedly part of their evil master plan. The only way to 
guard against French malevolence was to abjure them altogether; to forsake French alliances and 




Partisan political pamphleteers within France and the Holy Roman Empire used national 
stereotypes for their political or cultural utility, in response to current events and contemporary 
developments. But they also successfully draped them in an air of immutability and permanence. 
They found it far easier to make a claim about the inherent character of a people when it could be 
made to look old. Thus, they appealed to history and recycled familiar characterizations while 
manipulating these ideas to fit new circumstances. But, this was only useful as long as those 
stereotypes remained relevant. The most important litmus test to the precise contours of a 
national character remained political utility.  
Since the early-modern era has been deemed a pre-national age, scholars have long 
dismissed the significance of early modern national pride, patriotism, and especially ideas of 
national character and national stereotypes. They were seen as politically insignificant ideas, and 
therefore historically insignificant ideas - ideas that scholars at most, and still problematically, 





modernity of ideas of nation, but it is simply not true. What we see in these pamphlets is that 
national stereotypes could serve specific political and rhetorical ends. But, in what may seem like 
a paradox to some, these ends were usually dynastic in nature. This is not, however a reason to 
discount the role that national characters played, and the work they accomplished, in the early 
modern period. As the next chapter will show with reference to patriotism, it is important to 
understand the specific early modern valences of these ideas in all their specificity in order to 







CHAPTER 2: PATRIOTIC DUTY TO NATION AND EMPEROR 
 
In 1673, as Louis XIV’s troops continued to rampage seemingly unopposed through the 
Netherlands, an anti-French pamphleteer explained that the imperial powers must cultivate “a 
good patriotic spirit [Gemüt]” towards each other, only then could they fully destroy “the roots of 
disunity” and successfully oppose French aggression.1 As discussed above, due to the weighty 
influence of the modernist thesis of nations, most scholarship has shied away from ascribing 
political significance to early modern ideas of nation. This has not been the case, though, for 
early modern patriotic rhetoric. But what distinguishes the two?  
Even in the modern era it is difficult, in practice, to draw a clear distinction between 
national and patriotic, though many have tried. Lloyd Kramer provides a good working 
distinction between national and patriotic.2 He describes “national narratives” as those which 
“affirm unique, collective identities by stressing that each national population differs from the 
people and cultures in all other nations,” (e.g. the Germans are different from the French). 
Patriotic ideas, in turn, express “emotional identifications with particular places, communities, or 
governments,” (e.g. the Holy Roman Empire and kingdom of France; the Habsburg emperor and 
French king; the fatherland and the patrie). But many also impose a qualitative distinction: 
nationalism is associated with xenophobic, illiberal extremism - loyalty to an ethnic community - 
while patriotism is considered a more inclusive, rational, palatable form of loyalty to a civic 
                                               
1 Der Hoch-Teutsche Reichs-Secretarius, unpag. 32. 
2 Lloyd Kramer, Nationalism in Europe & America: Politics, Cultures, and Identities since 1775 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 
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ideal.3 As Caspar Hirschi described, nationalism is often treated as “patriotism gone bad.”4 This 
theoretical distinction implies a difference in activity. Nationalism is more extreme, more 
strident, more likely to lead to conflict or atrocity in the name of the ethnic nation, while 
patriotism is more restrained, more rational and controlled. In the early modern period this 
spectrum of activity is shifted. If nationalism - the active program of constructing a nation-state 
or achieving specific claims on behalf of one –is purely modern, then pre-modern claims of 
loyalty or emotional attachment to a country or state must of necessity be the opposite: passive.5 
And since modern nationalism has been treated as the only possible manifestation of national 
ideas, then these earlier passive examples must require a different term. Here enters the 
theoretically less-problematic idea of early modern patriotism, perfectly suited to a pre-national 
age of dynastic monarchy.6 
                                               
3 The moral and political connotations of these concepts are still wielded and debated today. See for example one 
response to Donald Trump’s self-description as a “nationalist” in an October, 2018 rally, Michael Brendan 
Dougherty, “Nationalism Is Loyalty Irritated,” National Review, November 21, 2018, 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/nationalism-definition-loyalty-irritated/. 
4 Hirschi, The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany, 22. 
5 See for example the way that David Bell distinguishes between the two terms, one as an “attachment” (passive) 
and the other as a “program” (active), Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 20. 
6 As discussed above I agree that the project of nationalism, like the term itself, is modern, and do not condone the 
application of it prior to its own historically-specific context. But many other iterations of national ideas and 
national thinking have and continue to exist outside of specific nationalist programs. See, Introduction. Ironically, 
while there has been much discussion over the anachronicity of applying terms like national and nationalist to the 
early modern period, there has been little debate over the equally anachronistic use of patriotism in that era. In 
France the terms patriotism and patriote did not appear in official dictionaries until 1762. In Germany, too, the terms 
patriotisch and patriotismus emerged only in the eighteenth century, though pamphleteers often referred to 
“patrioten.” As with the root of the concept of nation, there was always some ambiguity in the root meaning of 
patrie or Vaterland.6 Both were undeniably associated with a geographical territory – the land of one’s father - and 
while this could refer to a local city or region, by at least the sixteenth century it could also mean the totality of the 
kingdom (in France) or the empire (in Germany). See, Jay M. Smith, Nobility Reimagined: The Patriotic Nation in 
Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 7; Peter R. Campbell, “The Language of 
Patriotism in France, 1750-1770,” E-France 1 (2007): 11; Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, Volume 
I: Maximilian to the Peace of Westphalia, 1493-1648, 1:13; Philippe Alexandre and Jean Schillinger, eds., Patriotes 
et patriotisme en Allemagne du XVIe siècle à nos jours (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 2015), 6. 
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In considering the reality of the early modern period, however, this distinction between 
early modern, passive patriotism and modern, active nationalism falls apart for two reasons: 
early modern patriotic and national ideas were regularly intertwined, and they were both used to 
encourage active mobilization and political action. As Jay Smith points out, the eighteenth-
century French neologisms patriotism and patriote derived from much older ideas of “amour de 
la patrie,” which implied a passive love of one’s homeland but also an active commitment to its 
well-being and future.7 Jean de la Chapelle evocatively described this duality in a pamphlet from 
1703. He began by explaining that he always thought of “l’amour de la Patrie” as a purely 
intellectual concept, “nothing but a pretty idea more suited to inspiring thoughts of the mind, 
than sentiments of the heart.”8 After hearing of recent disquiet and agitation in his own 
homeland, however, he experienced an entirely different reaction: “I feel, I confess finally, that 
this love, which has caused so many great things to be said and done, is less, if it is permissible 
to speak so, a light of reason than an instinct of nature.”9 When his patrie was in danger, 
embroiled in controversy and uncertainty, a protective instinct set aflame his amour de la patrie. 
Anti-French pamphleteers similarly mobilized this sense of defending an embattled patrie, of 
serving, protecting, and doing one’s duty to the Vaterland, to encourage active participation in 
Wars of Louis XIV. 
 This chapter shows that patriotic ideas in the Holy Roman Empire were regularly twinned 
with national ones, such that the former cannot easily be separated from the latter. Pamphleteers 
regularly used this twinned patriotic-national rhetoric to argue for active resistance against the 
French and, in this precise historical moment, were able to appropriate ideas of patriotic duty and 
                                               
7 Smith, Nobility Reimagined, 7. 
8 La Chapelle, Lettres d’un Suisse, 1708, 2:Letter IX, 70. 
9 La Chapelle, 2:Letter IX, 71. 
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link them with Habsburg interests. Imperial patriotism in the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries had often been deployed against the Habsburgs amid religious conflict and struggles 
over imperial power dynamics. With the very real external threat of Louis XIV, however, anti-
French writers defined “patriotic” as pursuing unity with the Habsburgs.  Pamphleteers praised 
imperial princes who fought the French alongside the emperor in terms of fulfilling their patriotic 
duty to Germany and empire, and scolded those who did not as traitors to the fatherland. These 
examples show that it is not as simple as dividing an early modern patriotic era from a modern 
national one. Nor is it fair to classify early modern patriotic ideas as passive “attachments” in 
contrast to modern, nationalist activity. Moreover, understanding the ways in which 
pamphleteers connected and mobilized patriotic and national ideas to serve a pro-Habsburg 
position helps to explain the unique power and authority that Leopold I was able to build in the 
empire, an authority that many of his heirs would try and fail to regain. Ultimately, the 
association of the Habsburg emperor with Germany and the German interest grew so strong that 
pamphleteers could play on this notion of imperial unity to laud the actions of loyal princes while 
shaming others who sided with France or sought neutrality. During the Wars of Louis XIV, 
pamphleteers defined ideas of patriotic and national duty as active support of the emperor in 
resistance to French threats.  
 
Patriotic Ideas as National and Active 
 
Since it has generally seemed less problematic to discuss patriotic ideas in the early 
modern period, there have been some excellent studies done on the topic.10 Because these studies 
                                               
10 In addition to those cited above see Christoph Prignitz, Vaterlandsliebe und Freiheit: Deutscher Patriotismus von 
1750 bis 1850 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981); Hélène Dupuy-Brégant, “Le Roi Dans La Patrie,” Annales Historiques 
de La Révolution Française 284, no. 1 (1991): 139–57; Edmond Dziembowski, Un Nouveau Patriotisme Français, 
1750-1770 : La France Face à La Puissance Anglaise à l’époque de La Guerre de Sept Ans (Oxford: Voltaire 
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have generally conformed to the modernist taboo on discussing anything national prior to the 
eighteenth century, however, patriotic ideas (often unintentionally) become just another 
precursor to modern nationalism. It was a sentiment suited to an early-modern age of personal 
rule by kings, queens and princes that narrowed into nationalism as the demands and 
discontinuities of the modern era imposed themselves. But patriotic sentiment was much more 
than simply an antecedent to modern nationalism, just as today it is more than a toned-down 
version of the same. The political pamphlets published during the Wars of Louis XIV reveal how 
patriotic ideas were understood and used in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
but also show how pamphleteers manipulated ideas of patriotic and national duty to serve their 
own political arguments. Patriotic and national ideas were completely intertwined, with the 
rhetoric of each more often than not simply used interchangeably. Using this patriotic-national 
rhetoric, pamphleteers mobilized active resistance against Louis XIV, even unto death. Finally, 
pamphleteers couched this resistance in ideals of German and imperial unity, which they 
primarily defined as supporting the Habsburg emperor.    
Many pamphlets played up ideas of patriotic duty as love for the state and nation as well 
as an active call to war against the state and nation’s enemies. Indeed, the simple act of writing 
these pamphlets, according to some authors, was a fulfillment of their duty to serve and protect 
their fatherland. The embrace of patriotic rhetoric can be seen almost at first glance in the sheer 
number of pamphlets who used patriotic pseudonyms. Pamphlets were purportedly written by “a 
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true German patriot,” “a true-German-patriotic Medico,” “German Man of True-Mouth,” or 
“Bonfidio Tuiskon.”11 In these pamphlets authors also described their motivations for writing in 
patriotic language. An author in 1711 declared his work as evidence of “the world-renowned, 
honest, German spirit of the Herr author, who most eagerly seeks to convey not only the well-
being of the serene House of Austria, through the salvation of his beloved fatherland, but also the 
general welfare and peace of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation [Nation], through 
the sacrifice of property and blood.”12 A second author, Hans Jakob Wagner von Wagenfels, 
wrote his work “with the comforting assurance, that all true born Germans would happily take up 
my zeal for the fatherland.”13 A third author ended his pamphlet in 1689, signing off on behalf of 
“the many thousands of Germans” who had been wronged by the French.14   
Pamphleteers presented the concept of patriotic duty – their own and others’ - as self-
evident. One example from 1673 began by describing love of the patrie as a sentiment as natural 
as religion and filial devotion: “Deeply planted by the universal mother of nature… in every 
single people [Volk], however savage they may otherwise be, is fear of their God: reverence for 
their princes or regents: love of their fatherland: devotion to their parents.”15 Writer after writer 
                                               
11 Ludovicus der XIV. König in Franckreich, Als ein Flagellum Dei zur Warnung vorgestellet. Von Einem getreuen 
Teutschen Patrioten, 1673; Die Entdeckung deß unter dem Fuchs hervor-gläntzenden Wolffs-Peltzes; Frantzösis. 
Ratio Statûs; Der Hoch-Teutsche Reichs-Secretarius. The latter, Bonfidio Tuiskon, is a play on the legendary 
ancestor of the German people, Tuiskon.  
12 Memoires pour la Franche-Comtée. Oder: Ohnmaßgebliche Erinnerungen, an Ihro Kayserliche Majestät, das 
gesambte Heil. Römische Reich Teutscher Nation, und Deroselben Hohen Aliirten, Auf daß die Franche-Comtée von 
der Frantzösischen Ober-Herrschafft möge erlöset werden. Sambt bey gedruckten Vorstellungen Der 
Frantzösischen Nation, wegen des Circular-Schreibens ihres Königs de anno 1709. übersetzt und notirt durch 
Medeum Prothasium Seeperg, Chrysopolitam, 1711, 2. 
13 Wagner von Wagenfels, Ehren-Ruff Teutschlands, preface, unpag. x, also xiv. For more on Wagenfels and his 
background see, Chapter 3: Mobilizing History and Failing the Ancestors.  
14 An die... Majestät Himmels und der Erden, unpag. 6. 
15 Teutsch-lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungsrede, unpag. 1. This hierarchy of devotions is, unsurprisingly for the 
seventeenth century, reminiscent of Roman civic virtues which valued public service over personal interest. See, 
Krebs, A Most Dangerous Book, 41. 
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reminded their readers of this natural, patriotic love and their responsibility to fulfill their “duty 
owed to the fatherland.”16 Nothing about these ideas of patriotic duty was presented as new, 
surprising, or even something that may have been unfamiliar to readers.  
Authors rarely drew a distinction between the patriotic and the national, rather conflating 
emperor, empire, and Germany. Regardless of the realities of linguistic and cultural diversity in 
the empire, not to mention its own shifting borders, there was a clear overlap between concepts 
of Germany and the empire. The conceptual association between “imperial” and “German” had 
been set as early as the late middle ages.17 In the pamphlets of the late seventeenth century, 
“Germany [Teutschland]” and “Empire [Reich]” were often used interchangeably. For example, 
a pamphlet written in 1675 featured a rousing patriotic speech given by an Austrian delegate to 
the Reichstag. This delegate rallied his fellows to right “affairs in the empire” by countering the 
French with their “German bravery” and thereby protecting the “liberty” of the “German nation 
[Teutscher Nation].”18 Another critiqued French attempts to woo the Swabian Kreis, an imperial 
jurisdiction, to their side, explaining the French were “not so unexperienced with the German 
state,” that they did not know how important “Swabian strength” was to “Germany’s power.”19 
In other pamphlets, the association between the German nation and the institutions of the Holy 
Roman Empire were simply indivisible. Wagenfels, for example, wrote about the history of the 
imperial crown, explaining 
So even though the German Empire was led progressively by Franconia, Saxony, Swabia, 
and Luxembourg, and today is led by the most illustrious Austrian archdukes, so it still 
always remained and remains the same German monarchy, in the same consideration that 
it has been brought not from one people [Volck] to another, but rather only from one 
                                               
16 Der Teutsche Frantzoß, 41. 
17 Scales, The Shaping of German Identity. See also, Chapter 3: Mobilizing History and Failing the Ancestors. 
18 Curiosorum (1.1), 1.1:4. 
19 Die Entdeckung deß unter dem Fuchs hervor-gläntzenden Wolffs-Peltzes, unpag. 5. 
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branch to another. Note the Franconians, Saxons, Swabians, Luxembourgers, Austrians, 
all together are called Germans and as Germans are recognized.20  
 
Here Wagenfels referred back to the various medieval dynasties that had ruled as Holy Roman 
Emperors prior to the Habsburgs. The history of the imperial crown, as far back as the very first 
Holy Roman Emperor, was the history of the German crown. Regardless of which princely house 
possessed the imperial title, all were German and collectively ruled the German empire. Many 
other authors simply combined the two into one concept, referring to the “German empire,” or 
using “fatherland” and “Germany” interchangeably.21 As a pamphlet from 1675 exclaimed, “Ah 
pay heed my fatherland, you… illustrious Germany.”22 In another pamphlet, from 1689, the 
protagonist was shown a scene of violence and destruction meant to recall Louis XIV’s 
destruction of the Palatinate at the outset of the Nine Years War. Upon viewing the scene, the 
protagonist expressed his shock that such actions had occurred in his homeland and exclaimed, 
“What? My fatherland?... in Germany?”23 Other pamphlets simply referred explicitly to “German 
patriots [Teutsche Patrioten].”24 In the rhetoric of these pamphlets there was no distinction 
between being a patriot and being German, no division between duty to the patria and duty to the 
                                               
20 Wagner von Wagenfels, Ehren-Ruff Teutschlands, 608. 
21 Wagner von Wagenfels, preface, unpag. xiv. 
22 Der abgezogene frantzösische Staats-Rock, 43. 
23 Das an der Teutschen Colica, 44. See also, Die Entdeckung deß unter dem Fuchs hervor-gläntzenden Wolffs-
Peltzes, unpag. 2. 
24 Teutsch-lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungsrede, unpag. 4, 10,  21, also in title; Frantzösis. Ratio Statûs, 20; 
Flagellum Dei, 91, also in title; Teutscher Abschied, Für die Herren Frantzosen, 1674, unpag. 2; Der Verkleidete 
Götter-Both, 51; Die unteutsche Freyheit, unpag. 23; Der abgezogene frantzösische Staats-Rock, unpag. 1; 
Curieuser Staats-Mercurius, welcher Der vornehmsten Staate in Europa weit-außsehende Maximen, Und 
insonderheit Den gefährlichen Zustand Deß H. Römischen Reichs, Allen Teutsch-gesinneten Patrioten, zu reiffern 
Nachsinnen, eilfertigst entdecket durch Fridericum Sincerum. Auff dessen eigene Unkosten., in title; Das neugierig 
und veränderte Teutschland, 241; Die Waagschale der Frantzosen, in title; Mars Orientalis et Occidentalis. Das ist: 
Eine kurtze jedoch warhafftig- Historische Erzehlung, Sr. triumphierenden Römisch-Kayserlichen Majestät 
Leopoldi I. des Berechten gegen die Unchristen in Orient... und Ludovici XIV. der Tyrannisirenden Königs in 
Franckreich... barbarische Einäscherungen so mancher schöner Städte und Flecken am gantzen Rhein- und Neckar-
Strom, und viel andere unterschiedliche Proceduren..., 1689, 102; Franckreichs hinckende, stinckende und 
sterbende Fama, 13. For a French language example see, L’orateur françois, 29. 
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nation. Instead, writer after writer appealed to a twinned national and patriotic understanding to 
appeal to “every sincere, German-minded patriot” and convince them that protection of and 
service to the empire was protection of and service to “our dear fatherland of the German nation 
[Nation].”25 In the rhetoric of the pamphleteers, there was no distinction between patriotic duty 
to the empire and national duty to Germany. 
Patriotic rhetoric in these pamphlets was no mere reflection of passive emotional 
attachments; it was an active attempt to rally audiences to war.  Scholars recently have begun to 
recognize that, despite its many complications, the empire was actually quite an effective 
institution when it came to military defense.26 Armed conflict in the second half of the 
seventeenth century resulted from some combination of bilateral treaties between individual 
princes and the Emperor or a foreign power; leagues or associations of various imperial powers; 
or a declaration by the Reichstag of an imperial war (Reichskrieg), which would prompt the 
creation of an imperial army (Reichsarmee). Each of these options resulted in a different 
constellation of contributions, subsidy payments, and layers of authority and command, and were 
dictated as much by internal imperial political jockeying as by external threats. The era of the 
Wars of Louis XIV saw numerous attempts, and some progress, in terms of reforming imperial 
defense policies and streamlining the process of mobilizing the empire, but still each conflict saw 
the practical need to renegotiate who would contribute, how much, and under what auspices. 
Briefly, the empire needed to be convinced before it went to war. To do so, it was necessary to 
make the case that the present conflicts were more than dynastic squabbles, but held significance 
                                               
25 Mars orientalis et occidentalis, 102; Der Hoch-Teutsche Reichs-Secretarius, unpag. 58. 
26 On specifics of imperial defense and post-Wesphalian military reforms see, Whaley, Germany and the Holy 
Roman Empire, Volume II: The Peace of Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich, 1648-1806, 2:7, 29–30, 34–37, 
39–42, 44–46, 48–50, 54–55, 97–98, 113–15, 118, 234–40. 
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for the Empire as a whole. Patriotic and national ideas were useful for this task. They could 
appeal to all members of the empire by presenting conflicts as threats not to one or another 
territorial prince, but as attacks on Germany and Germanness.27  
Pamphleteers most often couched patriotic ideas in rousing, spirited calls to action. A 
particularly interesting example from approximately 1673 was published anonymously, with no 
imprint or date, titled Voice of the German Watchman, about the Dangerous Cry of the Rooster 
[Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, uber das gefährliche Hahnen-Geschrey].28 The content of the 
pamphlet was formatted as an extended poem and read like a very polemical, public oration. The 
pamphlet began, “Wake up! Wake up!/ You brave, unafraid Germans!”29 The author then 
embarked on an evocative discussion playing on the emblematic associations of France (rooster) 
and the empire (eagle).  
The rooster has, for a considerable time brandished its wings, 




has made in the Netherlands great terror, 
[has] opened cities and fortresses, 
and uncovered many traitors. 
GERMANY, 
do you want to let yourselves fall asleep again to the rooster’s crow? 
Should your children, who under the protection of the 
mighty eagle, sat until now in peace and 
quiet, 
                                               
27 For more on this see, Chapter 3: Mobilizing History and Failing the Ancestors; Chapter 4: French Cultural 
Infiltration. 
28 Teutsche Wächter-Stimme. 
29 Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 1. For similar rhetoric see also Französischer Warsager; Zu denen H. 
Römischen-Reichs Fürsten Abgesandter Französischer Wahrsager; Der abgezogene frantzösische Staats-Rock, 
unpag. 43; Friderich Funcke, Triumfirender Lorbeer-Krantz, mit welchem der Gerecht-Kriegende und Gnädigst-
Siegende herr und Gott Zebaoth, den Durchläuchtigsten, Hochgebohrnen Fürsten und Herrn, H. Georg Wilhelm 
Hertzogen zu Braunschweig und Lüneburg, durch Ritterliche Uberwindung des Fürsten Crequi und glücklichen 
Eroberung der Chur-Fürstlichen Residentz-Stadt-Trier, als einen Tapffern und Keyser-Treuen Creiß-Obristen, 
Glücklich beehret und rühmlich beschencket hat... (Lüneburg, 1675), unpag. 1; Die Waagschale der Frantzosen, 




quarrelsome rooster be controlled, led and ruled?  
Do the roosters in their own manure pile not have 
enough to eat, [that] they should still come into the 
[Holy] Roman Empire?30 
 
By 1673, all of Europe had observed what the rooster, France, was capable of, through Louis 
XIV’s repeated depredations in the Netherlands. The writer appealed to a collective Germany to 
reflect upon and question their own interests with regards to France. Did they want to be victims 
to Louis XIV’s armies like their Dutch neighbors? Did they not appreciate the peace and 
prosperity that the empire –  the “mighty eagle” – provided for them? Surely, they would not 
prefer to be ruled by such a “quarrelsome rooster.” The fate of the Netherlands was undeniably 
against the interest of Germany, went the logic of this pamphlet. Only lethargy kept the empire in 
the throes of inactivity. “Stand up! Stand up!/ You lethargic heads [Häupter],” the writer 
declared, “and listen to the sincere/ VOICE OF THE GERMAN WATCHMAN.”31 
Patriotic appeals in anti-French political pamphlets of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century even went so far as to advocate for something considered much more modern: 
sacrificing one’s life in service to one’s country. Numerous pamphlets appropriated the Roman 
poet Horace’s words, “dulce et decorum est, pro patria mori,” in order to argue for the most 
active of patriotic sacrifices: laying down one’s own life.32  A 1673 pamphlet, urged its readers 
to support war against France for their actions in the Netherlands. This pamphlet, also published 
anonymously, was titled  Teutsch-Lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungs-Rede, an seine untreuen 
                                               
30 Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 1. Emphasis in original throughout. 
31 Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 1-2. 
32 For background on this concept and its connection to early modern patriotic and national ideas see, Beaune, Birth 
of an Ideology, 298–302; Eva Piirimäe, “Dying for the Fatherland: Thomas Abbt’s Theory of Aesthetic Patriotism,” 
History of European Ideas 35 (2009): 194–208; Hirschi, The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from 
Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany, 50–77. 
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und verrätherischen Kinder, sambt beyfügung einer Aufmunterung der redlichen Teutschen 
Patrioten zu Ergreiffung der Waffen wider des Kaysers und des Reichs in demselben der Zeit 
tyrannisirende Feinde [Germany’s Speech of Grievance, Punishment, and Rebuke, to its Untrue 
and Treasonous Children, with the Inclusion of an Appeal to the True German Patriots to Take 
up Weapons against the Currently Tyrannizing Enemy of the Emperor and the Empire]   
According to this author, war with France was unavoidable. He therefore urged, “up, all true 
German patriots, up, up, your liberty is on the line, let no danger deter you from preserving it.”33 
To quell any such misgivings, the author then exhorted his readers to “think, quod pro Patria 
mori honestum fit.”34 And, in case there was any confusion as to his meaning, or perhaps for 
those readers not as familiar with Latin, the author continued with a rousing poem to further 
explain: 
To the hero stays the glory: he knows infallibly, 
if he, through battle, sheds his blood for the empire, 
and valiantly strikes the enemy, that he earns great praise  
from the entire German people [Volk], [whether] he lives, or dies. 
It must be risked. A feminine mind [Weiber-Sinn] feels pain, 
when it worries about death, for a brave heart 
all fear and trepidation vanish: then he who goes to battle, 
he knows… 
fear is pointless.35 
 
 A true hero, this author reminded, knows his duty and the sacrifices it requires. To do anything 
less would be to disappoint the empire and German people, to show himself to be effeminate, 
weak, and unworthy of the “fire, love of danger, and great passion for weapons” that made up the 
German character.36 “Therefore you, my loyal and honest German children,” the author 
                                               
33 Teutsch-lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungsrede, unpag. 21. 
34 Teutsch-lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungsrede, unpag. 21. 
35 Teutsch-lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungsrede, unpag. 21. 
36 Teutsch-lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungsrede, 21. 
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continued, do what you know to be your duty and “seize the rightful weapons of defense.”37 One 
year later, also amid the Franco-Dutch War, an author asked “and who should not be happy… to 
extend the last drops of blood… for the fatherland against foreign tyranny.”38 Two decades later, 
in the midst of the War of Spanish Succession, another author voiced almost the same question 
to his readers. “Is it possible,” this writer asked, “to display a greater proof of your loyalty, than 
when one risks his health and life for the fatherland?”39 
Reinforcing the importance of active measures as part of patriotic duty, several writers 
criticized what they saw as inaction in the face of France’s past and continuing threats as Louis 
XIV’s power reached its zenith following the Franco-Dutch War.40 Many accused their fellow 
countrymen of being unwilling to endure the hardship and dangers of war in order to protect their 
fatherland. These writers took death for one’s country as the gold standard of patriotic sacrifice, 
of which their contemporaries were sadly falling short. In 1680 a pamphlet criticized the officers 
and generals of the imperial army for being corrupt and self-serving. The writer’s greatest 
accusation was that it was difficult to find an example of one willing “in true earnestness, to die a 
praiseworthy death for the empire, the emperor, or the fatherland.” Here the intertwining of these 
categories – state (empire), head of state (emperor), and nation (fatherland) – is clear. Each are 
recognized as distinct, and yet each is overlapped such that service to one is a service to them all. 
After this critique, the writer concluded, therefore, that “the universal love for the fatherland is 
almost entirely extinct.”41 The author praised the Romans for having epitomized the patriotic 
                                               
37 Teutsch-lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungsrede, unpag. 22. 
38 Die unteutsche Freyheit, unpag. 31. 
39 Schöne Raritäten, 16. See also, Politische Considerationes, unpag. 24-25. 
40 For more on the political climate of this decade see, Chapter 4: French Cultural Infiltration.  
41 The author praised the Romans for having epitomized the patriotic ideal, “und allerley Arten deß Todes umb der 
Liebe deß Vatterlands willen erlitten.” Trajani Boccalini Gespräch und Discursen, 423, 424. 
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ideal, “and willingly suffered all manner of deaths for their love of the fatherland.”42 The 
Germans, once, had demonstrated such “valiant heroes’ courage”  and “with disdain for death, 
and setting aside of all danger, had fought for the wellbeing of the empire.”43 But alas, their 
heroism seemed to have run dry in the face of Louis XIV. Merely two years later another 
pamphlet also voiced such dismay, claiming that contemporary German youth had no desire to 
fight or die for the empire. In this author’s words, too many young Germans, even military 
officers, “measure… their dulce & decorum in their purses, and do not search for pro Patria 
mori.”44 Just so in 1685 a writer lamented that “love of the fatherland” had, “to date, so 
noticeably cooled,” that “Dulce et Decorum est, pro patria mori, is quite forgotten and unlearned 
among us Germans.”45 This propensity to criticize an aversion for patriotic sacrifice reinforced 
the ideal itself and its political and national connotations. Patriotic ideas were rife in anti-French 
pamphlets, where they were both constantly intertwined with ideas of the German nation and 
mobilized to encourage active military resistance and war against the French. 
 
 
The Habsburgs & Imperial Unity 
 
Patriotic rhetoric was not new in the Holy Roman Empire, nor for that matter ideas of the 
German nation, but the purposes for which pamphleteers deployed these ideas were. Towards the 
end of Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, the author turned once again to his compatriots to rouse them 
                                               
42 Trajani Boccalini Gespräch und Discursen, 424. 
43 Trajani Boccalini Gespräch und Discursen, 424. For more on projections of past German virtue as a contrast to 
contemporary failings see, Chapter 3: Mobilizing History and Failing the Ancestors. 
44 Der Teutsche Frantzoß, 112, also 7–8, 238. 




not only to action, but to unity. “Stand up! Stand up!/ You German heroes, and lovers of the 
fatherland,” he called.46  
Oh, you dear fellow countrymen! 
Call back the former, enduring, German loyalty 
and honesty! 
Loved and practiced, favored unity! 
Have pity for the misery standing before you! 
Have pity for the fatherland, soon to be lying in mortal danger  
and dying!  
Have pity for your noble and invaluable liberty! 
Have pity for your conscience! 
The wellbeing of the people [Volck], 
the safety of the empire, 
should be the most noble law.47  
 
“I say this,” the author insisted, “not out of hate against the foreigners,” but “out of love for the 
Germans.”48 Writers of anti-French pamphlets mobilized patriotic-national rhetoric to encourage 
unity – specifically unified military action against Louis XIV. What makes patriotic rhetoric in 
this precise moment of history unique, is how pamphleteers defined national and imperial unity: 
as supporting the Habsburgs. Pamphleteers encouraged “pro patria mori,” but they meant “pro 
imperator mori.” 
For centuries, writers, thinkers and political leaders mobilized patriotic rhetoric in the 
empire, but it had far more often been used against the Habsburg emperors. What German 
humanists had originally mobilized against Italy and Rome, became “the core of ideological 
resistance” against Roman Catholicism, and combined with the vocabulary of “German liberty” 
to oppose the supposedly despotic aims of the Catholic, Habsburg emperors from 1520 through 
                                               
46 Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 13. 
47 Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 13. 
48 Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 7. 
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the Thirty Years War.49 In the Thirty Years War especially, France had often encouraged this 
anti-Habsburg patriotism as a useful benefit to its own interests. In the post-Westphalian era of 
the late seventeenth century, however, conflict in Germany shifted from largely internal to 
largely external. The empire needed to defend itself, not least against France.50 As Joachim 
Whaley described, “external threats posed questions of loyalty and identity; they demanded 
commitment and solidarity.”51 This change allowed Habsburg agents to regain control of 
patriotic and national ideas and to promote Leopold I as the answer to these new demands. The 
fact that Leopold I and his supporters were able to reclaim imperial patriotism and mobilize it for 
their own gain against France is a remarkable testament to both the success of Leopold I’s tenure 
as emperor and the extent to which Louis XIV’s France was recognized as a threat.52 
Pamphleteers supported this new perspective by firmly linking imperial and German interest 
with the Habsburg position. Germans needed to do their duty to protect the fatherland, the 
empire, against foreign incursion, which meant joining with the emperor to actively resist Louis 
XIV. 
 Leopold I was a remarkably capable emperor, particularly in terms of his navigation of 
the complexities of imperial politics. But he, like his French adversary, knew the importance of 
spectacle and self-fashioning. As Jutta Schumann has explored extensively, Leopold I was in 
many ways “the other sun” of Europe.53 Whether due to his own propaganda sponsorship, the 
                                               
49 Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, Volume I: Maximilian to the Peace of Westphalia, 1493-1648, 
1:116, 328–29, 465–74. See also, Schmidt, Spanische Universalmonarchie oder “teutsche Libertet.” 
50 Martin Wrede also discusses the impact that conflicts with the Ottoman Empire and Sweden had for pamphlet 
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52 On the reign of Leopold I see Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, Volume II: The Peace of 
Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich, 1648-1806, 2:5, 8–9, 27–102. 
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success of the same, or simply his own immense popularity and success, there is an entire body 
of pamphlets celebrating Leopold I.54 Some were personal celebrations, often pitting his virtues 
against Louis XIV’s vices, or, especially after victory against the Ottomans in the 1680s, 
celebrations of Leopold I as the defender of Christianity. But many mobilized imperial patriotic 
rhetoric. Leopold was celebrated as the protector or savior of Germany, as the protector of 
German liberty – now redefined not against Habsburg tyranny, but against French tyranny – and 
as the father of the fatherland. He was vaunted as an exemplar of German bravery and valor, a 
scion of German patriotic duty. One pamphlet from 1687 even praised “the honorable House of 
Austria” as “the North Star… according to which we must arrange all German maxims.”55 
Another described Leopold and the imperial princes collectively as “fathers of the fatherland.”56  
After a century and a half of being the target of imperial patriotism, the Habsburg emperor had 
managed to become the source.  
                                               
54 See for example, Gemüthes-Rede Deutsch Landes, unpag. 10-13; Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 11; Neuer 
Friedens-Curier ins Teutsche übersetzet Welcher fürbringet, was allenthalben in Teutschland, Franckreich, 
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Teutscher Abschied, unpag. 1-2, 5-6; L’Apologiste Refuté, 17–18; Der Verkleidete Götter-Both, 50; Le Politique du 
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Teutsche Wächter-Stimme’s rousing appeals alluded to the idea of a shared German-
imperial interest, explained by the “sincere” voice of patriotic Germans. Many pamphlets argued 
in a similar vein. One example from 1684 insisted that “one must for the sake of the common 
good and wellbeing of the empire, set to one side particular interest.”57 This held true for 
defense, politics, and economic interests, for “as long as we prefer this [particular interest] to the 
empire and fatherland’s common benefit and prosperity… there is little improvement to hope 
for.”58 A pamphlet from 1673 declared that in order to defend themselves against the French, the 
Germans needed to “eagerly” exert themselves for the “general good… of the fatherland.”59 
Another pamphlet discussed in detail the terms of the peace treaties signed between the various 
dynastic powers at the end of the Franco-Dutch War, evaluating all of them in light of what was 
“best for the fatherland.”60  In order to best serve the German interest, the empire needed to be 
unified.  
In Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, the author addressed his readers as if they were an army, a 
unified defense force all directed towards a mutual goal. The narrator plays the role of scout in 
the night, rousing readers to the approaching danger of the French “Hahnnibal” – a clever pun 
combining the name of the ancient Carthaginian who nearly conquered Rome, Hannibal, and the 
German word for France’s emblematic rooster, Hahn.61 “Up to this point [your] neighbor’s wall 
                                               
57 Das neugierig und veränderte Teutschland, 314. 
58 Das neugierig und veränderte Teutschland, 314. See also, Wagner von Wagenfels, Ehren-Ruff Teutschlands, 
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59 Der Hoch-Teutsche Reichs-Secretarius, unpag. 54. 
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“observed their own interest.” Curiosorum (2.3), 2.3:2–3, 10, 79. 
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has burned, [but] now the fire comes to your land,” the writer warned.62 “Therefore, let the bells 
crash,” he urged, “make a racket, beat the drums/… sound the trumpets:/ RIDERS TO YOUR 
HORSES!/ Soldiers to arms! To arms!”63 The urgency of this call to arms left little room for 
interpretation. They could no longer stand idly by and watch their neighbors burn. They needed 
to rouse and stand united, the natural and rightful state of the empire. Other authors highlighted 
this natural unity of the empire, either through biological metaphors of the empire as a body, or 
through juridical reminders of their shared legal and institutional history.64 In 1675 after most of 
the imperial estates had joined the war against France, one pamphlet celebrated that “the empire 
is one, the limbs are together.”65  The author of Teutsche Wächter-Stimme opted for the military 
metaphor. Just as soldiers are undeniably tied to each other within the institutional framework of 
the military, so too was each German undeniably tied to each other through mutual interest. In 
this case, that interest was supporting the emperor as he defended against the depredations of 
Louis XIV. 
Just as in any army, though, discipline could lag. The pamphlet acknowledged that in 
practice, Germans often did not live up to their natural state of unity; some had been blinded by 
French gold, others by foreign goods.66 Author after author, in fact, lamented the current 
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divisions in the empire. But, these issues that divided them, that lulled them into a false sense of 
security and ambivalence in the face of French troops, were not intrinsic and insurmountable. To 
each of those who had been led astray, “finally/ with the passing years comes the all-to-late 
remorse.”67 All those who had ignored their patriotic duties to serve the good of the empire and 
the good of Germany would come to regret their choices. Regret followed inevitably because 
unity remained the empire’s natural state.  
 
Celebrating Loyal Allies   
 
 If pamphleteers defined patriotic duty as unity, and unity as pro-Habsburg, it makes sense 
then that pamphleteers treated allying with the Habsburg emperor and following him into war as 
a righteous, patriotic act. Authors mobilized this idea in two forms in the propaganda pamphlets. 
First, there are pamphlets written from a pro-imperial perspective that frame the idea of serving 
the emperor as fulfilling one’s patriotic duty to encourage support and rally the troops. Second, 
are numerous pamphlets written from a local or regional perspective to celebrate the exploits of 
specific Fürsten against the French troops, which frame those actions in terms of serving 
emperor and fatherland and celebrate the individual princes as patriotic exemplars.  
In the first category fall pamphlets like Teutschlands Macht [Germany’s Power] from 1674, 
which surveyed the deeds of various Fürsten and then painted them all in terms of the greater 
power of the empire.  
An elector out of Bavaria indeed defeated the French army before: an elector in Saxony 
maintained thirty thousand men for many years during the German Wars [Thirty Years 
War], and delivered many victories: an elector from Brandenburg showed many kings, 
especially Sweden, that a German elector yields to no king, and shot his cannon so 
sharply… a princely House from Lüneburg can maintain thirty-one thousand men…The 
Roman Imperial Majesty, it is the greatest honor to be an emperor and lord of such 
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electors and princes… What does the Arch-Ducal House of Austria have for great power? 
If all these made good use of their power at the same time; if the other Kreise of the Holy 
Roman Empire came for this purpose with their considerable strengths, where then could 
France remain [in safety]?68 
 
Yes, the imperial princes had all accomplished great feats individually, this author explained, but 
they were even greater together under the auspices of the Emperor! And only in that way could 
they truly challenge and defeat France. The message behind this was both to encourage those 
already fighting the empire’s enemies to coordinate with the emperor in their effort, and to 
encourage any princes or imperial entities not actively supporting the emperor to join their 
brethren and do so.  
Another pamphlet from the same year deployed similar refashioning when discussing the 
victories of Friedrich Wilhelm, Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia. Known as the Great 
Elector, Brandenburg’s loyalties in the Franco-Dutch War vacillated even more than those of 
Brunswick-Lüneburg. The duke promised support for Louis XIV in 1670, was receiving 
subsidies from the Dutch by 1672, concluded an agreement with France to withdraw support for 
the Dutch by 1673, and reversed that agreement through an alliance with Vienna in support of 
the Dutch in 1674.69 Written in 1674, however, this pamphlet emphasized a strong patriotic 
connection between the emperor and Brandenburg. The pamphleteer portrayed the emperor as a 
mighty eagle, and the Great Elector as his offspring. This metaphor immediately set up a strong 
patriarchal understanding of the relationship between emperor and prince; one where the 
emperor was in the natural position of authority, bound by filial loyalty to his brood of Fürsten. 
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And like a good, loyal son, the Great Elector stood strong in the face of French manipulation and 
corruption. “This young man,” the pamphleteer described Brandenburg, “would be a strong, red 
eagle and would be followed with great bloodthirstiness by his allies.”70 The pamphlet set up the 
Great Elector as an example for others to follow, subsuming his actions within the umbrella of 
loyal service to the emperor, and then encouraging others to follow suit. This rhetorical tactic 
made sense from an imperial perspective. In much the same way that politicians today capitalize 
on events or other people’s actions to prove their own points and further their own platforms, so 
were these pamphlets recasting the deeds of imperial Fürsten to encourage further support for the 
emperor’s fight. 
Even more interesting, however, is the evidence that this imperial-patriotic rhetoric came 
to resonate in local contexts. Georg Wilhelm, Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, provides a 
particularly good example of this. Georg Wilhelm led troops in the Battle of Konzer Brücke 
(1675), which was an important victory over the French and a prelude to the relief of Trier, 
which the French had occupied two years prior.71 In the aftermath of this victory, panegyric 
pamphlets were printed and seemingly circulated locally, either by order of the duke himself or 
initiated by their supporters and admirers. These panegyrics were typically short, commonly 
printed in the form of poems and odes, and primarily intended to glorify and celebrate the deeds, 
honor, and bravery of the prince. In doing so however, many of these panegyrics chose to 
celebrate the prince in terms of their patriotic duty. Their bravery advanced the cause of the 
empire, emperor, and fatherland. It was precisely this patriotic service which was a credit to their 
honor and glory. Although his deeds could have been celebrated in any number of ways, his 
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actions were again and again subsumed within the larger framework of imperial patriotism and 
national service. 
 One such example, titled Sur la tres Glorieuse Victoire, celebrated Georg Wilhelm’s 
younger brother and heir, Ernst August. Written in French, this pamphlet describes the younger 
brother as an “invincible Mars,” coming to the aid of his oppressed neighbors with “his brother 
sovereign,” Georg Wilhelm, against “the enemy”– France – who was ravaging the Empire “with 
its barbarous cruelties.”72 What motivated these martial princes to such sacrifice and aid was not 
consideration of their own honor, nor the honor of their house or lands. As the pamphlet 
described, “oh my dears, oh brave soldiers,/ remember that our struggles/ are for love of the 
patrie.”73 Combined with the previous discussion of coming to the aid of the embattled empire, it 
is clear that by “patrie” the pamphlet is referring to the imperial collective, to Germany as a 
whole. This is made even clearer later on in the ode. The author moved from the celebration of 
the dukes, to specific praise for some of his military officers, all of whom were described as 
“brave Germans”74 Finally the author returned to the brothers in the final stanzas, describing 
them as “Grand Dukes, the honor of Germany.”75 Again, we see the common elision in the 
pamphlets between empire, Germany, and fatherland. 
A second pamphlet, Das Gedämpffte Hahn-Geschrey, deployed other imagery for similar 
purposes. The pamphlet began with the same emblematic animal imagery seen above, but this 
                                               
72 Sur la tres Glorieuse Victoire, remportee 11. Aug. sur les François dans la Bataille dounee préz de Treves par 
leurs Alt. Sermes Messeigrs les Ducs de Brunsvic, Lunebourg, & d’Osnabrug, avec la prise de la Ville de Treves, & 
du Mareschal de Crequi. Ode., 1675, unpag. 1-2. 
73 Sur la tres glorieuse victoire, unpag. 2. 
74 Sur la tres glorieuse victoire, unpag. 3. 
75 Sur la tres glorieuse victoire, unpag. 3. 
 
 100 
time focused on the role of the house of Brunswick-Lüneburg, whose emblem was a white horse, 
still the emblem of the region, present-day Niedersachsen. 
How, does the rooster still crow, in his pride and arrogance? 
I thought, its peep, its voice had died away. 
It came… too near the white steed, 
which stepped on its foot… 
[and] brought him great pain, now it lets its head hang 
… The arrogance is gone. 
The defiant spirit very small. The wings are clipped. 
See, so was this rooster tamed by the white steed.76 
 
This pamphlet, meant to celebrate the glory and victory of Georg Wilhelm, suggested that the 
French rooster was brought to heel almost single handedly through the bravery and military 
prowess of the duke. But, instead of continuing on in this vein of solely princely-focused 
celebration, the pamphlet then couched the duke’s actions in terms of serving the empire and 
emperor. When France “penetrated into the German empire,” expecting “that Germany should 
come undone,” the Duke of Brunswick-Luneburg instead turned and fought.77  
 The worthy Lüneburg to report in highest glory 
 even put armor on; the loyal Georg Wilhelm, 
 an incomparable prince, seized shield and helmet 
 in service of the German empire. He streaked with sword and dagger.78 
 
The pamphlet celebrated the duke not simply for fighting against France, for protecting his own 
lands and people, but for protecting the larger idea of the empire. “Now the great God has sung 
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His thanks from the bottom of His heart,” the author continued, “that our territorial princes have 
succeeded in the great work./ He has fought, prevailed, to the benefit of the German empire,/ and 
to His great glory.”79 The duke deserved both worldly honor and heavenly reward for his actions 
in service of the empire. The celebration was personal and particular, but at the same time 
subsumed within the larger concept of service to the empire. The panegyric ended with a call for 
all Germany to recognize this service and honor the prince for his duty to the fatherland: “Rouse 
yourself Germany, and let a song of thanks be heard… the clever, wary son, protector of the 
fatherland.”80 
Loyalty, however, was often flexible. It is very difficult to discuss the specifics of where 
imperial princes stood in relation to France and the empire, primarily because alliances were 
constantly changing. As Joachim Whaley aptly summarized:  
In myriad combinations, each dependent on a mix of constantly fluctuating regional 
security issues and dynastic interests, the German territories concluded alliances they 
believed would guarantee their security, promote dynastic interests, or simply secure 
them financial gain in the form of subsidies. It is often difficult to define clear groupings, 
for most continually adapted their policies, changing course as events unfolded, often 
hedging their bets by simultaneously pursuing, with varying degrees of openness, 
mutually contradictory options.81 
 
Many of the powers discussed here switched their support from or to the emperor and back 
again. George William, Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, was committed to “varying degrees of 
neutrality or tacit support for France,” prior to the Franco-Dutch war, but switched to an alliance 
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with Leopold I in 1674, and personally led troops in multiple theaters in 1675 and 1676.82 These 
latter actions were then celebrated in strong patriotic terms, as seen above. Perhaps it was even 
this fluctuating loyalty to the emperor that influenced the excessively patriotic celebrations in 
this and similar cases, to help distract in times of cooperation from disloyalty in the past. 
Fluctuating alliances also meant that to use imperial-patriotic rhetoric to encourage unity with 
the emperor, it was important to highlight as exemplary those individual powers who chose to do 
so in any particular conflict. For those princes who did not side with the emperor, though, 
pamphleteers mobilized a different rhetorical approach.  
 
Shaming Disloyal Princes 
 
Although proponents of the Holy Roman Emperors and celebrants of regional princes 
used patriotic rhetoric to immortalize their patriotic deeds, this understanding of a grand patriotic 
interest linking Germany and empire, prince and emperor, also worked in the reverse. If serving 
the emperor and fighting against the French was the ultimate patriotic act, then what of those 
who allied with France against the emperor, or those who simply remained neutral? The ability 
to independently pursue foreign policy was, after all, a prerogative of imperial powers confirmed 
by the Peace of Westphalia. And yet pamphleteers repeatedly portrayed such a choice as treason.  
The Treaty of Westphalia had confirmed and strengthened the right of each imperial 
entity to pursue its own foreign policy, specifically through their prerogative to make foreign 
alliances.83 During the Wars of Louis XIV, for all the reasons mentioned by Whaley, various 
imperial powers took advantage of this fact to either remain neutral or actively support France. 
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The motivations for these decisions would have been as individual as the powers making them, 
but generally fell into two categories: the desire to increase one’s own power vis-à-vis the 
emperor or another imperial rival, and the desire to avoid France’s ire and protect one’s lands 
from attack. In the Franco-Dutch War especially, much of the empire was divided. During this 
conflict pamphleteers repeatedly called out specific imperial princes as betraying their fatherland 
and their fellow Germans. 
A pamphlet from 1674 encapsulates this argument. The pamphlet was entitled, Die 
unteutsche Freyheit, oder Teutsche Gefangenschaft Etlicher Französisch gesinten Subtilen 
Teutschen, durch Ein plumpe teutsche Warheit von Einem unfranzösischen Plumpen Teutschen 
Plump… vorgetragen [The Un-German Freedom, or German Imprisonment of Quite a Few 
French-Inclined Subtle Germans, Presented… through a Simple German Truth from an Un-
French Simple German Simpleton].84 This irreverent title was meant to emphasize the 
Germanness of its author’s message and intent, contrasting French delicacy and artifice with 
“simple German simpl[icity].”85 In this pamphlet, the author repeatedly criticized “our German 
Frenchmen,” by which he meant all those not supporting the Emperor.86 These “German 
Frenchmen” watched French tyranny grow without making a single move to oppose it.87 Why, 
the author asked, could they not see the danger that such inactivity or support for France created 
for the Empire? Their patriotism, their “sincere love for the fatherland,” should have “faithfully 
and carefully submitted for consideration, in what great danger of irreparable misery one thereby 
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plunges the empire completely unnecessarily.”88 Not following the Emperor to battle in defense 
of Germany went “against your duty and the empire’s wellbeing.”89 
A number of princes and entities fell victim to such anti-patriotic shaming at various 
times during the Wars of Louis XIV, but the greatest offenders were the Wittelsbachs of Cologne 
and Bavaria, and especially their Fürstenberg advisors. Moreover, these individuals remained in 
the pamphlets’ spotlight throughout later conflicts for several reasons. The first was that Cologne 
and Bavaria, especially, continued to be the most constant of all the French allies in the empire. 
Second, there were several specific events that repeatedly dredged up old memories and forced 
the issue back into the public eye. Third, these steadfastly anti-imperial powers provided the 
perfect foil against which to continuously deploy the pamphlets’ patriotic message of German 
unity and Habsburg support.  
The Fürstenberg brothers, Hermann Egon, Franz Egon, and Wilhelm Egon, who worked 
on behalf of Bavaria and Cologne quickly became bogeymen for the imperial cause. Any 
disunity in the empire, reluctance to side with Leopold I, or accommodation towards France in 
the Franco-Dutch War was blamed on the influence and machinations of the Fürstenbergs. They 
themselves were seen as little more than pawns of Louis XIV.90 Already in 1671, a pamphlet 
described the “Friends Egon” as “false prophets,” and encouraged the imperial princes to “resist 
valiantly… with armed hand.”91 This author concluded his pamphlet by urging readers to 
“choose, whether you would rather be eagles under the Eagle, lions with the Lion, or chickens 
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under the Rooster!”92 Would they rather soar proudly as imperial eagles under the protection of 
Leopold I, roar like lions next to their allies the Dutch, or cower like dumb, female chickens 
ruled over by the French rooster? Unless they overcame their current blindness regarding both 
France and the Fürstenbergs, the latter would be their fate.93  
The Fürstenbergs all worked in important positions for the Wittelsbachs. Hermann Egon 
was the Grand Chamberlain in Bavaria until his death in 1674, while Franz Egon was initially 
chief minister in Cologne and his younger brother, Wilhelm Egon, was instrumental in 
negotiating an alliance with France during the Franco-Dutch War.94 The Archbishop-Elector of 
Cologne maintained a generally pro-French position throughout the Wars of Louis XIV. His 
Rhineland territory was on the front lines of any Franco-German conflict and he and his 
Wittelsbach kinsmen in Bavaria had traditionally been some of the most skeptical of imperial 
authority and Austrian aggrandizement. The fact that the Fürstenbergs were seen as their 
particular henchmen, especially after the younger two Fürstenbergs were tried for treason during 
the Franco-Dutch War, reinforced the picture of Cologne as a French agent within Germany. 
Pamphlet after pamphlet accused him of being led astray, of having sold his freedom to the 
French in pursuit of his own personal interest and in betrayal of his fellow Germans.95  
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One pamphlet from 1672 encapsulated these critiques especially well. Written from the 
perspective of a Liègeois noble to the burghers of his city, which was a prince-bishopric also 
ruled by the Archbishop-Elector of Cologne. The author lamented Cologne’s – and by extension 
Liège’s – alliance with France, describing the danger that Louis XIV posed to their own city as 
well as the empire as a whole. He appealed to the Liègeois, begging them to reconsider their 
position. He praised their honor and piety, their “proven steady devotion to [their] duty to the 
[Holy] Roman Empire” and “the honor of the fatherland.”96 Finally, he begged the burgers of 
Liège to realize who their real enemies were. It was not the emperor or their fellow Germans, but 
their prince-bishop - the elector of Cologne – and his Fürstenberg servants. “It is true, and I 
assure you, that you have cause to argue with  the absurdity of your prince,” the Liègeois 
nobleman asserted, “who is a murderer of his people, when he should be your father, a traitor to 
the empire… and a monstrosity of the House of Bavaria… the wickedness of [Wilhelm Egon 
von] Fürstenberg, who only serves your enemies in order to serve himself.”97 Cologne and the 
Fürstenbergs stood accused of betraying the empire and the fatherland. Cologne itself was long 
gone, the author argued, but Liège still had a chance to escape a similar fate.98 Couched in terms 
of patriotism and service to the empire, this pamphlet actually encouraged insurrection against 
Liège’s prince-bishop. These true enemies, “will find, for all time, their defeat or annihilation in 
your resolve,” the author insisted.99 “Your kindness and obedience have until now supported 
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their strength and power,” he explained, they could just as easily do otherwise.100 But they must 
act quickly if they were to avoid the fate of destruction and enslavement to France. For, this 
author warned, France’s “end goal” was to elevate Wilhelm Egon in Cologne, so that the 
Fürstenbergs in turn would “make France the master of Liège.”101 The author left his readers 
with one final message: to reflect seriously on “all of these truths” and delay no longer the 
actions required “to ensure your wellbeing and honor.”102 For to wait around listlessly “between 
chains and death” would be folly when they have the power to “break the first and evade the 
second.”103 In the logic of this pamphlet, the actions of Cologne – namely his alliance in support 
of France against the emperor – were treasonous enough to absolve his subjects in Liège of 
loyalty to their own prince. For the good of their city, for the good of their neighbors, and for the 
good of the empire, they should break the chains with which they had been bound to this course 
of action and rejoin the side of their true interest: that of Germany & the emperor.  
The Fürstenbergs and Cologne rose again as a political flashpoint when the Archbishop-
Elector of Cologne, Max Heinrich von Bayern, died in June 1688. Louis XIV had already 
elevated the younger Fürstenberg brother, Wilhelm Egon, to be prince-bishop of Strasbourg in 
1682 to much criticism and controversy. The French king now wanted Wilhelm Egon to be 
elevated as Archbishop-Elector of Cologne as well. The election itself was contested and was 
one of several reasons which prompted Louis XIV to again invade the empire and spark the 
beginning of the Nine Years War.104 Amid this controversy, pamphleteers resurrected their old 
                                               
100 Send-Schreiben eines Lüttischen Edelmans, 11. 
101 Send-Schreiben eines Lüttischen Edelmans, 13. 
102 Send-Schreiben eines Lüttischen Edelmans, 13. 
103 Send-Schreiben eines Lüttischen Edelmans, 13. 
104 Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, Volume II: The Peace of Westphalia to the Dissolution of the 
Reich, 1648-1806, 2:46–47. 
 
 108 
critiques of both the Fürstenbergs and Cologne. They had been bought off by France, were guilty 
of putting their own ambition and selfishness before the good of the empire, and helped to stoke 
the “fires of war” within Louis XIV.105 Again, pamphleteers forwarded criticisms of being 
unpatriotic. As one writer summarized, nobody could be called “a child and patriot of the 
Roman-German empire, when he should to the insult and weakening of the inestimable German 
liberty, to the enervation of the strength of the German empire, light the highly pestilential fire of 
war in the bosom of his mother, and make from the same a Trojan spectacle.”106 This was a far 
cry from the “love and loyalty owed to the fatherland” that was such “an immutable law of 
nature.”107 It was not patriotic to sacrifice so many of one’s countrymen to the fires of war and 
destruction. Some had argued that Wilhelm Egon was simply looking for a prince to serve, and 
when spurned by the emperor had no choice but to turn to Louis XIV. The author disagreed and 
provided a counter-argument that summarized the contemporary understanding of patriotic duty: 
“In the service pledged to the king, which as a duty of nature is bound to the fatherland and must 
be done with unwavering faithfulness, one must enter into no [other] bond which should be 
executed through sin and vice.”108 One “should serve first God, but then, next to Him, one’s 
fatherland.”109 The author expounded upon the implications of this duty when he said, even more 
than “the love and loyalty owed to one’s parents, man is obliged to pursue the love of his 
fatherland.”110 Therefore, if a son knew his father to be a “traitor to the fatherland,” it was within 
his rights to “slay that same [father] without reproach… on the basis that the fatherland 
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nourishes, supports, and raises the people for its [own] service and defense.”111 Both duty to 
father and fatherland were natural, this pamphleteer suggested, but it was the latter that held 
precedence. Again, we see the politics of supporting France or Austria coated in the trappings of 
patriotic duty and loyalty to the fatherland. Again, we see the betrayal of patriotic duty as an 
excuse to treat that individual as an open enemy and to resist them with all one’s might. In the 
case of Wilhelm Egon, the pamphleteer concluded, his many trespasses against his fatherland 
rendered him a disgrace.112 
 The rhetoric of patriotism allowed pamphleteers to portray the actions of the 
Fürstenbergs, especially Wilhelm Egon, as more than just another imperial prince pursuing his 
own interests. The self-interested politicking of Wilhelm Egon instead became treason – betrayal 
of his patriotic duty. This argumentation provided a strong rationale to oppose French interests in 
Cologne and elsewhere, and also a strong rhetorical tool to encourage the unity and loyalty of 
other imperial princes. The lead up to the Nine Years War, as with every major conflict in the 
empire, was accompanied by complicated negotiations for troops, subsidies, alliances, 
concessions and support. By resurrecting and expanding upon critiques of Cologne and the 
Fürstenbergs’ treachery, writers thus pursued very specific tactical objectives. They called on 
other imperial princes to either stay the course of imperial loyalty, or reverse their own 
questionable stances in the past lest they, too, end up “traitor[s] to the fatherland.”113 The goal 
was to encourage more of a united front from the beginning of the conflict than the empire had 
                                               
111 Teutschlandes Politischer Fliegen-Wedel, 13. 
112 Teutschlandes Politischer Fliegen-Wedel, 14. 
113 Teutschlandes Politischer Fliegen-Wedel, 13. See also, Das verwirrte Cölln; L’Esprit de la France, 58–95; Das 
wiederrechtlich von Franckreich gebrochene zwantzigjährige Armistitium, 34; Die Waagschale der Frantzosen. 
 
 110 
shown at the outset of the Franco-Dutch War. And, for a variety of reasons, the strategy was 
largely successful.114 
 Unlike the early conflicts of his reign, Leopold I was able to marshal a relatively unified 
imperial response to French aggression in both the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish 
Succession. In both of these conflicts, more imperial estates lined up behind the emperor than 
had ever had before or after. The only significant exception to this imperial unity continued to 
come from the House of Wittelsbach. And what did the pro-imperial pamphlets have to say about 
all of this? Nothing less than a collective, “we told you so.” One pamphleteer reminded readers 
that “the two brothers of the Bavarian house and electors of the empire have until now observed 
the imperial constitution as well as their in-law and ally, King Louis… [they are] traitors to their 
fatherland and empire who have forgotten their loyalty.”115 Their current fates were precisely the 
kind of reward one should expect for betraying one’s patriotic duty and having “born arms 
against the emperor and his house.”116 A second writer concurred, describing Bavaria as “such a 
sad example of one of the foremost imperial estates that had forgotten their bonds of duty, 
whereby they were connected to the emperor and the empire.”117 As for Cologne, “so let this 
unhappy arch-bishop,” the author scoffed, “be bound hand and foot, willingly and without 
necessity, in the chains of French slavery.”118 Both princes had insisted on betraying their 
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fatherland, even while record numbers of their neighbors rallied to the imperial cause, and they 
had finally reaped their just desserts for their treason. 
The actions of the Fürstenbergs and the princes of Cologne and Bavaria were perhaps 
egregious examples of disunity: actively working with France against the interests of the 
emperor. But numerous other princes were accused of treachery for much less. In fact, one of the 
most fascinating aspects of the pro-Habsburg pamphleteers’ mobilization of patriotism was that 
allying with France was not the only way to betray the fatherland. In the rhetoric of the 
pamphlets, even neutrality became treasonous. A number of imperial princes, usually those most 
in danger of French invasion, preferred to try to remain neutral in conflicts with France, 
especially the earlier conflicts like the Franco-Dutch war. France, too, actively encouraged this in 
an attempt to limit conflicts and avoid an imperial declaration of war.119 But, according to 
pamphleteers, in the face of Louis XIV’s aggression, even neutrality provided succor to the 
enemy. Indeed, while outright allies, like Cologne, were beneficial to France, many argued that 
the Sun King’s true goal in the empire was to encourage inactivity on the part of most of the 
imperial princes “under the pretext of neutrality.”120 This would hamper the ability of the 
emperor to rouse a united front and marshal all the defenses of the empire to counter France’s 
superior armies.  
Pamphleteers called out neutrality and those powers who advocated for it in similar terms 
of damage and betrayal of one’s neighbors as those who concluded outright alliances with 
                                               
119 This strategy can be seen in pro-French publications like the “Antwort” appended to, Send-Schreiben eines 
Lüttischen Edelmans, 25–26. See also, “Consideration Historique”; Manifestes de quelques princes de l’Empire sur 
l’estat present de l’Allemagne. Suivant la copie imprimée à Liége (Paris: Sebastien Mabre-Cramoisy, 1675), 26–28; 
[Joachim Legrand], Discours sur ce qui s’est passé dans l’Empire au sujet de la succession d’Espagne. [Avec] 
L’Allemagne menacée d’estre bien-tost reduite en Monarchie Absolue, si elle ne profite de la conjoncture présente 
pour assurer sa liberté., 1711, 5, 34, 48. 
120 Curiosorum (1.4), 1.4:49. 
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France. One author included an entire section titled, “That Neutrality is Pernicious.”121 At the 
outbreak of the Franco-Dutch War a pamphlet warned all the states of Europe, “that if some stop 
in a false ease, and if others sleep, this calm will have its trouble,” for “fear also has its effect; 
and in the end it seems that all conspires to the happiness of France.”122 Many pamphlets decried 
the “sleepiness” and “sickness” of those in the Empire who were reluctant to declare outright 
against France.123 Just a few years later a different author explained that though “many rulers 
desire peace… this good will alone is… not enough, either for the majesty of the lords or for the 
wellbeing of their subjects[, rather it is necessary] to check violence with violence.”124 In 1686 
one writer declared that while some might think giving in and cooperating with France was the 
easier path, “no sincere German patriot” should wish such a thing.125 Though remaining neutral 
in the face of the depredations France had already committed might seem like the easier option, 
for “sure it is just a drop of water, but when he tears open the dam, your lands will soon be 
flooded, because you armed him to your neighbors’ destruction.”126 Such actions eventually 
“will cost the general freedom.”127 If such disloyal princes had but “still one spark of a true 
German spirit” they would beg for forgiveness and mend their ways.128 
 
 
                                               
121 Le Politique du Temps, 118–32. 
122 Conference Infructueuse de Windisgratz, 25. See also, Politische Considerationes, unpag. 2-3. 
123 Französischer Warsager, unpag. 13. See also, Trajani Boccalini Gespräch und Discursen, 420–21. 
124 Teutschlands Macht, 3. 
125 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 41–42, 46. 
126 Send-Schreiben eines Lüttischen Edelmans, 4. See also, Des neulich-verkleideten... Götter-Bothen Mercurii, 74–
75; Curiosorum (1.1), 1.1:4–44. 
127 Send-Schreiben eines Lüttischen Edelmans, 4. 





Pamphleteers mobilized patriotic rhetoric to praise princes that fought with Leopold I 
against the French, and to shame those who opposed the emperor and aided Louis XIV. Even 
neutrality in the face of the French threat came to be seen as treason. The broader understanding 
underlining the pamphlets’ rhetoric was a very simple one. To be patriotic meant supporting the 
emperor. Imperial unity meant supporting the emperor. And this patriotic unity was as much a 
service to their ruler, and their state, as it was to Germany and the greater German interest. 
Patriotic-national rhetoric was mobilized in anti-French political pamphlets to serve hybrid 
purposes.  
This was a smart rhetorical move on the part of pro-Habsburg pamphleteers as it 
encouraged imperial powers to line up behind the emperor, especially when they had the legal 
prerogative not to. In many ways this is a testament to the success of Leopold I’s image 
campaigns. He had so successfully been vaunted as father of the fatherland, protector of the 
patria, and defender of German interest, that anybody who did not actively support the 
Emperor’s resistance to France became branded a traitor. It is important to remember that just a 
few decades before the rise of Louis XIV, patriotic rhetoric, service to the fatherland, and 
defense of German liberty had been common tools of those who opposed the Habsburgs. 
Understandings of imperial patriotism, like any other idea, shifted over time in response to 
events and changing context. There was no inherent link that necessitated the equivalency of 
“patriotic” and “pro-Habsburg,” but throughout the Wars of Louis XIV, countless anti-French 
pamphleteers constructed one. They built this association so strongly that the French finally had 
to wade back into the seas of pamphlet warfare to try to prize the two ideas back apart from each 
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other.129 This link would survive intact to shape the particularities of ideas of Germany and 
Germanness through the eighteenth century. The further associations of “Reich” and “Germany,” 
“fatherland” and “nation,” were so entangled that over the course of the 1670s, 1680s, and 
1690s, allying with France became not just a betrayal of the emperor, but a betrayal of the shared 
German interest that united all within the empire. Pamphleteers built further on these ideas, 
combined with a constructed idea of an ideal German past, to argue that contemporaries were 
betraying not just their current national interest, but the national heritage passed down from their 
honorable German ancestors. 
 
                                               







CHAPTER 3: MOBILIZING HISTORY AND FAILING THE ANCESTORS 
 
“What kind of people were our brave and virtuous ancestors… the ancient, honest 
Germans,” a pamphleteer in 1684 inquired, largely answering his own question even while 
asking it. This question, the idea of an ancient lineage of German ancestors, and arguments for 
the historical extent of the Germany those ancestors claimed, occupied much of the writing of 
anti-French pamphleteers. This was not due to pamphleteer’s lack of focus, but rather a 
continuous effort to construct and mobilize understandings of the long history of Germany and 
the German people to make specific political claims.  
In the late seventeenth century, “history” was highly regarded as authority, proof, and 
model. This was particularly true of the authority that ancient writers held in the seventeenth 
century imagination. This did not mean, however, that seventeenth century writers’ use of history 
was particularly accurate. Rather, as Christopher Krebs has shown in detail, ancient sources were 
more often misread, misinterpreted and misused. When describing the “historical” claims of one 
early modern writer, Krebs wrote that the individual in question “was untroubled by the absence 
of evidence.”1 This excellent phrase could likewise be used to describe almost all of the “history” 
in political pamphlets of the Wars of Louis XIV. Despite history’s appeal as a source of 
objective truth in the broader imagination, pamphleteers’ use of it was neither accurate nor 
neutral.  
                                               





Pamphleteers selectively chose examples, exaggerated importance, and drew ahistorical 
parallels across millennia. But they did so for two very specific political goals. First, they 
projected a vision of historically German territories in order to support their claims for territorial 
defense and restitution. Pamphleteers made claims based on historical jurisdiction, but also on 
historical culture, language, and demographics, to argue that France had no legitimate right to 
regions along the Rhine and the western imperial border. The categories they constructed, 
however, were indeterminate and vague enough that similar rhetoric of historical Germanness 
was used to justify protection of regions that were parts of the Empire, but predominantly French 
by culture.  
Second, pamphleteers promoted a historical idea of the German people in order to rouse 
contemporary Germans to military action. They seized a projection of the ancient German as 
embodying every positive German stereotype, from honesty, to integrity, to martial prowess, and 
then used that ideal to shame contemporary Germans for their cowardliness and impassivity in 
the face of the French threat. But this ideal German ancestor also helped pamphleteers explain 
why the martial, courageous, and mighty Germans lost so easily to the weak, effeminate, and 
cowardly French. Ultimately, the idea of the honorable German ancestors helped to justify 
pamphleteers’ claims of the superiority of the German character while simultaneously explaining 
the successes of Louis XIV’s armies.   
 
Historical Germany as Territorial Right 
 
The historical construction of ideas of Germany, Germanness and the German people 
were not purely academic pursuits for pamphleteers.2 Authors engaged in and mobilized such 
                                               
2 Indeed, histories were not purely academic pursuits even for the majority of early modern intellectuals. On their 





projects for concrete, immediate goals and to argue points of contemporary relevance to ongoing 
politics. Of particular note during the Wars of Louis XIV was the status of various territories that 
formed the borderlands between France and Germany, including Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-
Comté and the Rhineland.3 Pamphleteers explored the “German” history of these regions in order 
to argue for their restitution, to emphasize the injustice of French conquest, and to motivate 
imperial powers to action to defend against and seek vengeance for French depredations in the 
region. Though the boundaries were never strictly delineated, pamphleteers evinced a mental 
imaginary of “Germany” defined in part by sovereignty and jurisdiction, but also by ideas of 
culture, language, and historical inhabitance, no matter how vague or unfounded those ideas 
were. Indeed, the ambiguity of many of the categories that pamphleteers used helped them to 
apply their claims of history and Germanness when and only when it was politically useful.4  
We have seen how common the terms “Germans” and “Germany” were in pamphlets. 
But what did those terms really mean to the people who used them? Modern maps of the Holy 
Roman Empire are concerned with showing all the complicated divisions of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction – indeed it is one of the most difficult parts of actually making accurate maps of the 
empire. Our modern concerns impose complicated and strictly delineated boundaries, which 
often result in highlighting the seeming fragmentation of the imperial structure. But much of this 
                                               
Consciousness’ of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century),” in The Holy 
Roman Empire, 1495-1806, ed. R.J.W. Evans, Michael Schaich, and Peter H. Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 323–45. 
3 On French campaigns in these areas and their work to integrate and establish control over the various pays conquis, 
see Darryl Dee, Expansion and Crisis in Louis XIV’s France: Franche-Comté and Absolute Monarchy, 1674-1715 
(Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2009); Phil McCluskey, Absolute Monarchy on the Frontiers: Louis 
XIV’s Military Occupations of Lorraine and Savoy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013). 
4 This contradicts the arguments of scholars such as James Sheehan, who argue that the early modern empire’s lack 
of conformity to modern requirements for centralized, uniform statehood make even speaking of “Germany” prior to 
the nineteenth century innacurate, “What Is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German 





strict delineation and separation is itself modern. As historian Peter Sahlins has shown, the idea 
of a precisely delimited borderline which defines the extent of a state’s centralized control is an 
invention of the nineteenth century, and specifically of nineteenth century nationalism.5 While 
boundaries and territories were certainly noted earlier, political power was thought of more in 
terms of jurisdiction over subjects and dependencies of cities, towns or villages, rather than 
precisely demarcated territories.  Boundaries were as often shaped by geographic features – 
mountains, rivers, and other defensible positions like those that Louis XIV sought to acquire on 
his own borders – as they were by artificial delineation.6 Borders acted much more as zones than 
lines. This is significant for ideas of Germany for two reasons. First, the early modern state was 
uninterested in the sort of uniform imposition of power and control across a precisely demarcated 
territory that its modern counterparts would value. Uniformity, homogeneity, and regularity were 
all concepts that would gain prominence only during and after the Enlightenment. Second, and 
more importantly, it helps to explain the comfort that pamphleteers display with how ambiguous 
were the extent and boundaries of what they thought of as Germany.  
Rather, the pamphlets reveal more about cultural understandings of what the idea of 
“Germany” meant. Pamphleteers described the extent of Germany in different ways and for 
different reasons. Some argued for the restitution of territory as historically – and thus rightly - 
                                               
5 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1989), 2–7, 61–63. Sahlins also discusses how even the most detailed of early modern maps regularly made 
mistakes in drawing boundaries in complicated areas, 61-63. On competing cartographic interpretations of the 
Rhinelands in this period see, Heinz Duchhardt, “The Cartographic ‘Battle of the Rhine’ in the Eighteenth Century,” 
in Bordering Early Modern Europe, ed. Maria Baramova, Grigor Boykov, and Ivan Parvev (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz Verlag, 2015), 3–14. On various approaches to mapping the Holy Roman Empire, very few of which 
satisfy the modern observer’s need for clear borders, see Uta Lindgren, “Die Grenzen des Alten Reiches auf 
gedruckten Karten,” in Bilder des Reiches, ed. Rainer A. Müller (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1997), 31–50. 
For explorations of the shift to modern understandings of delineated borders world-wide and their many continuing 
ambiguities even in the modern era, see the analyses included in Paul Readman, Cynthia Radding, and Chad Bryant, 
eds., Borderlands in World History, 1700-1914 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Also, Hirschi, The Origins of 
Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany, 104–18. 





belonging to Germany, especially territories preyed upon by French armies in Alsace, Lorraine, 
and the Rhineland. But rather than being constrained by strict political boundaries – areas of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction – many pamphlets used a looser mental map of what was considered 
German, culturally and historically (See Figures 4 & 5). These pamphlets relied on a more fluid 
definition of Germany, inadvertently revealing assumptions about what was and was not German 
in the process.  
One of the most commonly repeated conceptions in the pamphlets about the area called 
Germany was that it extended from the Danube in the east to the Rhine in the west.7 As with 
many early-modern ideas of “boundaries,” this was far from specific. First, this idea was likely 
taken from Tacitus’s Germania which described neither contemporary Germany nor the Holy 
Roman Empire, but rather the region that the Romans called Germania, defined not on its own 
merits but negatively as the lands beyond the furthest extent of the Roman empire.8 Second, the 
Danube extends all the way to the Black Sea, though no concept of Germany – early modern or 
modern – has ever gone quite that far. Moreover, as numerous pamphlets argued, these rivers 
were not external borders in the modern sense, but rather existed within Germany. One work 
declared the Danube to be the first of the “major waterways” of Germany, followed in order by 
the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Oder.9 These rivers did not mark of the “ends” of Germany, but were 
                                               
7 Spicilegium Antiquitatum Palatinarum... Kurtzer Bericht von deme genannten kleinen Franckreich, dessen under 
Marckung den Rheinstrom, sampt denen an der Franckreichischen Seiten des Rheins allernächst gelegenen Städten 
und namhafftigsten Orten zur Pfalz eygentlich gehörend. Seltz, Germersheim, Altrip, Oppenheim, Bacharach: Wie 
auch Kaysers Caroli Magni, des alten Teutschen Helden, Heimheydt und Geburtsstadt Ingelheim..., 1679, 499–500; 
Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 2; Wagner von Wagenfels, Ehren-Ruff Teutschlands, 53.  
8 Tacitus’s Germania opens with a very similar description of physical boundaries including using the Rhine and 
Danube as key landmarks. However, these boundaries were set by the Romans. Julius Caesar determined the Rhine 
as the borderline between “Gallic” and “Germanic” tribes, i.e. between those he had conquered and those he had not, 
imposing a sense of political unity on the Germanen east of the river that did not exist in reality. Tacitus and many 
other ancient writers continued Caesar’s practices. Krebs, A Most Dangerous Book, 30, 43–44.  








Figures 4 & 5: Mental Map of Germany. Each of the marked locations was described in a 
pamphlet as German. These locations are shown both with present-day boundaries and with the 
superimposed boundary of the Holy Roman Empire c. 1700. University of North Carolina 
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instead constituent components of the same. A pamphlet published c. 1679, amid the territorial 
negotiations and fallout of the Franco-Dutch War, argued that the Rhine and the Danube had 
served as the ancient borders of Germany since before the birth of Christ. The German people, 
however, regularly went beyond these rivers to spread their language and culture, thus making 
the areas surrounding both rivers German as well. While the rivers were important landmarks, 
they were not adequate limits.10 
Several other pamphlets outline a robust territorial legacy in the context of critiquing the 
contemporary fashion of “educational” travels to Paris.11 Such travels were a waste of time and 
resources, these pamphlets argued, both of which could be much better spent at any one of the 
many German universities or other “most distinguished locations of Germany.”12 This sentiment 
was usually followed by a list of examples of suitable “German” locations that German youth 
could visit instead. Taking a survey of the mentioned locations gives a remarkably coherent 
image of the extent of what was considered “German” at the turn of the eighteenth century.13 
Unsurprisingly, the suggested locations map quite well with the locations of significant German-
speaking populations – notably including cities not part of the Holy Roman Empire at the time, 
like Metz, and those no longer considered German today, from Metz in the west to Gdánsk in the 
                                               
10 Spicilegium Antiquitatum Palatinarum, 499–500. 
11 By the late seventeenth century, Paris had become the destination of choice for elite young men’s “grand tours.” 
Pamphleteers and others were skeptical of how much of use was really learned on these trips. For more on this see, 
Chapter 4: French Cultural Infiltration. 
12 Der Teutsche Frantzoß, 29.  
13 Locations in figure taken from Der Verkleidete Götter-Both, 40–88; Spicilegium Antiquitatum Palatinarum; Der 
Teutsche Frantzoß, 28–29; Das Verkehrte Glücks-Spiel, 64–65; Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 187–88; Wagner von 





east.14 Moreover, like rivers, these cities do not represent boundaries, so much as regions of 
Germanness.  
Of note in the mental maps of the pamphleteers is the unanimous inclusion of Austria as 
part of Germany. Every list of distinguished and historical German cities included Vienna, 
usually foremost.15 Other pamphlets simply reflect the general early-modern assumption that 
Austria was as German as Saxony or Bavaria, Vienna as German as Berlin. In 1674, a pamphlet 
titled Der Verkleidete Götter-Both, Mercurius, Welcher durch Europa wandern [The Disguised 
Messenger of the Gods, Mercury, Who Roams through Europe] began a long section relating 
news from various German cities with the first dispatch, “Germany Report, from Vienna.”16 
Another pamphlet, the first in a remarkable series that began just a year later, depicted an 
imagined meeting of representatives from the “ten Kreise of Germany” – referring to the ten 
regional administrative districts in the empire. The first member to speak in this meeting was the 
representative from Austria, who gave a very patriotic speech against the “tremendous power of 
the invading enemy,” referring, of course, to the French .17 The Austrian delegate urged 
resistance “with ancient German bravery,” or else the “German nation” risks the “destruction of 
our lands, theft of [our] goods… rape of our women and children,” and still worse.18 Austria, far 
from a separate country or a separate nation, was simply one of the many component political 
entities that fell under the umbrella of Germany. 
                                               
14 Even some of the earliest humanist imaginings of “Germany” often did not align precisely with the contemporary 
“boundaries” of the empire, Völkel, “The ’Historical Consciousness of the Holy Roman Empire,” 330–31. 
15 Der Teutsche Frantzoß, 29; Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 187. 
16 Der Verkleidete Götter-Both, 40. Wagenfels also includes Austria in his celebratory tour of the riches and 
resources of Germany, Wagner von Wagenfels, Ehren-Ruff Teutschlands, 42–43. 
17 Curiosorum (1.1), 1.1:4. 





When thinking about the extent of Germany as it was imagined by early modern writers, 
it is important not to impose modern standards. To expect Austria to be treated as a separate 
national entity from Germany is to read back the vagaries of nineteenth century history onto the 
seventeenth century. More importantly, one cannot expect the same standards of homogeneity or 
definition that is understood by post-1945 claims to national culture and territory. There were 
plenty of people and regions within this “Germany” that did not speak German, or perhaps spoke 
only mutually unintelligible dialects of German. For many people, “German” may not have been 
the primary category of identification, if indeed it was one at all. Moreover, many of these cities 
did not even fall within the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation in the late seventeenth 
century, if indeed they ever had. But these questions of rational reconciliation between the idea 
and reality were simply not seen as problems in the late seventeenth century.19 Rather, 
pamphleteers tolerated a remarkable level of contradiction and dissonance in their use of ideas of 
Germany and Germanness. Pamphlets claimed for Germany, on the basis of history, territories 
which no one had any intention of legitimately trying to “recover.” But they also claimed for the 
empire – and Germany by extension – territories like Franche-Comté, which was linguistically 
and culturally French, and while technically imperial, was ruled by the Spanish Habsburg 
branch. There was enough ambiguity in these categories that pamphleteers could manipulate and 
reconfigure them to best suit their needs even if it did mean, in some cases, not troubling oneself 
over the lack of evidence. 
 The majority of French aggression towards the empire during the seventeenth century 
focused on these areas of the Rhineland, Lorraine, and Alsace and Franche-Comté. Pamphleteers 
                                               
19 Indeed, many would only emerge as issues that needed “solving” in the mid-late eighteenth century and thus, as I 
argue elsewhere, were modern projects of nationalizing populations to construct a culturally homogenous nation-





decried the damage being done to these regions, lamented their loss, and campaigned for their 
restitution. These regions deserved to be defended and avenged; conquest and annexation by 
France was not only questionable according to the conventions of international law, according to 
pamphleteers, but unjust on the basis that these were distinctly German regions. Numerous 
pamphlets discussed French claims and ambitions along the western border of the Empire as 
machinations, robbery, and enslavement - underhanded designs at best and outright theft at worst 
to secure what was never rightfully theirs.20 In 1673 one author explained, “to whom is it 
possibly unknown, that France has never shied away from posing as if these lands have already 
belonged to them, hereditarily and particularly since time immemorial?”21 Just a year later 
another pamphlet stated the case even more clearly: “Lorraine, the principality of Liège, and the 
duchy of Cleves, are these not members of the Empire? It is a truth too constant to be doubted. 
But the armies of France have entered there, have attacked and have made themselves master.”22 
Indeed, as was often noted, similar machinations had yielded results for France in the past.23 
France had already acquired most of Alsace by the end of the Thirty Years War. In 1670, they 
easily forced the duke of Lorraine into exile. Such reminders of past French aggression in the 
region constituted another method of mobilizing history – one that undermined French claims 
and justifications as one more set of schemes. 
                                               
20 Funcke, Triumfirender Lorbeer-Krantz, unpag. 2; Hoernigk], H.G.D.C. Francopolitae; Conference Infructueuse 
de Windisgratz, 4–12, 16; Fernere Continuation abgestatteter Relationen des verkleideten Götter-Bothens Mercurii, 
Darinnen enthalten, was sich in denen Monathen, September, October, November, u[sw]. am Ober-Rhein-Strom biß 
zu Außgang des 1674. Jahres notables zugetragen, 1675, 26; Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 210; Teutschlandes 
Politischer Fliegen-Wedel, 27; Der Teutsche Frantzoß, 169–75; Das wiederrechtlich von Franckreich gebrochene 
zwantzigjährige Armistitium, unpag. foreword i-ii, 4, 6-8; Das Regiersüchtige Franckreich, 26–27; Wieder-Schall 
deß Frantzösischen Cabinets, unpag. 72-73; Das Verkehrte Glücks-Spiel, 58–64; Franckreich schäme dich!, 49–50; 
L’Europe esclave, 4–8; Der... Straßburgische Staats-Simplicius... Mit den... Reyse-Relationen... Wegen restituirung 
der importantesten Reichs-Stadt Straßburg, observiret..., 1684, 101. 
21 Der Hoch-Teutsche Reichs-Secretarius, unpag. 1. 
22 L’Apologiste Refuté, 7–8. 





 While discussing events in these regions, pamphleteers continuously claimed these areas 
as “members of the Empire,”24 or “piece[s] of Germany,”25 even describing those territories 
already lost as the French king’s possessions “in Germany.”26 A 1675 pamphlet described the 
French occupation of Trier as an attack on the entire history, reputation, and honor of Germany. 
The occupation of the city by the French represented “all the rare adornment of antiquity 
diminished,/ how they defamed, what our past intellect/ thousands of years ago had 
established.”27 The author described “how Germany’s name so wickedly/ in Trier was jeered at 
and expunged” to the “shame” of “all of the empire.”28 The same pamphlet went on to recount 
and celebrate the restoration of the city from French hands, encouraging readers to “shake off the 
bondage of the enforced chains,/ now let Trier be the model of German victories,/ seek to restore 
your rightful borders based on ancient measures,/ show, how you, too, understand the art of 
ancient war.”29 Despite French attempts to mobilize their own versions of history to claim rights 
over these areas, anti-French pamphleteers would have none of it.30 Every new invasion, every 
                                               
24 L’Apologiste Refuté, 10. See also, Curiosorum (1.4), 1.4:47; Das Regiersüchtige Franckreich, 26–27; 
Frantzösische Verstörung der Alten Statt Hagenaw, welche im Januario dieses 1677. Jahrs vollzogen worden... dem 
Mordbrenner de la Brosse..., 1677, 2; Das wiederrechtlich von Franckreich gebrochene zwantzigjährige 
Armistitium, 7. 
25 Die Waagschale der Frantzosen, 1; Wieder-Schall deß Frantzösischen Cabinets, unpag. 72-73. See also, Der 
Teutsche Frantzoß, 170; Trajani Boccalini Gespräch und Discursen, 418–19; Das wiederrechtlich von Franckreich 
gebrochene zwantzigjährige Armistitium, 8; Memoires pour la Franche-Comtée; Teutscher Abschied; 
Straßburgische Staats-Simplicius, unpag. 2. “Empire” and “Germany” were used interchangeably throughout the 
pamphlets of this period, see Chapter 2: Patriotic Duty to Nation and Emperor. 
26 Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 77–78. See also, Die Waagschale der Frantzosen, 1. 
27 It is unclear whether the antiquity referenced here is Roman – with the Holy Roman Empire claimed as the 
rightful hair of the imperial crown – or Germanic – referring back for example to the Treveri, who gave their name 
to the city settled by the Romans who defeated them. Or perhaps it is simply a reference to more recent “antiquities” 
of the medieval and early modern periods. Thus the ambiguity of much of this rhetoric. Dem durchleuchtigsten 
Fürsten und Herren, unpag. 1. 
28 Dem durchleuchtigsten Fürsten und Herren, unpag. 1. 
29 Dem durchleuchtigsten Fürsten und Herren, unpag. 3. 
30 See for example, Antwort eines Freundes, auf einen Brieff, Betreffend die Rechte des allerchristlichst. Königes die 





new occupation, every new annexation provided an impetus to mobilize a long history of 
German cultural and territorial heritage. 
One important argument to support the claim for Alsace, Lorraine, Franche-Comté and 
the Rhineland’s Germanness was their historical inhabitance by Germans. In the seventeenth 
century especially, there was something of a competition to see who could “trace” – or at times 
simply invent – the longest lineage for one’s people.31 Writers looked to the authority of the 
classics, combing Caesar and Tacitus, but also Livy, Cicero, Herodotus, Plutarch and others for 
any “evidence” of their “ancestors.”32 Hans Jakob Wagner von Wagenfels, tutor and future court 
historian to Leopold’s son, Joseph I, provides an excellent example of this (mis)interpretation of 
history.33 Wagenfels’ work, published in 1691, is in many ways unique among the sources 
surveyed in this project. Extending to over 650 pages of history and analysis, complete with 
extensive original-language citations in Latin and Greek - though always followed by their 
German translation – it was published in a high-quality, large format and republished 
extensively. Truly, this work would probably not be classified as a “pamphlet,” and yet, despite 
the more elite, well-educated nature of the work, it contained many of the same polemic, pathos-
driven, arguments about contemporary events found in much lower-quality pamphlets. The work 
still encouraged German national pride and political and military action against the French. 
Indeed, the central argument of the book was to prove German superiority, over the French in 
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particular. One of Wagenfels’ main strategies was to recount the long, glorious, history of the 
Germans. He marshalled classic, medieval, and biblical references, with legends and repetition of 
received “wisdom” about the German character and lineage, all to explain the origins of the 
German nation, its people, and its unparalleled virtues. 
Wagenfels began by harkening back to stories from the Bible and connecting them to 
“knowledge” and legends of ancient tribes from the Roman period. Wagenfels argued that there 
were many different tribes, of varying linguistic groups, who all fell under the category 
“German.”34 What united all of these people as “Germans” were their shared virtues. As 
Wagenfels explained, they “surpassed… all other people [Völckern] in honesty and integrity.”35 
He spent an entire chapter discussing the bounds and bounty of Germany, working to rescue its 
“wondrous richness and excellence” from the criticisms of its detractors, both ancient and 
contemporary.36 Wagenfels recounted his history of what he called “our most praise-worthy 
German nation” in order to prove to his readers that “from the very beginning, until the present 
day [the Germans] have led all other residents of the wide world without equal in strength and 
bravery, and [they] still do.”37 
Another author also wrote of these ancient, brave “Germans, claiming they had lived 
west of the Rhine for millennia. This pamphlet was entitled, Spicilegium Antiquitatum 
Palatinarum, or Kurtzer Bericht von deme genannten kleinen Franckreich, dessen under 
Marckung den Rheinstrom, sampt denen an der Franckreichischen Seiten des Rheins allernächst 
gelegenen Städten und namhafftigsten Orten zur Pfalz eygentlich gehörend [Brief Account of So-
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called Little France, which, under the Boundary of the Rhine River, together with those 
Neighboring Cities and most notable Places on the French Side of the Rhine, actually Belonging 
to the Palatinate] (c. 1679).38 The author also combined biblical and classical accounts. He 
traced German ancestry back to Noah’s flood and the Tower of Babel. Like Wagenfels, this 
pamphlet dubbed as “Germans” a whole number of ancient tribes, from the Cimmerians to the 
Alemanni to the Celts.39 The author then discussed where these ancient “Germans” settled, as 
evidence for where the extent of “Germany” should be calculated in his own day. This author 
cited numerous Roman sources to show that the western side of the Rhine had been inhabited by 
“Germans” for millennia.40  
To even consider that these areas might have originally been settled by the French, and 
therefore belong to contemporary France, was simply preposterous in the eyes of this 
pamphleteer. He acknowledged with scorn the ongoing debates about the region’s national 
belonging. He explained that “the base, evil… riffraff” might believe that “the un-German 
people were living here from time immemorial, or even for all eternity.”41 Indeed “already a 
hundred years ago, not only among idiots, but also the most educated, it was asked and disputed 
of precisely this region and its occupants, whether they were French or German.”42 But the 
author then corrected both the “idiots” and the highly-educated by citing Renaissance humanist, 
Jakob Wimpfeling (1450-1528), who allegedly showed “that from now for over sixteen hundred 
years, the western bank of the Rhine, has been populated with Germans, [who] had indeed used 
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the German language, according to their ancient dialect.”43 Indeed, this was true even “at the 
time the French King of the name Carolus Magnus [Charlemagne], of German blood and 
descent.”44 It was “from this foundation” that the origins of the author’s present “little treatise” 
grew, to clarify the true belonging of this region and, in the authors’ words, to “please the lovers 
of the ancients and the fatherland.”45 Based on the evidence provided, the author insisted, “it 
must certainly [be] that Allemanni and Germans have already for so many hundreds, even 
thousands of years, lived here, used their natural Allemannic-German mother tongue, and in their 
way of life, all their doings, customs and gestures, conducted themselves as true Germans.”46 By 
conflating ancient and contemporary populations, this author argued that these “true Germans,” 
known through their language, customs, and way of life, had imprinted the land with their 
Germanness. The region, therefore, was as irreversibly German as its original inhabitants, 
regardless of how many French and French-speakers might live there now.47  
 What this pamphleteer was responding to was an ongoing contemporary debate that slung 
history and legend back and forth to lay claim to the cities and towns of Alsace, Lorraine, and the 
Rhinelands for either France or Germany. While anti-French pamphleteers constructed ideas of 
these areas’ primordial Germanness, pro-French pamphleteers were trying to prove its enduring 
Frenchness.48 And one of the most contentious figures in this debate was none other than the 
great king and emperor, Charlemagne. The fundamental sticking point regarding Charlemagne 
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was to which nation he, himself, belonged. These debates were so common that several unrelated 
pamphlets mentioned them in passing. In a pamphlet from 1684, for example, a Spanish 
character remarked “so there is, therefore, between the Germans and the French something of a 
fight, to wit whether the same emperor [Charlemagne] is from birth and descent a German or a 
Frenchman.”49 
Pro-French authors argued that Charlemagne was one of the greatest French kings, and 
therefore everything that Charlemagne conquered was French patrimony. According to Antoine 
Aubéry, Charlemagne’s empire, and therefore France’s rightful territory, began in Rome, 
included Cologne, Mainz, and Trier on the Rhine, and extended as far as Salzburg and Vienna.50 
In Aubéry’s own words, “one can verify the vast and prodigious extent of the French kingdom, 
which thus comprises the greater part of Italy, all of France as it is presently bounded, all of the 
Low Countries and all of Germany.”51 Aubéry in fact devoted an entire chapter to reinforcing 
this claim on Germany, explicitly entitled “The Greater Part of Germany is the Patrimony and 
Ancient Heritage of the French Princes.”52 Some had argued that since Charlemagne was 
crowned emperor, the current emperor, Leopold I, must be his heir.53 Aubéry, however, 
countered these claims in another chapter, entitled “Charlemagne Possessed Germany in the 
Capacity of the King of France, & Not as Emperor.”54 The Habsburgs and the Germans, Aubéry 
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insisted, could have no possible claim, based in either national heritage or inheritance right, to 
the lands conquered by “our Charlemagne,” King of the French.55 
This argument of course aligned well with Louis XIV’s expansionist ambitions and 
helped to lay an extensive groundwork for any territory the Sun King might have the opportunity 
to annex. Anti-French pamphleteers did not hesitate to point this out. In the satirical pamphlet, 
Der Teutsche Frantzoß [The German Frenchman], the main characters happen upon a fight 
breaking out between a Frenchman and a German one evening over dinner. The Frenchman 
claims that Metz rightfully belongs in France, citing, like Aubéry, the basis of the French king’s 
inheritance from Charlemagne. The German, however, answers the “Monsieur” by saying, “I 
hear quite well, that he has his king’s principles, by virtue of which he, out of an all-too-great 
hunger for power, [extends] the borders of his empire much too far, such that the dependencies 
extend into infinity, if one would only allow him.”56 Despite French ambitions, empty claims, 
and propaganda, the German knew that these territories all truly belonged to Germany.   
The crux of the arguments forwarded by anti-French pamphleteers, of course, was that 
Charlemagne was not French, but German. Some authors continued to argue along the lines of 
royal inheritance and claims of birthright. One generous author acknowledged that while Louis 
XIV may be descended from Charlemagne, “the House of Austria [is] much closer to Charles 
[Charlemagne] than the House of Bourbon.”57 Therefore if anyone had the better claim to 
Charlemagne’s patrimony, it was the Habsburg emperors, not the French kings. On the other 
hand, a less generous writer claimed that Hugh Capet, the elected successor to the last 
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Carolingian king, was actually a usurper who deprived the true descendants of Charlemagne of 
their inheritance. The Bourbons, who eventually succeeded to Hugh Capet’s crown through the 
Valois, therefore, had neither a true claim to the French crown, nor to Charlemagne’s former 
empire.58  
Other writers dispensed with the juridical discussion of inheritance and cut straight to the 
heart of the matter. As the author of Spicilegium Antiquitatem Palatinarum clearly stated, 
Charlemagne was simply “a true born German.”59 In support of this conclusion the author cited 
several historical authorities, from renaissance humanists to medieval and renaissance popes.60 
This would, according to their view of primordial Germanness, mean that Charlemagne’s empire 
had been and still should be German.61 But the author of Spicilegium made an even more 
fundamental argument about the territories along the Rhine: since Charlemagne was German, 
that meant that the area he came from must also have been German.  
Here, then, the author of Spicilegium marshals a similar argument to the one forwarded 
by authors who detailed the extent of ancient German settlement: the historical residence of 
Germans in a certain area made that area part of Germany. But, in the logic of the pamphlet, the 
argument also worked in the reverse: a certain area being a part of Germany makes its residents 
Germans. After discussing a variety of cities along the Rhine and in the Palatinate that the author 
claimed as part of Germany on the basis of various historical arguments, the author ended with 
the city of Ingelheim, which he claimed as the birthplace of Charlemagne.62 According to the 
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argumentation of the pamphlet, it was indisputable that Ingelheim belonged rightfully to 
Germany, “the proof” of which was that it “is without question the birth city of this celebrated 
hero,” of “Charles the Great [Charlemagne] and his same German blood and land.”63 Ingelheim 
and the surrounding areas were German because Charlemagne and his “blood” were German. 
But also, Charlemagne was German because Ingelheim and its “land” were as well. Thus, other 
pamphleteers were able to claim that “our age-old forefathers… already lived [in this region] 
before the time of Caroli M. [Charlemagne].”64  
With such a long and illustrious history of German ancestry in the contested regions 
along the French-Imperial border, the prospect that these territories could become permanently 
French was unacceptable. This disastrous outcome seemed like a genuine threat in light of the 
claims of pro-French authors that anything a French king conquered automatically became an 
inviolable part of France. In Aubéry’s words, “the domain and the conquests of the sovereigns 
have always been the domain and conquests of the state.”65 According to this French theory, no 
subsequent cessions, treaties, or conquests were valid; the original French claim always stood. 
This was an interpretation heavily encouraged and favored by Louis XIV, of course. Thus, it is 
no surprise that well-known Habsburg agent and author, François Paul de Lisola, himself a 
native of Franche-Comté, tried to counter this argument in his most famous pamphlet, Bouclier 
d’Etat [The Buckler of State, 1667].66 If the theory of French inviolability applied to all that 
Charlemagne conquered, Louis XIV not only had a right to claim those territories, but he had a 
duty to do so to restore France to its rightful borders. The historical Germanization of these 
                                               
63 Spicilegium Antiquitatum Palatinarum, 525. 
64 Das neugierig und veränderte Teutschland, 259. 
65 Aubery, Des justes pretentions du roy sur l’empire, Book I, Ch II.  





regions carried out by numerous anti-French pamphleteers, then, was an attempt to combat these 
deeper-seated concerns about their permanent loss to France and Frenchness. 
Indeed, many anti-French pamphleteers pointed to a sad example of this policy: Lorraine. The 
duchy of Lorraine had been occupied by France during the Thirty Years War, returned to its 
duke in 1661, and invaded by France again in 1670. The duke and his son were forced into exile 
at the Habsburg court, where they remained until they were restored to their duchy by the Treaty 
of Ryswick in 1697. The duchy was then invaded and occupied by Louis XIV again during the 
War of the Spanish Succession. Between 1670 and 1697, especially, the sad, exiled fate of the 
Dukes of Lorraine became a warning cry of what could happen to every other territory France 
coveted. Already a prior victim of French aggression, the territory could be forcibly and 
permanently incorporated into France, never to be recovered.67  
With the fate of Lorraine as precedent, pamphleteers mobilized pride in and knowledge 
of a historical sense of Germany and Germanness to urge for the protection and defense of 
territories under attack or threat of attack by the French.68 One pamphlet from 1711 was written 
with the express purpose of inspiring the new emperor, Charles VI, to redouble efforts to win 
back Franche-Comté (Burgundy) – conquered by the French, first in the War of Devolution and 
again in the Franco-Dutch War. The author, who wrote to encourage “the salvation of his 
beloved fatherland” and the “general welfare and peace of the Holy Roman Empire of the 
German Nation,” urged  
our most dear, newly elected sovereign and… emperor, the electors, imperial Fürsten and 
estates, even the worthy German nation in general, who from hardship and misery are 
half deceased… [that they] may graciously… set free Burgundy, [which has] sunk under 
the French yoke… [but] who hopes to rise like a new shining sun under the protection of 
their erstwhile princes and German bravery, and would strive with all strength to force 
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within appropriate bounds the enemy of the Arch-House [of Austria] and the Holy 
Roman Empire, raging in the west, so that the laurel and olive branch may continuously 
cast their shade over noble Germany.69 
 
With this rousing patriotic declaration, the author urged the emperor to rescue the inhabitants of 
Franche-Comté – members of the “worthy German nation” despite the fact that the area was 
heavily Francophone and ruled previously by Spain – from the oppression they suffered under 
French occupation.70 In doing so, the emperor would contain France within its previous borders 
and rescue a grateful people from oppression, a people who would risk their own lives to help 
him achieve this goal. The pamphleteer then added even more pressure on the new emperor by 
appealing to one of his most illustrious forbears – his namesake no less. “Emperor Charles V 
spoke… so favorably of the city of Besançon,” the author explained, “that I must properly set his 
words here, and doubt not, that in view of the very same Your Sovereign Majesty, the Emperor 
of the Holy Roman Empire… would resolve to rescue the frequently mentioned city of 
Besançon, together with… Burgundy from the despotic might of Louis XIV, King in France.”71 
Charles V, one of the most legendary “fathers of the fatherland,” had so highly praised this 
region.72 Would the newly elected Charles VI repudiate these sentiments, the author dared, and 
abandon these regions of “noble Germany” to their sad fate? This pamphlet mobilized an ideal 
sense of the German past as tied to this specific region for the specific purpose of urging the 
restoration of Franche-Comté as a priority in peace negotiations.73  
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 Other pamphlets called for protection against and vengeance for the depredations that 
France inflicted on “German” land and people. Already in 1672, one pamphlet described the 
state of Lorraine under French rule as nothing but a region “smoking, demolished, covered with 
debris, and its subjects, their eyes full of tears and their hearts heavy with sighs, overwhelmed 
with taxes, and enormous burdens.”74 The author then addressed every other city from the Rhine 
through the western half of the empire, from Cologne to Braunschweig and Hamburg, to warn 
that they could be the next to share such a fate. In 1675 a different author described the 
destruction of Alsace in similarly harrowing terms: 
Noble Alsace… the once resplendently fruitful lands stand now, sadly, nearly entirely 
destroyed. Peasant and townsman have flown, and the fumes, filled thick from 
murderous, incendiary smoke and gunpowder, cover the unseasonably dormant fields. 
Alike in dark and foul haze: villages and cities, fortresses and palaces have had the 
mantle of devastation laid over them, and what the… fiercely consuming fire, that raged 
against the people with furious wrath and will, has left over lay in the coal-blackened 
sorrow, showered over and over with the ashes of wretchedness and pity. 75 
 
One could expect such horrors from a bloodthirsty Frenchman like Louis XIV.76 Such laments 
were renewed with vigor after the outbreak of the Nine Years War, with the Sun King’s bloody 
destruction of the Palatinate.77 
 These descriptions of horror and destruction served the pamphleteers’ purposes in several 
ways. First, as with many political pamphlets, they were a way of sharing the “truth” of what was 
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happening with audiences far from the battlefields themselves. These vivid descriptions were a 
method to spark sympathy and outrage over what was occurring, to encourage a shared sense of 
experience even with readers on the opposite side of the empire. When combined with the 
historical Germanization of these regions, however, such descriptions of carnage became not just 
an unfortunate attack on a neighboring state or principality, but an incursion and insult to part of 
one’s own nation, occurring within the broader shared idea of Germany. Thus, action – whether 
to recover these regions from French occupation or annexation, or simply to punish the French 
for their aggression and audacity – became a question of protecting and avenging Germany 
instead of simply a political negotiation of aiding a sovereign state.  
Throughout the above examples, pamphleteers manipulated and mobilized history to 
construct a “German” past for territories, especially those targeted by Louis XIV’s expansionist 
policies. In doing so they presented vaguely defined, sometimes contradictory and often 
historically inaccurate arguments, but it was often the ambiguity of their categories that made 
this rhetoric of a historical Germany so politically useful.  
 
Historical Germans as Inspiration and Shame 
 
Pamphleteers mobilized history to project not just an ideal historical Germany, but an 
ideal historical German. The (mis)interpretation of history in this way solved both a rhetorical 
and a logical problem in the Wars of Louis XIV. Projections of the Germanness of specific 
regions allowed pamphleteers to campaign for their restitution or protection on the basis of a 
shared, German “history.” The “history” of the German people, though, could serve even broader 
interests. All of the positive qualities of the German national character were applied to past 





everything it meant to be a good German. This strategy simultaneously projected Germanness 
back into time immemorial while also flattering contemporary Germans to think that they shared 
such a glorious legacy. But pamphleteers also inverted this idea for political purposes. They 
harnessed an ideal German past to shame contemporaries for failing to uphold this legacy. This 
rhetoric worked to advocate for increased activity and resistance to France – to take up arms 
against the foreign invader as the great forefathers had also done. As the wars wore on, however, 
the legend of the glorious German ancestors also proved useful in explaining why the Germans – 
so martial and brave by nature – were defeated again and again by the supposedly weak and 
effeminate French. It allowed pamphleteers to maintain the idealization of the German national 
character amid the realities of the Wars of Louis XIV.78 
German intellectuals had been constructing an ideal German ancestor loosely based on 
historical, primarily classic, sources. This ancestor embodied every virtue and characteristic of 
the German national character.79 Many of the qualities of this ancestor, just like many of the 
qualities of the German character itself, were drawn from classical sources that had actually 
described various, ancient Germanic tribes. Classicist Christopher Krebs has distinguished 
between the ancient tribes that inhabited the same territory and contemporary Germans, but early 
modern writers did not strive to do the same. As Krebs describes, in the fifteenth century 
commentators had already begun to draw parallels across the millennia. Ancient Germanic tribes 
and contemporary Germans all lived on the same land and “geography thus guaranteed that the 
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present audience descended from the heroes of times past.”80 Pamphleteers also made these 
leaps, taking any ancient mention of “Germans” – as well as of the “French” or even the 
“English” - to apply unproblematically to the people they called by those categories in their own 
day. 
Pamphleteers seized on these easy comparisons and added their own “proofs.” 
Wagenfels, of course, was among the most ardent in this endeavor. For him, the most difficult 
part of telling the glorious history of the German people was narrowing down the illustrious 
examples from which he could choose. He described the problem as no small feat, for “our 
Germans have performed on the stage of this wide world at all times and in all places such 
marvels of human strength and bravery, that even if everything were true, which other people 
[Völcker] recount as legend about their idolized heroes, still, in view of the feats of our German 
heroes, it would only be held for a cheap shadow.”81 Yet Wagenfels did his best. According to 
him, Herodotus himself wrote about “our German people” and their “strength and bravery.”82 In 
Wagenfels’ retelling, Herodotus recorded how Darius of Persia amassed a massive army to 
overwhelm the Danube, but the “courageous Germans… only laughed” and instead, “in one day 
with great cries and laughter,” overwhelmed the Persian army.83 Plutarch, so Wagenfels 
explained, described the Germans as “powerful giants,” who were “so adept with manual skill, 
agility, and joyfulness in battle, that they were considered equal to the thunder and lightning.”84 
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Wagenfels recounted that the Roman historian Florus credited the “Germans” with essentially 
making and maintaining Julius Caesar as Roman Emperor. Wagenfels summarized, “and just as 
our Germans had set him [Caesar] upon the greatest throne in the world, so had they also 
maintained and defended him thereafter upon the same.”85 Through further “German bravery,” 
the Romans were able to subdue and conquer the “French,” not to mention the “English.”86 Just 
as with the “Germans,” Wagenfels here applied contemporary political categories to the ancient 
world; he was of course actually referring to ancient campaigns in the Roman provinces of Gaul 
and Britain. This particular bit of anachronistic extrapolation, however, made an especially 
salient point in the context of seventeenth century politics and warfare.   
Throughout this recounting of German heroism, Wagenfels both appealed to the authority 
of ancient sources and exaggerated most of what they said. Many of these ancient sources 
mentioned various Germanic tribes or Germanic soldiers, who did have a fearsome reputation in 
the Roman world. But the examples that Wagenfels elevated were usually offered as rhetorical 
gestures to the bravery and fighting prowess of the small numbers of Germanic troops present 
among Roman armies. Wagenfels played up such asides and presented “the Germans” as key 
figures, without which the Roman Empire would scarcely have survived. For Wagenfels and 
other pamphlet authors, it was not the purely academic authenticity of their claims that was most 
crucial, but how they were able to use the authoritative weight of classical sources to buttress 
their arguments about the “miraculous feats of human strength and bravery, that were performed 
by our ancestors.”87  
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Pamphleteers also looked to real historical figures as role-models and exemplary figures. 
These individuals, who may or may not have identified as German or even German-speakers in 
their own lives, became both ideals of German virtue and character and evidence of the long, 
illustrious history of the German people. Popular choices included notable emperors, from 
Charlemagne to Otto I to Charles V, and of course Leopold I.88 To a contemporary eye these 
choices do not always seem entirely logical. A pamphlet from 1672, for example, praised as 
German heroes both Charlemagne and Widukind, the Saxon leader whose forces Charlemagne 
fought for nearly ten years, defeated, massacred, and forcibly converted to Christianity.89 Just as 
the history of France’s vices could be traced through the behavior of its kings, so the history of 
“German” bravery was paralleled in the history of “Germany’s” emperors through the centuries. 
As Wagenfels noted, “what could other peoples [Völcker] boast of their brave men, which would 
compare with… our Germans?”90 
Wagenfels recounted the heroic examples of emperors such as Otto I, Maximilian I, and 
Charles V, but went beyond the obvious, imperial, candidates, too. Germans were not only brave, 
martial, and heroic, Wagenfels argued, but ingenious. In his words, “what [other] people 
[Völckerschafft] have ever brought into the world such brilliant inventions, as our Germans?”91 
Wagenfels celebrated such “German” achievements as the invention of the clock and 
gunpowder. He celebrated Johann Gutenberg’s “almost super human reason” in developing “the 
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noble printing press.”92 He celebrated the genius of German writers, such as the early 
seventeenth-century poet, Martin Opitz von Boberfeld, who Wagenfels referred to as “our 
German Homer.”93 He cited the unparalleled artistry of the painter Albrecht Dürer.94 After such a 
tour of German greatness, Wagenfels humbly concluded by summarizing all that he provided as 
“proof, that our Germans surpass all other peoples [Völckern] in art and reason.”95 The illustrious 
history of the Germans extended from the ancient world to the present day, and encompassed all 
of the virtues of the German nation, from bravery and skill in battle to reason, diligence, and 
intelligence. 
So then, a regular reader might wonder, if the Germans were so illustrious, why could 
they not defeat Louis XIV? According to the pamphlets, Germans laughed in the face of Persia’s 
mightiest ruler and single handedly propped up the greatest of the Roman emperors. And yet, so 
many contemporary Germans were sitting idly by – or, worse still, actively helping – as Louis 
XIV’s armies marched through imperial territories. These contemporary Germans, pamphleteers 
explained, were failing the illustrious examples set by their ancestors. Wagenfels expressed the 
sentiment well in the opening chapter of his work.  
How… many praiseworthy deeds the ancestors achieved through honest souls 
[Gemüthern] is a well-known and wholly indisputable truth, and not alone for their 
wonder and emulation, but also to best prompt the esteem and veneration of all of their 
name and lineage: how no less, that those, who have such character of ancient nobility 
and brave ancestors to boast of… despise the same noble past and do no little dishonor to 
their ancestors.96 
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This strategy was useful for the pamphleteers’ ultimate goal of encouraging resistance against 
the French. As one author exclaimed, “fight bravely after the example of your fathers!”97 
Pamphleteers used history to construct an ancient ideal of Germanness and German heroism, and 
then used that same ideal to shame contemporary Germans for not doing enough in the face of 
French aggression.98 They simultaneously flattered and humbled readers. They appealed to a 
glorious past for their nation and chided contemporary Germans for failing to achieve the high 
standard their ancestors had set. But these models also provided a ray of hope for recovery; the 
possibility of their own greatness was there in their German blood. They simply had to change 
their ways - to take up arms against the French - in order to fulfill that promise.  
Pamphleteers saw the juxtaposition between the vaunted Germans of the past and the 
compromised Germans of the present day as both a powerful form of indictment and a call to 
action. In one pamphlet using this strategy, the author flipped back and forth between the vices 
of contemporary Germans, and the virtues of their German ancestors. 
Then  
Germany was a university for well-learned people, and 
a battlefield for noble heroes: 
Now 
the scholars are respected little or not at all, 
nothing special is made of brave men. 
Impertinent windbags, disingenuous weathercocks, 
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baseless swindlers, wicked spies, 
who just like insatiable bloodsuckers, suck the land 
dry, are highly esteemed. 
Then 
when deceitfulness grew, so too did your 
prudence: 
Now 
the more deception grows, the more your 
wisdom drops. 
Then 
foreigners cultivated German respectability: 
Now 
Germans are the apes of foreigners, and want 
to imitate them in everything, whether good or evil.99 
 
The author then transformed his scolding into demands, asking, “would you like, then, to be led 
around by the nose/ even further down the wrong path?/ how long/ will you disregard/ the 
ancient rule of your fathers, the ancient laws/ of your fathers, the ancient mores of your 
fathers…/ the old German faithfulness, honesty, bravery,/ constancy and circumspection?”100  
 A pamphlet from 1672 went even further with this overlapping rhetoric of honor and 
shame, voiced directly from the mouth of a personified, female, “Germania.” Entitled Germany’s 
Speech from the Soul [Gemüthes-Rede Deutsch Landes], the pamphlet began with a direct appeal 
to “Germany,” lamenting the current downfall of the nation’s virtues: 
the day must be lost, on which I, Germany, was born. Of old I was an empress, who 
instilled fear and terror, a conqueror of worlds, and a provider of laws for all people. I 
was worshipped by kings, and those who are held to be the greatest monarchs of the 
present age…! The night must be lost in which I bore heroes [and] through heroes bred 
much splendid glory… My shame for these ill-advised, and, as much as it concerns the 
old bravery, thoroughly vacant times…! The day must be lost, in which I birthed 
Germans into this world, alas, Germans! The nights must be lost, the unhappy signs of 
the stars and their influence must be lost, when I… brought so many, yes, so many heroes 
into the world, who with unflagging honor and glory battled with their victorious arms 
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for their subjects’ livelihoods, for the wellbeing of their fatherland, for the liberty of their 
estate, for religion and for God.101 
 
The author brought forth all of the common tropes of German virtue and character – bravery, 
martial prowess, honor, masculinity – packaged in the language of historical Germanness. 
Germans had embodied all of these strengths and virtues from time immemorial, but those times 
now seemed to have been lost forever. Rhetorically, the sentiment was all the more effective 
coming, as it did, directly from the mouth of Germany herself. The author cited the examples of 
historical figures, “German” heroes, from legendary medieval kings to Habsburg emperors. But 
the historical construction of Germanness in this pamphlet was not simply an act of pride or 
vanity, nor yet justification for territory or sovereignty. The author contrasted this historical 
Germanness with the sorry state of Germany today. Yes, their ancestors were heroes, “but the 
Germans in the present time… tremble and quake before the royal name of the French.”102 
Referring again to the likes of Widukind, Charlemagne, and Charles V, Germania laments, “if 
you rise again from among the dead… if you should see… the German character, how it is (the 
words for it nearly stick in my throat) so exceedingly timid… what would you… say except that 
these people are not worthy, of carrying the name of the Germans?”103 The German heroes that 
contemporary Germans celebrate and admire would be ashamed to rank as members of the same 
nation with them. Specifically, this pamphlet targeted the various Fürsten who allied with Louis 
XIV during the initial stages of the Franco-Dutch war.104 The manipulation of a constructed 
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glorious German past was mobilized for the very specific purpose of trying to shame these and 
other imperial states into action against the French. 
  A pamphlet from the following year employed a very similar strategy, chastising 
imperial powers allied with France through the mouthpiece of “Mother” Germany.105 In the 
pamphlet the author cited ancient sources, like Cicero, to “prove” the virtues for which Germans 
were once famed. “Are you not ashamed,” the author then cried, “when you read in the old 
scribes, how brave the ancient Germans fought for their fatherland?”106 This pamphlet brought 
the unflattering comparison between the heroic ancestors and the contemporary allies of France 
to an even finer point.  
It is well to be found in the histories, that the Germans, for the maintenance of their 
liberty, around the year 200 A.D., waged frequent bloody war against the French, who 
had invaded their land, and drove them various times from the battlefield. Have you 
never read in the imperial histories, how often your dear ancestors rebuffed the ancient 
Roman emperors on the battlefield: how many battles they delivered: how much blood 
they shed, until they completely gained possession of the title, dignity, and majesty of the 
Roman Empire: and with what effort and great expense they have maintained such 
dignity until now? And you… striving now, out of shameful self-interest and insatiable 
greed, to deprive your fatherland of such a jewel, and to give it to a foreign people 
[Volck].107 
 
The author listed all of the depredations that French troops had committed in German cities and 
regions and blamed such chaos and destruction on contemporary Germans who had forgotten the 
example of their forbears.108 It was not simply the honor and reputation of the Germans that was 
at stake by failing the ancestors, but the wellbeing, lives, and livelihoods of their fellow 
Germans. They held in their hands the legacy of the past as well as the future of the empire. 
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 During the Franco-Dutch war, the imperial entities allied with France often bore the brunt 
of such historical shaming. But the strategy was easily adapted throughout future conflicts. In the 
conclusion of the 1682 pamphlet, H.G.D.C. Francopolitae, Leopold I, among others, came under 
fire for failing to live up to his ancestors’ examples. This pamphlet was written shortly after 
France forcibly annexed Strasbourg, and in the midst of French attempts to seize other territories 
and “reunite” them as parts of France. A year before an armed resistance to these “reunions” was 
finally organized and implemented, the author advocated for such a resistance, by criticizing 
everybody he could think of - the emperor, imperial Fürsten, “the rest of the German aristocrats 
and others” – for their lack of action in the face of French seizures.109 The author painted a vivid 
picture of Germany itself – the physical features of land and water – overcome with shame at the 
passivity of the emperor and other German leaders. “Its banks are reddened,” the author claimed 
in reference to the Rhine, “not, as in the past, from Roman and Gallic blood spilled by your 
ancestors, but rather from shame, that, while it previously had been raised to a victorious 
battlefield of German honor and bravery, it now should be reduced to a footstool of French 
arrogance.”110 “This Rhine is ashamed,” the author reiterated, “to henceforth be called the 
boundary,” of those who would not lift a hand against the armies who stood on its banks, even to 
protect their own freedom and wellbeing.111 “Your ancestors would have willingly granted 
passage, in order to avenge themselves on Gallic degeneracy and Roman arrogance,” the 
pamphleteer asserted, preferring head on conflict to cowardly avoidance.112  
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While much of these pamphlets read as condemnation, many of them also provided a glimmer of 
hope. Appealing to a glorious German past, the pamphlets also offered the possibility that 
contemporaries could aspire to such a level of virtue and bravery again in the future. All they had 
to do was to follow the advice of the pamphleteers – to emulate the martial spirit and bravery of 
their forebears and, in the many pamphlets with a pro-Habsburg bent, to unite with the emperor 
and take up arms against the French. After shaming contemporary Germans from the mouthpiece 
of Germania, the author of the 1672 pamphlet, Gemüthes-Rede, ended with reference to current 
events. “Just look around yourselves!” the author urged, everything from the Netherlands to the 
empire was in flames.113 But all hope was not lost. Germania appealed to the Germans she had 
just so thoroughly shamed. 
Stand together in unison, protect German liberty with your own blood, where it is 
necessary. In doing so you will not be the descendants that differ from your ancient 
ancestors, and I will rejoice, that German virtue and bravery, which you absorbed from 
me [Mother Germania] with your milk, has been encouraged in you: so would one then 
write your noble signs of glory and your heroic, knightly deeds, inflicted against all 
enemy approaches, in the chronicles or histories, namely under the title, which reads: 
That Germany can be protected by nothing other than just and only German virtue and 
bravery!114 
 
If the German powers - the author of the pamphlet referred specifically to the Reichstag - could 
just band together, they could face down their enemy with strength of arms like their ancestors 
had once done. This would prove to everyone that, despite what most thought, the virtues of the 
ancient Germans were not yet dead! If only the empire could be convinced to unify and act 
against France – as the Habsburgs hoped they would – then they could loudly proclaim that 
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Germany had not changed. They were just as capable of defending their lands and their people as 
they had been in the time of Tacitus if only they would so choose.115  
  A decade later, the author of Francopolitae also ended with a rousing appeal, this time 
focused on the importance of the blood that ran through the veins of current and future Germans. 
After claiming, again, that the land of Germany itself was ashamed of its current inhabitants for 
their lack of action in the face of French reunions, the author appealed to any who may still 
harbor the smallest fraction of their ancestor’s virtues. “Up then,” the author cried, “all you, in 
whose veins still one authentic drop of German blood flows! You in whose hearts still stirs 
something implanted of the spirit of your glorious ancestors!”116 The author mixed this rhetoric 
of blood and ancestry with a sense of duty to protect and recover territories that had 
“historically” been part of Germany. Referring to Lorraine and the lands “there on the banks of 
the worried Rhine,” the author warned that “your fortune, disaster, and complete salvation is 
shown to be closely and tightly linked with that of the territories of the upper-Rhine.” 117 Ever 
since this region had been “lost,” the “enemy has trampled your liberty, as well as you, under 
foot.” 118 “So then rouse yourselves now, you of blood and greatness of heart… shake off from 
your arms and hands the bands of mistrust and revenge, and those of shameful self-interest, 
which hobble you, reach out the same for you and your brothers’ preservation!”119 All Germans 
were brothers, this pamphlet argued, and therefore their interests extended far beyond the petty 
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divisions of imperial politics, to the broader benefit of Germany itself. And Germany was in 
serious danger from Louis XIV’s ambitions. 
The author appealed not just to pride in German ancestors, but also urged contemporaries 
to think of future generations of Germans if they would not concern themselves with the past.  
Is the distress of your brothers… your own honor, the devotion avowed to the fatherland, 
not obliging enough to assign you to your duty? Then at least consider this… fairly could 
you and others complain about your ancestors, … [who] let the harbors of Marseille and 
Toulon, along with other neighboring lands of the German Empire, be charmed [away]… 
how much more fairly, however, would your children cry out for revenge on you, who 
through the loss of the Rhine doubled the enemy’s power.120  
 
All they needed to do to recover the glory and bravery of past generations, and to protect what 
was left of Germany for future generations, was to put aside their distrust and disunity and 
realize that France was the true enemy.  
These two pamphlets employed the tactic of shaming Germans for their lack of bravery 
and virtue while suggesting a way that this weakness could be remedied. On the other hand, 
some pamphlets instead used the concept of ancient German virtues to compliment those they 
chose to celebrate, setting them apart as a contemporary example of how one might continue and 
maintain the German spirit of old. In the same way that a lack of ancient virtues was a cause for 
shame, these pamphlets promoted the persistence of those same virtues in particular cases as a 
rare cause for celebration among contemporary Germans. One, written in 1675, was a celebration 
by Friedrich Funcke (1642-1699) of the victories of the house of Braunschweig-Lüneburg 
against the French at Trier. In this pamphlet, Funcke celebrated “the brave Guelph hero” 
specifically for maintaining the virtues of his ancestors. The pamphlet recounted the heroic 
exploits of Duke Georg Wilhelm on the battlefield, weapons bared, surging forward on the 
                                               





battlefield, coming to the aid of Leopold I and the defense of the Rhine. Funcke described all of 
this as the duke’s “hereditary courage, the ancient bravery.”121 Such valor, inherited from his 
German ancestors, still ran strong in the duke’s veins. The evidence for it was his active support 
of the emperor and military defense of German territory against the French.  
Another example focused not on an individual person, but specific German cities. Das 
Verkehrte Glücks-Spiel was written around 1685, after the seizure of Strasbourg and various 
other territories “reunited” with France, and after the conclusion of the ill-fated twenty-year 
truce. The pamphlet provided a tour of events that had transpired since the Thirty Years War, 
primarily between France and the empire, but also with Sweden, England, Spain, and the 
Netherlands. The author of this pamphlet discussed the seizure of Strasbourg at length, providing 
reasons why France turned its sights on it as well as why the city succumbed to the French so 
easily, drawing the conclusion that Strasbourg had been slowly corrupted from its original 
Germanness.122 The pamphlet contrasted the corruption in Strasbourg with north German cities 
the author deemed to have better protected their German virtues and freedoms. Like their 
ancestors before them did against the Romans, “these cities lying to the north… Hamburg, 
Lübeck, Bremen, and others,” had retained “their ancient and for so long maintained German 
liberty,” in the face of foreign threats.123 Moreover, these cities were less susceptible to foreign 
cultural corruption, and thus far more capable than Strasbourg of maintaining their Germanness, 
in terms of both mores and political affiliation. “There is no reason to suspect that they would 
also let themselves be so easily enticed and brought into the net,” the author explained, because 
they “measure their character by the old Saxon rigor and love of liberty, still a noticeable share 
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of which makes itself be felt.”124 In both of these pamphlets the maintenance of ancient German 
virtues and dedication to the ways of the “ancestors” are not just means of rectifying a 
contemporary decline, but actual characteristics still to be found and admired in certain pockets 
of Germany. Thus, the hope provided by resurrecting the ways of the brave ancestors was not 
just theoretical, but was presented as something that Germans were still doing, albeit in small 
numbers.  
The argument that contemporary Germans were failing their brave and honorable 
ancestors was, of course, rhetorically effective. The pathos-centered strategy mobilized both 
pride in being German and personal shame at having let down one’s forbears. But it was 
effective in another way, too. This argument helped solve a particular logical problem that 
contemporary Germans, and pamphleteers in particular, began to face. Over and over again in 
political pamphlets, the Germans as a nation were lauded as martial, brave and strong.125 They 
had defended their freedom against the greatest armies in history and never let themselves bow 
to foreign conquest. And yet, as the years of French aggression progressed, it was clear that 
German armies were proving no match for the warpower of Louis XIV. If Germans were by 
nature martial heroes, why were the French defeating them so easily? The rhetoric of failing the 
ancestors allowed pamphleteers to maintain the fiction of the German national character while 
explaining the continuous setbacks. Germans had always been everything the pamphleteers 
claimed, and more; the problem was that their contemporaries had forsaken the ways of their 
forefathers and thus lost the martial spirit. One can see the development of this logical coping 
mechanism in the pamphlets as the years and battles dragged on. Initially, pamphlets lauded the 
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martial prowess and were more dismissive of the French threat. In the midst of the Franco-Dutch 
war, after several years of easy French victories, the dismissive attitude disappeared and German 
martial prowess became something contemporary Germans had lost. By the 1680s, the decline of 
German virtues had transfigured into a perceived general cultural malaise, despite moments of 
optimism that corresponded with German victories. 
By 1671, at the outset of the Franco-Dutch War, French military prowess had already 
been proven to some extent, but not primarily against German troops. Thus, it is no surprise that 
two pamphlets printed in that year were optimistic and celebratory about German might and their 
chances against Louis XIV’s armies. Indeed, one pamphlet, written in the voice of a Frenchman, 
described French military power as a farce. “Do not let yourselves be deterred by our great war 
preparations,” the “born Frenchman” assured German readers.126 French power was mostly just 
trappings of silver and gold, with fancy feathers in their caps.127 The author even referred to 
French war preparations as “more of such child’s play,” and turned to historical examples to help 
explain the advantage that Germans had.128 Ultimately, the Frenchman assured his audience, the 
French “certainly could not hold out against German might.”129 If even “a small resistance 
occurs” to the first French forays they would be quickly rebuffed.130  
Another pamphlet printed the same year was very similar in content and tone. It also 
dismissed the French with historically-based insults, saying “think oh, you formerly true hearts 
of the Germans, on that, which the Roman historian, Livy, said… that the French in open battle 
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at first behave like men, but in the end behave more like women.” 131 With this gendered 
construction, the author suggested that though the French seemed like brave and strong warriors 
– hallmarks of masculinity – when push came to shove they revealed their true nature as weak 
and cowardly – effeminate as women.132 Instead of a children’s game, this author described the 
impressively-arrayed French armies as nothing but a “puppet show” – an act.133 “The French are 
not raised with the strength of the Germans,” the author explained.134 Therefore, despite the 
“exceedingly great preparations for war” of the French, the author assured the Germans that they 
were more than a match.135 
By 1673 and 1674, however, German armies had experienced first-hand the might of the 
French, and this was reflected in the pamphlets. Early French campaigns against imperial forces 
had shown that while the Germans could secure isolated victories, the French were more than a 
match for them.136 By the later years of the war, and especially by the end of the negotiations of 
the Peace of Nijmegen (1678) France had secured its position as the military powerhouse of 
Europe. The transition is illustrated well by a series of pamphlets portraying different “visions” 
related to and discussing current events. Entitled, Curiosorum, nec non politicorum, the series 
ran to a total of eight volumes, organized into two sets of four, all successively published 
between approximately 1676 and 1680. In one of the earlier volumes, published around 1676, a 
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group of Germans are discussing whether to continue fighting against France or to make peace. 
One member of the group scolds his fellows, saying “Germans, celebrated for bravery… you set 
your great reputation and power in danger, and request to negotiate a treaty with your enemy, 
which will bring not only your entire fatherland to despair, but also your enemy to more courage 
and arrogance than they have ever had before.”137 The German was amazed that his fellows were 
losing heart in the current war, and that they would even consider making peace with their wily 
and untrustworthy enemy. This was not the course of action one expected from such “Germans, 
celebrated for bravery.” Instead the German encouraged his fellows that the only way forward 
was to keep fighting. “Trust your strength,” the German character insisted, “apply your courage 
to the enemy,” and they will soon reveal their true weakness.138  
The following volume, printed around the same time, contained a discussion between a 
German and a Dutchman, where both criticize the other for letting the French trample all over 
their countries. The Dutchman launches into a song as retort, singing “blessed were the times,/ in 
which the Germans were revered,/ they were different by far,/ Alas! Now everything is amiss… 
let yourselves [be] warned,/ ancient German heroes… Oh the very great shame!”139 In both of 
these examples, written well into the final years of the Franco-Dutch War and after the opening 
of the negotiations for the Treaty of Nijmegen, the characters are clearly lamenting the decline of 
the German fighting spirit from the levels of its fabled history. In comparison to the pamphlets 
from 1671, the bluster and confidence about German bravery vis-a-vis the French are gone, and 
the kind of concern and shame surrounding contemporary Germans’ status in comparison to their 
ancestors is palpable. Together with the other pamphlets cited above, these pamphlets suggest 
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that by at least 1675 the rhetoric of failing the ancestors had gained traction in response to the 
defeats of German armies against the supposedly effeminate, lazy, and weak French. 
By approximately 1680, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Nijmegen and the beginning 
of French reunions, the final issue of Curiosorum summarized the tragic downfall of German 
bravery and military prowess. In this issue, the goddess Athena argues with Mars, and asks him 
how it came to be that he was now “through and through goodly French,” when “before he was 
well German.”140 Mars admits in return, “the truth is” that the Germans had once been martial 
and strong, but “unfortunately, our [martial] art and bravery in Germany is spurned,” while in 
France the king worships war with “respect, money, and sustenance to satisfy,” both in the midst 
of conflict and while at peace.141 Germans, once such a warlike and renowned nation, had 
declined so far as to allow the French to surpass them in everything at which they had once 
excelled.  
Pamphlets printed in the ensuing decade took this argument of German decline and 
corruption even further, arguing for a general cultural malaise that ate away at all of the intrinsic 
virtues and characteristics of the German nation.142 A pamphlet published in 1682 featured a 
complicated and detailed parable which centered entirely around a young German disobeying the 
wishes of his father, being corrupted and maimed through his cowardly and dissolute decisions, 
and finally returning home to his father’s great shame having achieved nothing and rendered 
himself useless in the defense or benefit of Germany.143 This lack of optimism continued 
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throughout the 1680s, persisting through the bloody, opening battles of the Nine Years War in 
which large swathes of Rhineland territory fell quickly to the French.144   
In response to this incursion and the scorched-earth policies Louis XIV’s armies carried 
out in the Palatinate, Baden, and Württemberg, however, the Imperial Diet declared war in 
February of 1689, thus launching the most united imperial war effort of Louis XIV’s reign.145 
Even stalwart allies of the French, such as the Elector of Bavaria, joined with the Emperor in this 
conflict. What Louis XIV had intended to be a limited, small scale conflict, quickly grew to a 
multi-front war that France could ill afford. Perhaps even more importantly, after almost losing 
Vienna, imperial and allied forces had finally triumphed over Turkish armies in the east and 
reengaged their French foe with renewed confidence and strength. It seemed, for the first time 
since the early years of the Franco-Dutch war, that the tables might be turning in favor of 
German military strength.  
It was in this climate that Wagenfels wrote his work. Wagenfels, like most pamphleteers 
of the time, suggested a broad, deep-seated cultural malaise as the chief explanation for German 
setbacks and defeats in recent conflicts. But, unlike most of the pamphlets published during the 
1680s, Wagenfels evinced a shred of optimism at Germans’ ability to recover the ancient ways 
and virtues of their ancestors. After laying out the victories and accomplishments of numerous 
historical German “ancestors,” Wagenfels declared that this history was proof that “the ancient 
German strength and bravery was not buried with our ancestors, but was rather unalterably 
passed on, until it came to us.”146 He then reviewed several contemporary examples, from the 
Siege of Vienna to the territories lost to French reunions, as proof of how far Germans had 
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fallen. Echoing the sentiments of Mars and Athena in the last issue of Curiosorum, Wagenfels 
cried, “and why then should foreigners understand war better than Germans, when war has been 
waged by no other people in the world as much as by our Germans, and when the foreigners 
themselves arrived only recently in our fatherland and [only recently] have cared to learn this 
science under our German masters of war? Yes, it seems quite laughable.”147  
And yet, Wagenfels ended his work with a long and detailed discussion arguing that the 
“Empire of the Germans” was the fourth and final world monarchy, as foretold by Daniel in the 
bible.148 As the final monarchy, the empire could never be overcome and would last until the end 
of the world itself. “And what is the current war,” Wagenfels declared, “but a fulfillment of the 
prophesy of Daniel about the fourth empire?”149 The Turkish forces were being driven back and 
German armies had secured victories along the Rhine. Thus, Wagenfels ended his work with the 
simple conclusion, presented in the words of Tacitus himself, that “Our enemies are only 
powerful through our discord and disunity, not through their own strength and bravery, [they] 
foster honor for their armies from our flaws.”150 When the Germans put aside their petty 
squabbles and joined together in force with the emperor, as they had in the current war, they 
could regain their ancient strength and nobody could stand against them. 
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Writers in the Wars of Louis XIV harnessed the power and authority of history, 
specifically the weight of classical sources, to construct and perpetuate ideas of a distinct 
Germany and German people whose history projected back into time immemorial. They used the 
historical construction of Germany, and specifically the Germanization of contested territories in 
the borderlands between France and the empire, to advocate for territorial restitution and the 
protection of and vengeance for areas invaded and conquered by French armies.  
Pamphleteers also constructed an ideal of German virtue and bravery, embodied by 
distant, archetypal “ancestors,” to embolden contemporary pride in a glorious, shared, “German” 
legacy. They then inverted this ideal, shaming contemporary readers for having failed their 
glorious ancestors through their lack of action in the face of French aggression. This rhetoric 
allowed pamphleteers to advocate for armed intervention and unity with the emperor on the basis 
of recovering an ideal German past and proving one’s worth to be called German. As the wars 
dragged on, this rhetoric of shame and failure came in handy yet again as a way to maintain the 
fiction of innate German superiority while simultaneously providing an explanation for why the 
French were beating German armies so consistently. Rhetoric of national decline and failing the 
ancestors helped explain German losses against Louis XIV.  
But this idea of failing the ancestors was not simply a matter of shame or pride. 
Pamphleteers argued that it had serious political and military consequences. Some could already 
be seen of course, as German armies were unable to defend German lands against French 
depredations. But pamphleteers also argued that by losing touch with their historical, essential 
Germanness, they were putting the entire well-being and future of the empire – of Germany – at 





Germans were not just failing to live up to the illustrious examples of their ancestors, but were 
losing their core Germanness altogether. The fear of national decline, and, eventually, national 







CHAPTER 4: FRENCH CULTURAL INFILTRATION 
 
In the late seventeenth century, French culture began to take Europe, and the Holy 
Roman Empire, by storm. As one pamphleteer complained, “the hair must be combed in the 
French manner and the body clothed fashionably; the tongue does not blurt out more than three 
or four words, without having to drop French phrases.” In short, he finished, “all comings and 
goings must be conducted à la Françoise.”1 As another described, even in Germany if one 
“cannot speak French, [one] must, in much of society, remain as silent as if they were in Paris in 
the company of nothing but Frenchmen.”2 Both high and low, whether in travel, clothing, 
hairstyles, language, or manners, there was a mania for all things French. By the end of the 
seventeenth century, the French had become such dominant arbiters of taste and style that many 
considered fashion a national trait of the French.3 Even amid years of bitter warfare and rivalry, 
imperial inhabitants could not resist the temptation of having the latest creations from France.4  
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As with most trends, this one had its fair share of critics, both within France and beyond. 
Writers criticized the excessive consumption of their age, the lighthearted manners and seeming 
flippancy of the young, the vain and superficial influence of fashion which captivated the mind 
and emptied the purse. Pamphleteers in the empire echoed these critiques. Throughout Louis 
XIV’s reign anti-French pamphlets decried the influence of French culture, the excessive 
consumption encouraged by la mode, and the pernicious moral, national, and political 
consequences it was having on German populations. But many writers also saw the influence of 
French culture as something far more nefarious: an intentional military tactic launched by Louis 
XIV to make invasion and conquest of Germany that much easier. 
For, they argued, while consumption of French culture corrupted German morals, it also 
corrupted German souls. The greatest danger facing Germans, according to pamphleteers, was 
the danger of becoming French. Pamphleteers mobilized this fear of national corruption in order 
to maintain anti-French sentiment and opposition to Louis XIV across the empire, particularly in 
the fraught decade of the 1680s. At the height of Louis XIV’s political and military power, fear 
of his armies and his aggression was very real across the empire. Pamphleteers capitalized on 
this fear and mobilized one of their own. The fear of French cultural infiltration built on 
projected ideas of cultural and political “Germanness” inextricably linked with the empire. 
Pamphleteers argued that if Germans allowed themselves to be culturally transformed into 
Frenchmen, French political and military conquest would inevitably follow.   
 
French Fashion and Culture  
 
Over the course of the seventeenth century, France replaced Italy to become the cultural 
arbiter of Europe. French clothing, fashion, hairstyles, modes of sociability, even the French 
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language increasingly dominated the European cultural sphere.5 The many courts of the Holy 
Roman Empire were not immune to this cultural campaign. Many courts in the empire emulated 
not only Louis XIV’s fashions, but his symbols of power and authority in their own attempts to 
solidify and build up their positions.6 Young, elite Germans favored Paris as the setting in which 
to learn sociability, refinement, and worldly manners on their Grand Tours.7 Across the Empire 
even those who were unable to travel to France adopted French fashions, manners, and modes of 
sociability. Even in Vienna, the heart of France’s arch-rival, consumption of French culture 
flourished through the exchange of goods, servants and craftspeople, clothing and fashions, and 
language.8 Nor was this cultural consumption limited to the highest elites of the court. In both 
France and beyond, those in the middle and lower classes participated in a constant cycle of 
emulating elites in French fashion and cultural consumption.9  
Pamphleteers decried this mania for all things French. As another writer described, “We 
shame ourselves to go [around] in such clothes, which were not concocted in the fanciful mind of 
a French tailor. We drive in no carriage, [unless] the exact same was used previously at the court 
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of Versailles.”10 Another pamphleteer claimed that the moment a child was born in Germany, it 
must immediately be given to a French wet-nurse, to encourage consumption of French culture 
from the first breath.11 A third declared, “if only it were possible, we [Germans] would gladly 
engage a French language-master for [our] children while still in their mother’s womb.”12 French 
culture influenced fashion, language, comportment, even the hobbies and pastimes of Germans 
across the Empire. But for what purpose? Critics viewed this cultural consumption as useless and 
wasteful; the variety of pamphleteers’ critiques was matched only by the vehemence with which 
they were voiced.  
All this French poison, so pamphleteers claimed, entered the German bloodstream 
through travels to France. Only in Paris itself could one find the latest fashions, personally 
observe the sartorial splendor of the French, and, most importantly, gain access to the most 
refined spaces of sociability and the education those venues provided.13 Many pamphleteers, 
however, argued that these tours were just a way for France to seduce unsuspecting Germans 
with no tangible reward. First, such tours cost an excessive amount of money; funds which could 
have been better spent in the empire itself.14 Second, pamphleteers maintained that nobody 
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learned anything of actual use in France. Germans as young as fifteen years old, those in the 
“fresh bloom of youth,” were sent “not by the hundreds, but by the thousands to France” and 
they came home having learned nothing but “a bon jour, or bon soir... and [how] to make 
themselves comfortable among the young ladies.”15 And even these small niceties many forgot 
within a year of being home.16 Out of every ten people that went to France, hardly even one or 
two could “with a basis in truth say that they derived use out of their trip, and that they did not 
badly invest their money.”17 Even those who did learn something of politics could not be said to 
have profited, as it was well known what the French meant by “politics”: “namely, to plunge 
land and people into ruin… to hold to no faith or word, to insult and deride the greatest rulers, to 
commit the crudest transgressions and vices.”18 Such travels were hardly worth one-twentieth of 
what they cost, and often did “more harm than good.”19 Instead of returning from such a tour 
with education and refinement, more often “sages go forth [and] fools come back.”20 Many 
Germans returned with over-inflated egos and a taste for luxury and extravagance.21 Plus, tours 
were the conduit by which all manner of French vanities and vices infected Germany. 
Pamphleteers argued that French hobbies, manners, language, and fashion had all increased in 
popularity as a direct result of increased travel to France. “It is certain,” one pamphleteer 
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explained, “that we have been consistently harassed by the French from within and without, ever 
since our travels in France… began to be frequent.”22 The Germans had been reduced to nothing 
more than “apes” who mimicked everything French, “whether for good or evil.”23 Indeed, one 
author concluded, Germans had long been deluded to think that they could learn anything of use 
by traveling to the “seductive and poisonous France.”24 
Far from receiving edifying lessons on politics and warfare, pamphleteers argued, most 
who traveled to France spent their time mastering the subtleties of French pastimes, notably 
dance, swordplay, gambling, and tennis. Following the example set by the light-footed Louis 
XIV himself, French dance had taken on such social and cultural importance that its aesthetics 
influenced all manner of daily movement.25 As one pamphleteer sneered, even when walking 
these days “the feet turn on the street as if they want to dance a [French] ballet.”26 Swordplay 
and dueling had become so popular in Germany that attempts to ban the practice had failed in 
several cities and universities.27 Many young people returned from France with gambling 
addictions that led to the loss of immense sums. In Paris especially, one could find “more than a 
hundred” of these “tennis houses” in which to waste one’s time and one’s money.28 Such 
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activities brought nothing but idleness and frivolity. They provided Germans with no practical 
skills, but were rather yet another example of French waste and luxury in the minds of 
pamphleteers. 
Another motivation commonly used by contemporaries to justify the Grand Tour was 
language acquisition. France, in particular, was quickly becoming the international language of 
communication across Europe, the eponymous lingua franca.29 And yet, as with French 
pastimes, many pamphleteers maintained that learning the French language was useless for the 
majority of Germans. First, because few actually made any significant progress in the language, 
and most quickly forgot what little they had learned.30 A character in one pamphlet was unable to 
even answer in French the simple question of how long he had spent in Paris. “He never had it in 
mind… to learn the French language there… only eating, drinking, courting and being idle.”31 
Second, even those who did gain some fluency in French reaped only meager rewards. As one 
author quipped, “this language makes nobody smarter, wiser, or more learned; rather it serves… 
only… so that one can reveal one’s ignorance in one’s mother tongue as well as in French.”32 
Few indeed were the diplomats or international merchants who truly needed French for their 
work, the rest wanted simply to be able to “give a French compliment” or “toast one’s health” 
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and other “vanities… which were certainly not worth the effort.”33 Another character had so little 
use for the language that he spoke French only to his oxen, and was unsurprisingly considered a 
complete fool by his household.34  As several pamphleteers teased, nobody would pay more for 
your produce at the market, nor would your servants or farmhands work harder, just because you 
could speak a few words of French!35 
Finally, there was the problem of fashion. A pamphleteer from 1691 encapsulated the 
objections to this new mania when he decried fashion as the wearing of “oft changing, vain, 
asinine, regularly promiscuous clothing… that one adopts and loves [simply] because the 
conceited worldlings invent and love it from one moment to the next.”36 And both the wealthy 
and the poor had come down with the fashion bug. In 1684 one writer described:  
there comes often in Germany a poor fellow, who is from no… fortune, arrayed in silk 
and other expensive fabrics, and over this hangs so much ribbon, expensive lace and the 
like, that frequently many wear more on their bodies than they have in their coffers, or 
are likely to earn in an entire year; nevertheless they hold it for an insult and great 
diminishment of their vanity, if they should [wear] a frock of domestic cloth.37 
 
From dresses, to coats, to wigs, and hairstyles, all manner of clothing, accessories, and styles 
related to appearance suddenly had to be both à la mode and à la française.38 Pamphlet after 
pamphlet complained about the “peacocks” that strutted around “dressed all in French 
galanteries and trinkets.”39 Germans had become so “drunk” on French fashion, that they felt the 
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need to array themselves “even more splendidly and luxuriously than the native [French].”40 
Whether at home, at church, or at holidays and grand occasions, nothing could stop “the French-
inclined Clothing-Apes” from making their fashions “always more colorful and more curly, 
bigger and wider… higher and higher.”41  
The trend that was despised perhaps more than any other was the fontange.42 This 
hairstyle had been invented in 1680 by one of Louis XIV’s mistresses, when she tied her hair up 
in such a way that her curls spilled down onto her forehead.43 By the next day the same style was 
being copied by ladies throughout the court, and sparked a series of variations and modifications 
over the next several decades. By the 1690s, this style was often constructed using a fabric-
covered base of wire netting to provide both height and structure for the hair, lace, fabric, jewels, 
and other adornments piled on top. The constructions could reach such a height that they would 
sometimes exceed two feet. To many critics, this hairstyle seemed to embody everything that 
was wrong with French fashion in general. All this excessive coiffing and building of the hair 
was seen as unnatural, artificially built up, and a way of reaching beyond what was right and 
God-given.44 Moreover, the fact that its inventor was the king’s mistress led many to decry this 
hairstyle as “a whore’s costume” that would “unwind all the bands of modesty and fasten instead 
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42 There were actually entire pamphlets devoted almost exclusively to the hairstyle. See, Der Gedoppelte Blas-Balg 
der appigen Wollust, nemlich die erhöhete Fontange und die blosse Brust, mit welchen das Alamodische und die 
Eitelkeit liebende Frauenzimmer in ihren eigenen, und vieler unvorsichtigen Manns-Persohnen sich darin 
vergaffenden Hertzen ein Feuer der verbothenen Liebes-Brunst anzündet... zu guter Warnung und kluger 
Vorsichtigkeit vorgestellet, und zum Druck befordert... (Ernestum Gottlieb, 1689); Die mit lebendigen Farben 
Abgemahlte; Heilsame Artzeney-Mittel. 
43 The mistress in question was the seventeen-year-old Marie-Angélique de Scoraille, Duchesse de Fontanges. 
DeJean, The Essence of Style, 30–33. 
44 Die mit lebendigen Farben Abgemahlte, 10–12, 16. The first part of this pamphlet reproduces word for word the 




Figure 6: Monument to the Fontange. Frontispiece to both Der Gedoppelte Blas-Balg der 
appigen Wollust, nemlich die erhöhete Fontange und die blosse Brust… (1689) and Die mit 
lebendigen Farben Abgemahlte, und mit der verführischen Blossen Brust vergesellschafftete 
Eitele Fontange des heutigen Frauen-Zimmers… (1690). This image depicts two women arrayed 
in fashionable dresses, displaying heavy cleavage, and elaborate fontanges. Both women are 




Figure 7: The Corruption of Fashion. Frontispiece to Das Von Teutschen Geblüth und 
Frantzösischen Gemüth Leichtsinnige Frauen-Zimmer… (1691). This image depicts two women 
sporting their fontanges primping in front of mirrors, wearing dresses adorned in multiple layers 
of finery, while a demon serves as their chambermaid and an angel of death descends from the 
heavens. A third woman, also wearing a pristine fontange, is being consumed by both a 
frightening monster and the fires of hell – suggesting eternal damnation and torture for her sins 
of vanity. There is also a spider web superimposed over the center of the image connecting all 
the figures, illustrating the suggestion made by many pamphlets that these women had been 
ensnared by France’s enchanting webs.  
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the heavy chains of brazenness.”45 The frivolity of paying large sums to have a hairdresser 
construct such “a monument of vanity” on one’s head was exemplary, for many pamphleteers, of 
the evils that all French fashion represented (see Figures 6 & 7).46 
And, worse still, fashions changed – rapidly! – necessitating a cycle of constant 
consumption by adherents to always remain au courant. The concept of fashion “seasons” that 
still rules the clothing industry today was invented in 1678. The new fashion press began to share 
special updates on style changes, including the rapid addition of each season’s associated 
“colors,” for consumption and emulation across Europe.47 Pamphleteers complained about these 
“clothing-fools” who needed to be kept constantly informed, with “monthly correspondence” to 
Paris, only to find out whether or not “the king has altered a ribbon on his coat.”48 This wasteful 
mania encouraged nothing but consumption for consumption’s sake. Previously in Germany, 
“the good ancestors made do with one good, dignified and everyday frock… that he inherited 
from his ancestor.”49 But these days, “nobody wears a frock for more than half a quarter of a 
year,” at which point even the servants refuse to wear it for fear of being out of fashion.50 The 
honorable German ancestors had no need of such vanities, and yet contemporary Germans “walk 
like peacocks around our ancestor’s graves” not realizing that those same ancestors, if they were 
to come back to life, would “laugh” at such fashions and then “immediately crawl in fright back 
                                               
45 Die mit lebendigen Farben Abgemahlte, 16, 13–14. See also, Das von Teutschen Geblüth, 57–58, 61, 67.. 
46 Das von Teutschen Geblüth, 54. 
47 DeJean, The Essence of Style, 48–49. 
48 Das von Teutschen Geblüth, 5; Teutschlands Macht, 27; Der Verkleidete Götter-Both, 57. 
49 Der Verkleidete Götter-Both, 56. See also, Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 31. 
50 Der abgezogene frantzösische Staats-Rock, unpag. 28. See also, Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 24; 
Das von Teutschen Geblüth, 46. 
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into their dark graves.”51 This was how deeply “this [French] nation [Nation] infected and vexed 




Consumption of French culture was so widespread that many actually called for an all-
out ban on importing French goods, at the very least in times of war.53 One pamphleteer even 
suggested imposing “grave penalties [for] all discussion of the French,” while another 
encouraged those who had not yet been lost to the Franco-mania, to shun the company of such 
“worldlings.”54 Many of the pamphleteers’ critiques were echoed throughout Europe – even 
France itself. Many onlookers complained about the sheer expense involved.55 Others 
complained that it blurred the lines between social classes.56 And still others warned of the 
danger of moral corruption; fashion and honnêteté could both be considered masks or unnatural 
adornments – deceptive, impure, and contrary to the will of God.57 But pamphleteers in Germany 
also addressed this issue from a different standpoint. Fashion was not just an immoral, wasteful, 
                                               
51 Das von Teutschen Geblüth, 31; Teutschlands Macht, 8; Der Verkleidete Götter-Both, 56. 
52 Threnemann, Der Französische Mord-Brenner, 3–4. 
53 Wassenberg, Aurifodina Gallica, 47, 50; Der Hoch-Teutsche Reichs-Secretarius, unpag. 40, 54-55; Teutschlands 
Macht, 11–12, 13, 15–16; Der Verkleidete Götter-Both, 55; Der abgezogene frantzösische Staats-Rock, unpag. 31-
32; Der geropffte Hahn, 5–6; Das neugierig und veränderte Teutschland, 80–81, 121, 180, 199–200; Das von 
franckreich verführte Teutschland, 28–29, 35–36; Europaeische Rath-Stube, 104; Threnemann, Der Französische 
Mord-Brenner, 15; Wagner von Wagenfels, Ehren-Ruff Teutschlands, 640. 
54 Der Hoch-Teutsche Reichs-Secretarius, unpag. 54; Das von Teutschen Geblüth, 16, 9. 
55 DeJean, The Essence of Style, 16; Ulrike Graul and Bärbel Zausch, eds., Frau Hoeffart & Monsieur Alamode: 
Modekritik auf illustrierten Flugblättern des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts. Ausstellung vom 21. juni bis 19. Juli 1998, 
Aus eigenen Beständen. (Halle: Staatliche Galerie Moritzburg Halle, 1998), 8; Roche, The Culture of Clothing: 
Dress and Fashion in the "Ancien Régime”, 57.  
56 Bohanan, Fashion Beyond Versailles: Consumption and Design in Seventeenth-Century France, 14; Graul and 
Zausch, Frau Hoeffart & Monsieur Alamode, 14; Roche, The Culture of Clothing: Dress and Fashion in the "Ancien 
Régime”, 55.  
57 Roche, The Culture of Clothing: Dress and Fashion in the "Ancien Régime”, 53.  
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luxury – it was an immoral, wasteful, French luxury.58 That last fact made the danger of fashion 
and all its related products, behaviors, and activities even more dire for the German soul and way 
of life. By wearing French fashion, imitating French manners, and speaking the French language, 
Germans were losing intrinsic parts of their national character, and, if allowed to continue, their 
Germanness entirely. 
This fear of losing their national character and identity because of what one wore or how 
one acted was based on an early modern understanding of the relationship between the external 
and the internal.59 In the modern world, external appearance has no effect on internal identity. 
Rather it is usually the internal that determines the external, as what we wear and how we choose 
to adorn ourselves is seen as a reflection of our personality and our identity. As Charles Taylor 
described, the modern person thinks of their thoughts, ideas, feelings, identity, as being “within” 
them, while “the objects in the world which these mental states bear on are ‘without.’”60 Taylor 
contrasted this with the early-modern self, which he argued was externally defined: by one’s 
social relations, one’s religious affiliation, one’s socio-economic or political status. Clothing and 
other external markers often served to represent one’s place in society, but they could also reveal 
one’s identity, personality, and inner moral worth. As Jacques Revel described, “movements of 
the body and face, bearing, and dress were taken as psychological and social signs, from which a 
                                               
58 Critiques of fashion and luxury, of course, were not new themselves. In the sixteenth century similar rhetoric had 
been leveled against the Italians. And as French fashion grew in prominence over the course of the seventeenth 
century these critiques began to be built against them instead. See, Krebs, A Most Dangerous Book, 125, 129–30. 
59 I am using the term “identity” here as an intellectual category to encompass all of the ideas of self, character, 
intrinsic quality, and belonging that are discussed in the pamphlets. This was not a term that pamphleteers 
themselves used.  




vocabulary of recognition was created.”61 Physical deformities were viewed as signs of internal 
deficiencies.62 Witches could be identified by visible marks that betrayed their secret relations 
with the devil.63 Every physical gesture and movement, every item of clothing or appearance, 
could be read as displaying one’s moral, psychological, or social characteristics and thus betray 
even the most intimate secrets of a person, secrets they might not know themselves.64 
In this way, early modern external markers were not just representative of one’s internal being, 
but also constitutive. Clothing and appearance, along with behavior, comportment, manners, and 
moeurs could actually affect one’s internal state. From Erasmus to Castiglione, early modern 
writers embraced the belief that “if the body reveals a man’s innermost secrets, it should be 
possible to influence and redress the dispositions of the soul by regulating the visible outward 
signs.”65 Referring again to the fontange, one pamphleteer explained that the hairstyle was not 
only a symptom of internal vanity and corruption, but itself a cause of further physical and moral 
degradation.66 And therein lay the true danger of French culture. Embrace of French fashions, 
emulation of French behaviors, even speaking the French language, were seen by many as signs 
of one’s internal Frenchness. Like a witch’s mark, such external behaviors could betray one’s 
secret loyalties to the French crown or French nation, marking them as a traitorous prince or 
                                               
61 Jacques Revel, “The Uses of Civility,” in A History of Private Life: Passions of the Renaissance, ed. Roger 
Chartier, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, vol. 3 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989), 
167. 
62 Lisa Verner discusses how the medieval idea of a “monster” was externally defined – a body part that was overly 
large or overly small, the abundance or lack of a body part (e.g. a finger or toe), and any other “aberrations” from 
the “normal,” Lisa Verner, The Epistemology of the Monstrous in the Middle Ages (New York: Routledge, 2005), 2–
3. 
63 Lyndal Roper, Witch Craze: Terror and Fantasy in Baroque Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 
54. 
64 Lyndal Roper described examples of women who had suspicious marks checked in the fear that they might 
unknowingly be witches. See Roper, 54; Revel, “The Uses of Civility,” 170.  
65 Revel, “The Uses of Civility,” 170. 
66 Die mit lebendigen Farben Abgemahlte, 4. See also, Das von Teutschen Geblüth, 21–23. 
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agent of Louis XIV. Still more nefarious, and far more dangerous, however, emulation of the 
French could actually corrupt the morals, virtues, and identity - the intrinsic Germanness - of 
even the most unwitting, innocent, and loyal Germans, wholly against their will. A constant 
refrain in the political pamphlets was that “foreign clothes beget foreign mores, customs and 
vices.”67  
Authors objected so strongly to the adoption of new hobbies in part because they viewed 
them as vain, useless, wastes of time, but also because they were French wastes of time. The 
French supposedly enjoyed dancing more than the Germans because of the former’s “volatile 
and fickle temperament” and their “mercurial and restless nature,” which made them “inclined to 
such frivolous exercises more than the Germans.”68 Dueling was considered endemic among the 
“hot-headed” French, who could not resist their natural inclinations even after the practice was 
officially banned.69 Tennis, too, was viewed as a uniquely French activity that was based “on a 
French fantasy” and involved “far too much heated action or movement” for the coolheaded 
German, who is “by nature, not the same in terms of hot-tempered and volatile activity.”70 In an 
apt metaphor for all cultural imitation, no matter how good a German player was, they could 
never defeat the French at their own game. Rather, through such slavish mimicry, they put 
German loyalty, the German character, and German honor at stake, and with it the future of the 
                                               
67 Der Frantzösische und das Heil. Röm. Reich, verderbende grausame Greuel und Abgott Ludwig der vierzehende, 
König in Frankreich (Bern, 1689), unpag. 22. See also, Das von Teutschen Geblüth, 21.  
68 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 61; Das neugierig und veränderte Teutschland, 240–41. One 
pamphlet argued that at the very least Germans should stick with German dances, instead of imitating French ones. 
Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 62. 
69 Dueling was very popular in France, despite repeated royal declarations against the practice, Kiernan, The Duel in 
European History, 67, 72–76, 95–98; Threnemann, Der Französische Mord-Brenner, 4. For more on the “hot-
blooded” French see, Chapter 1: Frenchness & Germanness. 
70 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 91–92. 
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Holy Roman Empire. With the growing dominance of France as the arbiter of fashion and culture 
throughout Europe, it seemed only a small step to their political and military dominance as well. 
Far from just an idle amusement, France and French culture were portrayed as nefarious 
influences that kept Germans enthralled. French culture was described as a deadly cocktail of 
“French poison,” that, once exposed, many poor souls could find no remedy to “discharge and 
drive out the French poison from [their] German Blood.”71 Pamphleteer after pamphleteer 
described France as a trap. Often this played upon the association of France as feminine and 
German as masculine.72 France was a “seductive labyrinth” that ensnared all who entered.73 The 
French became temptresses, ensnaring German heroes and stealing their vitality. The French 
were accused of being “sirens of sensuality” who seduced unsuspecting Germans until they were 
“led into and entangled in this enticing garden.”74 One author portrayed all French women as 
femme fatales. “Adorned in the most beautiful and luxurious [manner], of enchanting eyes and 
gestures,” the author described, “they take care to bind and capture the hot-tempered souls of the 
young travelers, so that many never again know how to uncoil themselves from these webs in 
which they must rather perish and decay.”75 Another version of this portrayed the French in the 
biblical role of Delilah, while the Germans played the hero, Samson. “You German Samsons,” 
one author exclaimed, “find yourselves a French Delilah, who with caresses or importune 
manners would discover your strengths and your weaknesses, reveal them to the empire’s 
                                               
71 Der Teutsche Frantzoß, 40. See also, Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 81.. 
72 For more on these gendered, national associations see, Chapter 1: Frenchness & Germanness. 
73 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, unpag. preface 3, the author refers to the “Frantzösische Irrgarten” 
throughout the text. See also, Der Teutsche Frantzoß, 163–64, 224. This analogy is potentially an interesting 
inversion of the traditional depiction of France as a walled garden, see Beaune, Birth of an Ideology, 292–98; Keller, 
Figurations of France, 11–40. 
74 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, unpag. preface 5.. 
75 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 78. 
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enemies, and so… deliver you indirectly into their hands.” The same author begged, “show 
yourselves not as courtesans, but rather as German heroes.”76 Another pamphleteer warned, 
“Samson/ guard yourself against these Philistines… trust no Delilah.”77 Nobody was safe from 
the French webs of intrigue. They “have so many means and devices to tempt and lure to 
themselves foreign, especially German, souls, that even the cleverest and most coolheaded 
cannot guard himself well enough, let alone the young, hotblooded, and inexperienced people, 
who resemble heedless and eager birds that remain afterwards stuck in such deceitful snares.”78 
All were susceptible, but those in the most danger were the young, inexperienced Germans sent 
each year to Paris for their Grand Tours.  
Pamphleteers routinely lamented Grand Tours in France as useless and wasteful, but that 
was the best-case scenario. Many Germans, pamphleteers argued, returned from Paris broken 
and corrupted. While they were by nature inclined to serious, earnest matters, in France they 
learned only “money squandering, debauchery… brawling, courtoisie and other wastes of 
time.”79 Then they brought those vices back with them to the empire, where they spread like 
wildfire.80 In this way, even just the relative few who could make such a long and expensive 
voyage, could “infect, ruin, or even completely change an entire nation [Nation].”81 And there 
was little hope of rehabilitating such corrupted youth, for once “the spirit is first captured by 
                                               
76 Teutsch-lands Klag- Straff- und Ermahnungsrede, unpag. 15. 
77 Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 6. See also, Europäischer Glücks-Topf, 90. 
78 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 78, see also 82-83. 
79 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 27. 
80 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 74. 
81 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 74. See also, Schöne Raritäten, 12. 
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such vanities, very rarely do its thoughts [then] turn to something proper.”82 In other words, 
innocence lost was lost forever.  
In the early modern understanding of these pamphleteers, imitation of any foreign culture 
was considered corrupting, but it was especially serious when the foreign culture in question was 
so drastically different, as the French was from the German.83 Pamphleteers discussed the 
influence of culture as if it was a disease: if endemic to a population, that population becomes 
acclimated and builds resistance to its negative qualities, but among those with no previous 
exposure, a foreign culture could have a terrifying effect. For this reason, among the French 
themselves, their culture’s “vanities and temptations of the soul [are] quite old and defended 
against, so that they no longer let themselves be so captivated and overpowered.”84 Among the 
Germans, though, “such galanteries and wonderful vanities [are] something new and 
extraordinary.”85 To imitate people with such a vastly different character was a dangerous idea. 
Germans were so thoroughly enchanted with all things French that they never once considered if 
these qualities “are proper for their nation [Nation] and humor or not.”86 
The metaphor of French culture as a disease was a popular one. Germany was “infected 
with the foreign, new-French, illness” and needed to see a doctor, one pamphlet exclaimed.87 
Another writer styled himself as just the thing, calling himself a “spiritual doctor.”88 “Ach 
Franckreich! Kranckreich!” the doctor exclaimed, creating a very entertaining pun that rhymed 
                                               
82 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 27. 
83 For more on the perceived opposition of Frenchness and Germanness see, Chapter 1: Frenchness & Germanness. 
84 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 63. 
85 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 63. 
86 Das neugierig und veränderte Teutschland, 203. See also, Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 55. 
87 Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 7. See also, Das neugierig und veränderte Teutschland, 180; Das an der 
Teutschen Colica, unpag. 3-4. 
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the German name for France, Frankreich – literally kingdom of the Franks - with a constructed 
word meaning, Krankreich - literally kingdom of the sick. “How many thousands of people have 
you already infected in the body and in the soul?” the author continued, “Infected in the purse, 
infected in Christianity, infected in goods, infected in honor and integrity?”89 French fashions, 
this author continued, were an all-consuming “plague,” a “cancer” that brought otherwise healthy 
people to their “death bed.”90 All of Germany was falling victim to this contagious infection.91 
As one author described, “the entire head is sick, the whole heart is weak, from the soles of the 
feet up to the head, nothing is healthy.”92 A third pamphleteer despaired that freeing the Germans 
from this “vanity” would be akin to waking the dead, while a fourth agreed that “it seems to be a 
hard cure, but the illness on the other hand is desperate… If the wound is not bound, the blood 
will run until death.”93  
The symptoms of this deadly disease were nothing less than national corruption. Whereas 
the Germans had long been famed for their morality, religious devotion, honesty and virtue, ever 
since the “reckless” tours to France and the consumption of French culture had gained 
popularity, “the upright German candor [has] perish[ed].”94 Scores of pamphleteers over the 
course of Louis XIV’s reign criticized the French for irreligiosity and sexual libertinism.95 These 
critiques were expanded upon further in conjunction with fear and outrage over the extent of 
                                               
89 This saying is actually offset in the original text in a larger and bolder font, expressing the vigor of the 
exclamation and perhaps also the author’s satisfaction with his own wordplay. Heilsame Artzeney-Mittel, 79. 
90 Heilsame Artzeney-Mittel, 6. As his medical title suggests, the author saw this affliction as not just a physical 
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91 Die unteutsche Freyheit, 1. 
92 Flagellum Dei, 95. 
93 Schöne Raritäten, 12; Teutschlands Macht, 7. 
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95 See Chapter 2. 
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French cultural influence in Germany. The result was a belief that buying French clothes and 
embracing French manners were simply the gateways that let in all manner of French sin and 
vice. In this way France, under the guise of la mode, made “virtues out of vices, and vice out of 
virtue,” inverting the entire moral edifice within Germany and destroying the German national 
spirit in the process.96 
One of the greatest poisons to be found in France was atheism. One writer declared that 
in Paris alone one could find 50,000 atheists, “or people who believe in no god.”97 Atheism in 
the early modern period could denote any range of heterodox beliefs, from critical questioning to 
unbelief, heterodoxy, or blasphemy.98 A second author defined an atheist in more deistic terms, 
as “super-clever Philosophastri, clever-fools who through their folly want to affect and hold 
forth as if God the Almighty has set loose everything in the world.”99 The term “atheist” was also 
used to denounce immorality - “godlessness in the sense of evil living.”100 As David Wootton 
described, the “quintessence” of early modern atheism was “the pursuit of pleasure and power 
without fear of divine retribution.”101 While Germans were honest, upstanding, and pious, the 
French were irreligious and notoriously immoral.102 But accusations of atheism were also 
                                               
96 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 50. See also, Das neugierig und veränderte Teutschland, 204. 
97 Threnemann, Der Französische Mord-Brenner, 15. See also, Wagner von Wagenfels, Ehren-Ruff Teutschlands, 
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98 David Wootton, “Unbelief in Early Modern Europe,” History Workshop, no. 20 (1985): 86; Gavin Hyman, A 
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connected to prevailing fashions of sociability. Many questioned whether the ideal, French, 
honnête homme could be bound by weighty things such as religious belief and devotion.  
Pamphleteer after pamphleteer hurled critiques of atheism at the French that encompassed all of 
these understandings. One entertaining example shows how pamphleteers collapsed the 
sociability and disbelief to make them mutually reinforcing, peculiarly “French” traits. In the 
pamphlet, a heavily-accented Frenchman explains to his German acquaintance why he has no 
fear for his immortal soul:  
O’ bagatelle. Ey belief, my good sir ‘as too much intelligence, zat ‘e should belief God 
‘as anyzing to do with wordly zings…. Ze common peuple belief zat; zey ‘ave no 
understanding. I ‘ave ze opinion, zat ze soul ees dead, like ze ‘orse, ze bird, ze cow. Eef 
eet should not be dead, I would not want to be such a great fool, as to search with so 
much work ze fortune and pleasure in zees world. No, no, believe not, Sir, zees fantasy. 
Eet ees bagatelle.103 
 
The Frenchman dismisses belief in the soul’s immortality or God’s involvement in daily life as 
something only the common people do, those who do not have “understanding.” The honnête 
and galant Frenchman was far too refined for such common thought and could not be tied down 
by weighty matters such as belief in God. As a refined French gentleman, he could confidently 
say that it is all nothing more than “bagatelle,” nonsense, merely a trifle. Such an attitude was 
even more dangerous, in the eyes of the pamphleteers, because godlessness was not considered 
shameful in France. This “atheism,” like other aspects of French sociability, was said to be 
“vaunted as a particular cleverness,” among even scholars and clergy.104 Indeed, this behavior 
was considered so widespread that France was commonly described as “this atheistic nation 
                                               
103 Hanß Knorr, 68–69. The original text is printed in German, but, while there is no difference in fluency between 
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104 Die Waagschale der Frantzosen, 79. 
 
 183 
[Nation],” and once even “a real witches-nest.”105 By spending time in such a country, Germans 
could be seduced away from their natural honesty and religious devotion into such “vices, 
atheism and other reckless principles.”106 Germans, pamphleteers claimed, had once been famed 
and admired for their dedication to religion. Their “praiseworthy and Christian ancestors had… 
virtuous rules, from which they did not lightly deviate.”107 Now, however, things were quite 
different. “Godless and promiscuous fashion” was unchristian and the deeper enthralled they 
became to French culture, the more Germans began to admire the ungodly insouciance of 
Frenchmen who dazzled their companions with atheistic maxims.108 For the fashion-obsessed 
Germans, atheism had become a virtue instead of a vice.109   
The dangers of atheism extended beyond just distracting Germans from religion and 
undermining Christian tenets; it was both a cause and symptom of moral corruption. As Michael 
Hunter described, “a kind of circular connection was presumed between theoretical irreligion and 
bad behavior,” such that the one was both symptom and evidence of the other.110 ⁠ The 
pamphleteer who described atheists as “super-clever Philosophastri” continued on with his 
definition. An atheist’s disbelief in God’s earthly power left them in a state where their actions 
had no consequences: they were free to “rave and rant as they want.”111 The heavily accented 
Frenchman also displayed this connection. Freed from worry over his immortal soul by disbelief, 
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he was able to pursue “fortune and pleasure in zees world” to his heart’s content.112 Unburdened 
by religious piety, the French lived in a world without morality or consequences. It was no 
wonder that the French character, and Louis XIV’s behavior, was so abhorrent. As one pamphlet 
described, “out of such a vile abyss of atheism emanates a terrifying swarm of devilish vices… 
with which sins the French surpass all other Christian peoples.”113 Thus, “everything wicked, all 
sins that otherwise occur in the rest of the world, are nothing but a puff of smoke against all that 
our eyes saw daily in Paris.”114 Full of atheists and debauchery, Paris was “a bottomless pit of all 
the bad fortune that can occur under heaven.”115 But these days such devilish sin and vice was 
not limited to Paris. It was spreading through Germany, too. The empire was increasingly rife 
with “treacherousness, corruption, [and] disloyalty,” to the extent that Germans, too, had become 
“atheistic and unscrupulous people.”116  
Atheistic immorality also went hand in hand with sexual immorality. James G. Turner 
explained this relationship in his analysis of the term “libertine.” In addition to meaning sexually 
licentious and hedonistic, Turner identified two other semantic fields that the term could signify 
in early modern Europe: philosophical materialism and antireligious skepticism. According to 
Turner, use of the concept in any of these three fields, could reciprocally call to mind the other 
two. This correlation is evident in the pamphlets. The deceitful and hot-blooded French were 
thought to embrace infidelity and sexual profligacy. The same pamphlet that described Paris as 
“a horrifying mass of atheists” also included “whores, adulterers and scoundrels” in its 
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accusation.117 “The city of Paris,” the writer concluded, “is a stable full of vile harlots,/ Stay 
away, if you do not want to lose your soul there!”118  
Like atheism, critiques of illicit sexuality were also connected to French sociability. As 
one pamphleteer described, “the libertinage of the giddy youth [in France] is… intolerable” and 
“the manner of loving among the French is nothing more than a galanterie.”119 Accusations of 
French infidelity also aligned with stereotypes of France’s natural perfidy: they violated their 
word in affairs of state as well as of the heart. According to the author of the Portrait de la 
nation françoise (1704), in France both men and women “promise eternal fidelity, [but] they 
reserve in secret the right to love all that appears amiable with no detriment to the first 
attachment.”120 An earlier pamphlet described a room full of “elegant and expensively arrayed 
gentlemen and ladies.” Each of the women, although they “seemed indeed quite old,” was still 
“galant[e] and gracious enough to allow themselves to be adored.” And to that end each had her 
own gentleman seated near her to provide caresses.121 This sexual openness would perhaps have 
been shocking enough, but the narrator then proceeded to explain that each woman was already 
married and known to have had multiple other affairs. To explain this behavior, pamphleteers 
referred once again to the humoral makeup of the French people. Because the French by nature 
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were supposedly more heated, French women possessed such “impulsive ardor and desire” that, 
even when married, “due to their fiery and intense amour, [they] seldom remained with one 
person alone.”122  
Sexual licentiousness did not stop with female infidelity, however. One author decried 
that “among other transgressions, which are fashionable in France, one also finds… sodomy, not 
only between people, but also with cattle and goats.”123 Another author reported to “have known 
French nobility, who boasted… how they went out together with their sons to the brothels, and 
found their greatest pleasure in the alacrity of their children, as each wanted to be the first to 
engage in illicit sexual activities.”124 These libertines “reap from these vices such glory, that one 
would rather burst than not boast of it.”125 The French king, as in so much else, surpassed his 
countrymen with his own his sexual liaisons. Referring to the Sun King’s many mistresses and 
illegitimate children, one pamphleteer explained that the king wanted to be a true “father of his 
people,” so he reintroduced “the sacrament of polygamy” and proceeded to “live in open 
whoredom and adultery.”126 To the French, this behavior, like so many other sins and vices, was 
“no evil, [but] rather a galanterie.”127 
Pamphleteers objected so strongly to French libertinism because, they argued, sexual 
liaisons were the real purpose behind all of those lighthearted and pleasing manners that 
Germans traveled so eagerly to France to learn. With French galanterie, German youth “could 
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better capture the eyes and feelings of the conceited ladies.”128 Indeed sexual licentiousness was 
one of the only things Germans learned well in France. Paris was full of loose-women and 
prostitutes, and the French saw no problem in visiting them as often as they liked, while the 
foolish “Teutschlinge” excused it all as simply “the liberty of the French” and eagerly followed 
suit.129 Under the mask of “learning the language,” young Germans could escape the “notice” of 
their families and communities and indulge “their excesses and other illicit amusements.”130 But 
once corrupted in France, these youth could not help but bring these habits back home with them. 
One pamphleteer, after accusing France of being the origin of prostitution, blamed the recent 
influence of French culture for introducing prostitutes to Germany. Thanks to this, he 
complained, Germans both high and low would now rather visit their mistresses and prostitutes 
than go to church or school.131 Again the earnestness and piety of the German national character 
was falling victim to French influence. 
 Corruption, both physical and moral, was a symptom of time spent in France, but the 
disease also had another carrier: fashion. Fashion itself was seen to be an inducement to 
libertinism and sin. Some authors saw all fashion as sinful, while others decried the 
lasciviousness of certain trends.132 One target in particular was the contemporary fashion for 
wearing low-cut and revealing dresses, that highlighted “the shamelessly undone breasts.”133 
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This trend, pamphleteers argued, was both an inducement to and a symptom of sexual deviance, 
vanity, and immorality. Just as there was a reciprocal relationship between atheism, libertinism, 
and immorality, such that one could be either cause or symptom of the other, so too, was there a 
reciprocal connection between one’s appearance or behavior and one’s character – or identity. 
One author scoffed at the idea that one could dress like the French without becoming fully 
corrupted: 
Namely, the tree good? The fruit wicked. Foolishness! Should it then no longer be true, 
what so many brilliant theologians have taught to date; that the inward lets itself be 
known through the outward: that the exterior by God’s children must be a witness to the 
interior; that which the old verse confirms: so, the condition of the clothes, so performs 
the heart [Qualis Vestis erit, talia Corda gerit].”134  
 
Even something as simple as buying a new outfit or arranging one’s hair differently could lead to 
disaster.  
Such profligacy reaped only harm. While atheism carried the threat of spiritual and moral 
corruption, libertinism also brought the very real threat of syphilis and other sexually transmitted 
infections.135 As one author described, the effects could be severe:  
Such smitten Teutsch-frantzosen, who, through such lewd activities in the French 
labyrinth, quite often continue to injure and even lose their health; note the[ir] blood, 
which is infected to such an extent through French lust and ignited through such 
lecherous ardor, that it subsequently infects and destroys the entire body through inner 
scorbutic rot which many times attacks the whole substance and eats it up so that many 
living bodies must fester and decay.136 
 
In such a way, “notwithstanding even the body and blood, the soul thereby becomes poisoned 
and defiled.”137 Without their natural morality, piety and virtue, Germans were wasting away 
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from the inside, eaten up by the nefarious influences of France. “It is therefore better,” one writer 
concluded, “that one does not come all too close to this pestilential fire and enchanting-poison, if 
one does not want to plunge his health, both of body and soul, into danger and ruin.”138 For once 
the soul of the German had been destroyed, one would finally succumb to the French influence 




Beyond atheism, beyond sexual immorality, by far the biggest threat cultural 
consumption posed, according to the writers of pamphlets, was the danger of actually becoming 
French. Clothing, appearance, and behavior had so much power, the authors contended, that if 
Germans did not stem the tide of French cultural influence into the empire, Germanness itself 
would be lost. French style might seem harmless, but “such a guise,” one author warned, “will 
make the German, not only in outward clothing, but also in the soul… into a Frenchman; which 
is not much different, than when one melts down old, good coin and mints lesser quality from 
it.”139 With French fashions so ubiquitous in the empire, it was undeniable that for many 
Germans already, “our interior and exterior is French.”140 Pamphleteers voiced warnings about 
the threat of national corruption out of a deep concern for the future of the Holy Roman Empire. 
According to the political pamphlets, the destruction of the German national character through 
French cultural infiltration would lead directly to the destruction of the Holy Roman Empire 
through French military conquest. By destroying their intrinsic Germanness, French culture 
sapped that most-vaunted of German characteristics: their military prowess. By turning them 
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fully into Frenchmen, French culture accomplished the conquest of Germany, a feat which Louis 
XIV’s troops had failed to achieve. But, once conquered in spirit, doing so in body would be 
much easier. French cultural infiltration thus weakened not only the Germans’ ability to defend 
the empire, but also their will to. Germans had fallen into Louis XIV’s trap.  
For many it was already too late. French language, fashion, manners, and culture, were 
already stealing German “souls.”141 Through cultural consumption and tours to France, too many 
young Germans “forget their German virtue, mores, and civilities, [and] in their stead take on all 
manner of bad habits, vice, and ill-manners.”142 Authors warned that such a transformation was 
happening throughout the Empire. French manners, virtues, and character were replacing 
German ones. “Our beloved fatherland,” one pamphleteer explained, “for several years now has 
changed in so many respects, and become… like other nations [Nationen], especially the French, 
whereby it has left a not inconsiderable stain on its old, brave, and honest forefathers.”143 
Whereas the “righteous and brave ancestors were people who knew what cleverness and virtue, 
both in times of war and peace, required,” young Germans “have since then shamelessly 
abandoned our fathers’ mores and customs, and quite ravenously adopted different, alien, 
dissolute ways, clothing, fashions, and practices, but in particular those of the French, our 
archenemy” and “have fairly danced the old German respectability and sober virtues out of the 
country.”144 Pamphleteers produced lists of all the sins and vices that Germans had acquired. One 
such read:   
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Pride, arrogance and hauteur, lasciviousness and harlotry, gorging and boozing, lust and 
profligacy are all the rage among us… Infidelity, brutality, deceit, mercilessness, and 
other overt offences, oppression of the poor, usury, selfishness… one hears so many 
lamentations about it every day, that it makes the ears ring and the hair stand on end.145 
 
Arrogance, lasciviousness, immoderation and lust, these were all key attributes ascribed to the 
French national character. And now they had become ascendant in Germany. These “Teutschen 
Frantzos” were so “blinded” by the French “sun,” that they did not even realize what was 
happening. They simply followed France’s examples until it was as if “an unfavorable tone 
sounded, and a German was transformed into a Frenchman.”146 
Author after author lamented that so many in the empire spoke French to the detriment of 
“our German language of gentlemen and heroes.”147 The French language was not just 
supplanting German; it was destroying it.148 Even the most patriotic of pamphleteers, one writer 
griped, were often guilty of filling “their German writings with simplified foreign words, such as 
commendirn, resistiren, fouragirn, allianz, accord, foiblesse.”149 This particular pamphleteer 
argued that it made little sense “to fight for the fatherland with [such] foreign weapons,” 
especially when German was far superior.150 For this reason, this author intentionally wrote only 
in “clear German words,” eschewed all foreign loan words and Germanized all foreign names 
and spellings.151 Another author presented the problem thus:  
I ask you my German, would you not rather your son be virtuous, pious, god-fearing, 
civil, and, in matters of the empire, highly proficient, but, at the same time, not all that 
fluent in the French language, which… is unnecessary and quite harmful? Or that he 
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indeed possesses ability in this unnecessary and dangerous thing, but in contrast has a 
marked lack of virtue, good mores, and other relevant knowledge of his fatherland?152 
 
This author thought the answer was clear, that any thinking being would “undoubtedly” choose 
to avoid the pernicious influence of the French language in favor of maintaining their German 
soul and virtues. But, alas, far too many had not made such a decision. 
Throughout the empire, pamphleteers argued, one could hardly recognize the true 
German spirit; “one could hardly find the virtuous old Germans in Germany anymore.”153 Those 
who returned from France could pass so easily as French not because they could imitate French 
speech, appearance, and manners, but because they had Frenchness “sitting in their flesh and 
blood.”154 They were “half-French” already.155 And regardless of the treatment, such individuals 
would never lose the mark of French influence: “the old German nature would disappear, and in 
its place would be a French monstrosity.”156 If those same honorable German ancestors were to 
return, “they would hardly recognize their descendants, or take them for German.”157 They 
would instead be “exiles in their homeland,” forced to search like Diogenes with his lantern “in 
order to find Germany in Germany.”158 In short, across the empire, countless numbers had 
already transformed from “Germans into Frenchmen.”159  
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It was widely believed that France was intentionally promoting its luxuries and its 
fashions, its “à-la-mode weapons,” as part of a larger concerted effort to use cultural invasion as 
a military tactic.160 “It is well known,” explained one author, “that the Germans always want to 
have what is new.”161 It is the unfortunate way of “our nation [Nation],” the same author 
continued, that once German curiosity is piqued, it is impossible to distract it away, “rather they 
must either be held from it with violence… or through boredom and excessive use… satiate 
themselves.”162 And so the French “changed and altered” their fashions “almost every month,” 
intentionally keeping the Germans entranced by their “vanities.”163 Indeed, France had found that 
“merchandise, fencing- and dance-masters” were especially effective ways to “lure many 
Fürsten and other German souls to itself.”164 All of those French dancing, language, and fencing 
masters, not to mention the tailors, dressmakers, wigmakers, and cooks, were also accused of 
being some of the “agents” and “spies” of Louis XIV.165 It was not so long ago, pamphleteers 
reminded their readers, that France had aspired after the “freedom, honor, and life” of the 
Germans, but these days those same Germans were slaves to “such grave vanity,” such “foul, 
God-damned arrogance,” this “clothing-folly gone bad.”166 And this was precisely what France 
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wanted, this argument went; “these are the nets with which the Germans… can be captivated.”167 
By promoting French cultural consumption, Louis XIV was effectively infiltrating the Empire, 
corrupting German souls and enervating imperial political and military power. French culture 
was weakening Germany from the inside out to make invasion and eventual conquest easier for 
French troops. The French had long ago realized that they would never be able to defeat 
Germany through sheer force alone, so they set about “on another, cunning way… by which 
Germany could be put in such a state and all at once enfeebled, so that afterwards it could no 
longer free itself from French domination.”168 In the argumentation of these writers, changes of 
culture implied changes of political loyalty. As Germans lost their Germanness, they also lost all 
sense of duty to their rulers, their countrymen, and their fatherland. As newly transformed 
Frenchmen, they had not only lost the martial prowess with which to defend against a French 




As the external worked its effects on the internal, pamphleteers insisted that French 
culture weakened and emasculated the hearty, martial Germans. As one author summarized, “as 
long as Germany stuck to its old German virtue and valor, it flourished in great power and 
happiness. Since it turned to foreign, especially French, vanities and similar lascivious 
indulgences, it has become more and more enfeebled and almost contemptuous.”169 Germans had 
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once been renowned for their “bravery and abiding zeal to defend their freedom.”170 But ever 
since “German youth… [had] appl[ied] themselves to such weak-hearted exercises and other 
French vanities,” writer after writer answered, “military and discipline [were] overwhelmed by 
so many weaknesses.” 171 As one author quipped, “if [only] dancing, hopping, springing/ and 
white-powdered hair,/ could subdue the power of the enemy,/ … But… they are heroes only of 
compliments.”172 Youth were unconcerned with serious military matters, “never mind [willing] 
to risk their lives for the fatherland.”173 For those precious few “brave Germans” still alive in the 
“fatherland,” their old German virtues got them little in the French-obsessed empire. “Fie! the 
great shame,” one pamphlet read, “he who cannot love [the] French,/ will never get a 
commission.”174 With such low quality soldiers, the pamphlet continues, “imagine, [if] we were 
to go to the field… one would see scorn and disgrace,/ nothing but just confusion, roguish 
prank[s], treacherousness,/ would continually occur.”175 If famous German generals such as 
Pappenheim or Tilly could come back to Germany, this author imagined, they would be horrified 
and disappointed to see the state of their German troops.176 Nobody could believe that “such 
Teutschlinge, transformed through this mimicry of French mores and clothing, are proper to the 
serious and brave German nation, and are beneficial to the [Holy] Roman Empire.”177  
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In one example, a character in a pamphlet is initially amazed by the sight of stylish and 
polished officers. His companion quickly disabuses him of this wonder. “To think, a dainty wig, 
well-made frock, and genteel compliment are [considered] the highest qualities of today, through 
which one, in times of both war and peace, can make their fortune,” the companion began.178 But 
such fripperies translated not into good soldiers, but “fosters much military disease and 
deficiency.”179 The consequences were clear: 
The result of this is, that little or nothing is done for the good of the fatherland; the 
borders and peace of the empire are not maintained, rather far more lost one after the 
other. Let Alsace, Lorraine, and the Netherlands speak of such things; then you will see, 
how many glorious cities bemoan their wretched condition under the French yoke… and 
complain about the corrupt character of the German military.180 
 
Without their natural, German, military prowess, they could not hold back the French armies. 
The entire empire stood open for the incursion and deprivations of the French. It was because of 
the “French poison,” the companion continued, that Germans these days “sell their own 
freedom” for the latest fashion.181 If only they had remained by what was natural, what was 
German, the empire would never have been brought to such a state. Instead, the great German 
martial prowess was crumbling from within. 
One of the most corrosive effects of French culture for German martial virtue was its 
effeminacy. The influence of so many “womanly vanities” was emasculating. As one author 
stated outright: “let me warn you,/ Old German heroes;/ Let the foreign courtesans/ not too far 
[with] your freedom./ Do you want to become sleeping slaves? Do you want to live like 
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women?”182 It was little wonder then that the effeminate Teutsche-Frantzos could no longer keep 
up in that most masculine of all realms: the battlefield.183 Another writer inverted the standard 
French/feminine, German/masculine dichotomies when they asked, “have you not prostituted 
yourself and made your nation [Nation] despicable through your various and pernicious travels 
to France?”184 Germany, placed in the position of the female prostitute, had offered herself up by 
so slavishly emulating French culture. Previous generations of Germans “proved themselves 
braver, more consistent, and more virtuous, both in times of war and peace,” but these days 
young Germans were “often… better suited to a Courtesie or ballet, than against the enemy or to 
serious action in the field.”185 The rhetoric in the pamphlets argued that the French campaign of 
cultural infiltration had directly and undeniably contributed to German military defeats. As one 
author explicitly stated, “the German nobility in the time of our forefathers could not speak 
French or dance well, but then one also in no way had to fear the French and their deceit and 
fraud in our fatherland, and far from having seen cities and regions cut down, turned upside 
down and devastated through the hands of the French on imperial soil.”186 The German inability 
to defend its own borders was a direct consequence of the supposed French campaign of cultural 
infiltration. 
This story of moral corruption and resulting uselessness to the fatherland is incredibly 
well represented by one particularly literary pamphlet. This anonymous pamphlet, entitled 
simply Der Teutsche Frantzoß (1683), told the story of Parmenio, a hapless sixteen-year old who 
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decided that he must journey to France to become a refined, gallant, gentleman (see Figure 8). 
Parmenio’s story drove home all of the arguments that pamphleteers had made, and would 
continue to make, regarding the pernicious influence of French culture, the waywardness of 
entranced German youth, and the devastating effects such obsessions had for the future of the 
fatherland.  
 
Figure 8: Parmenio in Paris. Frontispiece from Der Teutsche Frantzoß... (1682). This image 
depicts a German traveler, named Parmenio, decked out in finery and yet still surrounded on the 




Parmenio’s desire to travel to France, stoked by the encouragement of his scheming 
sister, did not much enthuse his parents. From the very beginning, his mother encouraged him 
instead to join the military and defend the Empire. She lamented the sorry state of contemporary 
German youth and the corresponding weakness of imperial armies.187 This was a prospect that 
Parmenio scoffed at. Parmenio’s father, subtly named Germanicus, decried the “contemporary 
abuse” of tours in France. These travels only “led the French gallantry-devil into our 
Germany.”188 Far from contributing to the enrichment of young Germans, their visits to France 
only encouraged luxury and indolence. A perfectly absurd example of this was found in 
Parmenio’s uncle, who relished any chance to remind others that he had travelled to France in his 
youth. When invited to dinner he dusted off “an old stylish frock” – by now horribly out of 
fashion - and flitted around, putting far too much effort into sprinkling half-forgotten bon mots 
throughout his conversations.189 After witnessing this, Germanicus argued that young Germans 
should instead visit any number of noble, German cities, “in such places a German can see and 
get to know his fatherland far better than in France.”190 But alas, in France they only encountered 
ruin. Germanicus’s arguments had little effect on Parmenio, who was blind to the ridiculousness 
of his uncle, and in the end his mother gave in to her son’s plans rather quickly, succumbing to 
feminine weakness and “blinding maternal love.”191 It was through her “sugar-coated caresses” 
that Germanicus assented against his better judgment.192 Thus from the very beginning, it was 
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feminine influence - both sister and mother - which led this German youth down the path of 
debauchery and ruin. 
As soon as Parmenio reached the relatively unsupervised freedom of Paris, all of 
Germanicus’s fears – and the pamphleteers’ repeated warnings - began to come true. Parmenio 
decided that he had no use for all of his tutor’s carefully planned lessons and turned solely to “a 
bit of French dancing,” made more enticing by his dancing master’s three attractive daughters.193 
Indeed, Parmenio “was far more disposed to pursue his studies with the female sex, and so put 
most of his time and energy into perfecting his courting and complimenting.”194 His reward, and 
the most concrete evidence of French sexual corruption: “he caught the French galanterie” – 
most likely syphilis.195 
Like most Teutschlinge, Parmenio also became obsessed with French fashion, spending 
inordinate sums of his father’s money on new clothing and accessories. But, like many Germans, 
the harder he tried to keep up, the more haplessly he blundered.196 One day Parmenio’s French 
companions decided to play a prank on this poor, misguided German.197 One friend arrived 
dressed, so he said, in the latest fashion.  He wore “two different stockings, one green and one 
red, the hat likewise decorated in two different colors, black and yellow.”198 Parmenio, “all keen 
and willing,” immediately demanded where he could get such a colorful creation.199 The tailor, 
in on the prank, charged Parmenio an exorbitant price, which Parmenio eagerly paid in his 
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desperation to have the ridiculous outfit as soon as possible. When he finally wore his exclusive, 
new design he was mercilessly taunted for his ham-handed naiveté. Not only did his French 
companions turn the foolish “dandy” into a laughingstock, but he had also wasted an incredible 
sum of money in his blind obsession to keep up with the “ever-changing styles and fashions from 
France.”200 
Shamed by this and many other embarrassing incidents, Parmenio finally decided to 
dedicate himself to learning something of use while in Paris. Much to his tutor’s chagrin, 
however, the activity Parmenio began spending all his waking hours mastering was not politics 
or history, but fencing. And, as the pamphlets often repeated, fencing was simply the gateway 
activity to that most dangerous and most French passion: dueling. Parmenio learned the hard way 
the dangers of dueling. First, his adversary stabbed him in the arm and left him permanently 
lame. Then, when trying to train up to get revenge, Parmenio stabbed his own eye out. Finally, 
another man hit him so hard in the mouth that he lost his front teeth – leaving him with “a great 
deformity” whereby, especially when he laughed, the young man resembled “a harried wolf.”201  
Now partially lame, disfigured, diseased, and completely out of money, Parmenio decided it was 
finally time to return home to Germany. Germanicus could hardly contain his disgust when laid 
eyes on his son: 
Had you gone to war, and risked your healthy limbs there, it would have been only to the 
credit of you and me. Instead I sent a healthy and capable child to France and a half-
mutilated and undutiful reprobate returned home, which brings neither myself nor the 
fatherland any advantage or joy.202 
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Had Parmenio returned from war with the same wounds and disfigurements, he would have been 
celebrated as a hero who had sacrificed his own wellbeing for the greater good of the empire. His 
injuries and hardships would have been nothing if gotten in service to the greater German good. 
Instead, Parmenio had chosen debauchery and corruption and thereby rendered himself incapable 
of ever fulfilling his duties, to Germanicus or to Germany, to his father or his fatherland. As a 
stand-in for an entire generation of supposedly French-obsessed youth, Parmenio brought harm 
not just to himself, but to the entire empire.   
Parmenio had transformed into just the sort of corrupt, feeble, youth that pamphlet after 
pamphlet warned French culture was creating. After being told off by his father, kicked out of 
the family home, scorned by every woman he met, bankrupted further by a poorly executed wine 
import venture, Parmenio finally turns to the military as a last resort. He was quickly rebuffed in 
his efforts to become an officer, forced to enlist as a common foot soldier. But this “weak,” 
effeminate, “pampered” Teutsche-Frantzos was far too feeble to endure the hardship of military 
life. With no sense of honor or duty left to his name, he tried to desert even before his first battle. 
He was caught and shot as an example to others. The story ended with the words: “this was, 
therefore, the bizarre state and unhappy conclusion of our German Frenchman.”203 The author 
then gave a warning to others who might consider following in Parmenio’s footsteps. 
With this [tale], German youth, as well as their parents, have a clear example of how 
dangerous it can be to send young people… to France, where they all too easily go astray 
on the path to ruin. Also [note] what irreparable damage has been done to Germany thus 
far, since it has become so enamored with and entangled in these French vanities.204 
 
For Parmenio was not an isolated example. Indeed, both his mother and father had referenced 
from the beginning the damage that countless unfit and wayward youth were doing to the empire. 
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Parmenio’s uncle and many of the people they met on their journey would have been at least a 
generation older than Parmenio himself, and yet they, too had been taken in by France in their 
day. For generations, already, French cultural infiltration had ensured that the empire was left 
without defenders. Louis XIV’s nefarious campaign was destroying German martial prowess 
from within to ensure his own armies’ victory. The issue of cultural consumption, these 
pamphlets argued, was one of life or death, of maintaining German independence or succumbing 




If Germans allowed Louis XIV’s campaign of cultural infiltration to reach its climax, it 
would hardly even matter whether their militaries could repulse French invasions, for they would 
not have the will to. Just as external appearance can transform the internal, so pamphleteers 
maintained, did culture transform a population’s political loyalty. Author after author warned, 
“Lingua, mores & habitus sunt maxima Imperii argumenta: Language, mores, and clothing are 
the greatest indications of dominion.”205 The more French a person was in their clothing, 
manners, and character, the more French-inclined they would be in terms of politics, the readier 
to accept the French yoke. As one author explained, “the German mind and spirit have changed 
without being noticed in such form, and going forward, are completely French natured and 
inclined, that in the end it counts the same to them, if they are German or French; that is, if they 
are free people or servants.”206 Another writer warned that imitation of fashion, language, and 
culture brought with it “a hidden poison… [that] sneaks… with it into the heart love and 
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attachment to the nation [Nation].”207 Many these days were already stamped with “the French 
lily on their foreheads.” 208 
This was Louis XIV’s game. Over the years, it had become clear to the French, 
pamphleteers argued, that the empire would be much more easily conquered when “the German 
soul is so enchanted and taken in, that they wish to be more French- than German-minded, and 
therefore are easy to subdue.”209 And so the French began “to bring the souls upon oneself, 
through their delicate, eye-catching wares, fencing- and dancing-masters; indeed through the 
over-abundant expenditure of money, broken marriages, the acclimatization of their mores and 
manners, both of clothing and the body.”210 How could Germans treat the French as their sworn 
enemy on the one hand, while slavishly embracing their fashion and culture on the other? “For 
we gladly speak French, we walk, dress, and entertain ourselves happily in the French manner, 
our mores, countenances and other things are French; and yet we want to, or should, still pursue 
the French as enemies, with fire and sword,” but “where can there be a true embitterment against 
one’s enemy and a hostile spirit, if one so mimics the enemy itself, and holds their things, 
conduct and doings for better than one’s own.”211 While French soldiers were repeatedly 
invading and destroying German territories and homes, Germans continued to eagerly order 
clothing and luxury items from France, following the latest updates in the fashion plates and 
learning the newest moves from their dancing masters.212  
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The result was that “with weapons we want to protect [our] cities and lands against the 
invasion and dominion of France; but meanwhile we and our souls have already long been 
subjugated and conquered by France.”213 In this way France not only corrupted the German 
character and destroyed their virtues, but “in every kind of way and manner has lured in many… 
German souls.”214 Once Louis XIV’s cultural infiltration was complete, “Teutsche-Frantzosen” 
across the empire would simply open the gates of their cities and fortresses to welcome their new 
French countrymen and their new French king. Whereas national corruption weakened 
Germany’s ability to defend against France, the transformation of their national identity made it 
impossible. Cultural infiltration opened the doors of German cities to military and political 
conquest. And, after 1681, this argument would not have seemed far-fetched. In that year, as part 
of his policy of “reunions,” Louis XIV forcibly annexed Strasbourg (see Figure 9).215 Considered 
a “jewel” of the Empire, the annexation of Strasbourg provoked outrage and anguish across the 
Empire.216 Many, however, saw this as the inevitable outcome of France’s successful cultural 
offensive.217 The Strasbourgers had long before been transformed into Frenchmen.218 
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Figure 9: Louis XIV receiving the keys of Strasbourg on 23 October 1681, by Constantijn 
Francken.  
 
Long before Louis XIV’s armies approached their gates, many had argued that through 
embrace of French language, culture, and mores, the Strasburgers, “both high and low,” had been 
corrupted and transformed into Frenchmen.219 Already in the 1670s writers were critiquing the 
“good, French-inclined people [Völcker] of the imperial city of Strasbourg” for their pro-French 
attitudes.220 In 1674 one “visitor” wrote of how the Strasburgers tried to ingratiate themselves 
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with their powerful French neighbor; “indeed they would like to not offend their most-Christian 
neighbor, [but] rather kiss him… otherwise he would wish to someday unleash the fire of his 
wrath over them.”221 One year later, referring to the French invasion of Alsace, another writer 
argued that French troops had only succeeded with the help of local elites who, “through 
visitation of foreign lands, foreign mores, clothing, marriages and vices,” had been corrupted 
until “the French air” ruled their decisions and their loyalties.222 Louis XIV’s armies had been 
preceded by a subtler cultural invasion as “bit by bit the French humor, customs, language, 
clothing, and other enticing webs of domination slipped into the city and impressed their way 
into the souls of residents, until their former standing and old German character fairly vanished 
or was completely forgotten.”223 By 1681, when French troops marched towards the gates of 
Strasbourg itself, there was hardly any German spirit left in the city to resist the onslaught. 
This, pamphleteers argued, was not only why the Strasbourgers were unable to resist the 
French invaders, but why the city capitulated so quickly. “Strasbourg would not have put itself 
so easily under the French yoke,” one author wrote in 1684, “if it had not previously been 
entirely taken in by mores, clothing, and other vanities and in such a guise become mostly 
French.”224 Because they were already French in all but name, the change of rule “had very little 
significance” for “such enticed and enchanted souls,” and they had therefore “freely accepted the 
French yoke.”225 Another writer presented this sentiment as widely accepted fact when they 
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wrote, “nobody sensible could deny [that] where the soul is first captured and inclined towards 
the foreign,” one could not expect much effort to defend “freedom, religion and the fatherland.” 
Rather, such people will “want” and welcome “a different rulership,” even when “it immediately 
thereafter is their complete ruin.”226 This argument referred back to the relationship between law, 
system of government and national character. As discussed above, a change in a people’s 
character would bring about a change in their form of government. Specifically, by transforming 
Strasbourgers from Germans to Frenchmen, French clothing, language, culture, and mores 
caused the city to slip, almost inevitably, from the grasp of imperial, German governance into 
Louis XIV’s fold. National character, far from an immutable and unchanging fact of life, could 
be manipulated as well as transformed, and it had serious political and military consequences. 
Louis XIV, authors claimed, was not only aware of this fact, but had masterminded this 
strategy from the beginning in order to steal Strasbourg, and countless other German cities. Louis 
XIV had long coveted the strong and strategic city of Strasbourg, but realized that he would 
never be able to take what he wanted through pure force or traditional diplomatic means. As one 
pamphleteer explained: 
This vigilant and power-hungry crown [Louis XIV] knew very well that the city of 
Strasbourg [was] a German city, and lay within the borders of the [Holy] Roman Empire, 
but that the souls of the residents both high and low were mostly French-inclined… they 
therefore would not protest very strongly when one held out to them the yoke of French 
dominion… that is why France had been concerned for quite some time already… with 
how it could acquire this beautiful jewel and splendid citadel of the [Holy] Roman 
Empire of the German Nation [Nation]… To this end it [France] used all imaginable 
means, at times violent, at times gentle and coaxing, to fulfil its wish.227 
 
The French set about a program of infiltration and cultural corruption. As with other territories in 
their sights, the French made itself their master once “the language and mores were not different 
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from their own.”228 Once the loyalties of the Strasbourg were so changed and their old German 
virtues so polluted, France could then take it without a fight.  
A different pamphleteer contrasted their easy success in Strasbourg with their hard-
fought conquest of Franche-Comté several years earlier. Unlike the Strasbourgers and their 
fellow Alsatians, the inhabitants of the Franche-Comté, the author argued even three decades 
later, would “make bridges out of their own bodies” to help the Emperor.229 In the Franche-
Comté, they were not corrupted and Frenchified like their neighbors, and for this reason Louis 
XIV had to use all his military power and fight for six bitter years until he finally subdued the 
region through violence.230 From experiences like this one, the Sun King allegedly decided he 
needed a new strategy. Cultural infiltration quickly delivered Strasbourg into his hands without 
the expense and bloodshed. 
The story of Strasbourg, pamphleteers repeatedly warned, should act as a wake-up call 
for the rest of the Empire. Louis XIV and his armies were a punishment from God for their 
immoral obsession with fashion and consumption and their rejection of traditional German 
values and mores.231 Already in 1675, one pamphleteer bemoaned that throughout the empire 
there were “so many brave Fürsten who are so fully taken in by the French obsession, that they 
have fully and completely forgotten that they themselves are German.”232 Strasbourg had just 
been the first of many potential German cities who would be happy to open their doors to the 
                                               
228 Politische Betrachtungen, 5. 
229 Memoires pour la Franche-Comtée, 10. 
230 Memoires pour la Franche-Comtée, 14.  
231 For an understanding of invasion and conquest as punishment for immorality and consumption see, Flagellum 
Dei; Speer], Der durch das... Weiber-Volck Geschichterte Hahn; Das von Teutschen Geblüth. For the same as 
punishment for betraying German values see, Flagellum Dei, 94–95; Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 10; Der 
abgezogene frantzösische Staats-Rock, 22. 
232 Der abgezogene frantzösische Staats-Rock, unpag. 45. 
 
 210 
French. What had worked so well in Strasbourg, argued these pamphleteers, was already 
underway elsewhere in the Empire. “Language, customs, and clothing are the first foundation 
stones of foreign rule,” and the French were well on their way to solidifying all four in 
Germany.233 The issue of cultural infiltration was inextricably linked with the future of the 
Empire and Louis XIV needed to be stopped before his seductive and enchanting strategies came 




Fear of conquest. Fear of corruption. Fear of losing all that made one German in favor of 
becoming entirely French. The rhetoric of cultural infiltration was a rhetoric of fear. It 
represented a rhetorical culmination of all the factors discussed previously – encompassing 
loyalty to the empire, national stereotypes, and one’s duty to live up to the example of one’s 
forefathers – and combined it with early modern ideas on the power of culture and the mutability 
of identity, into a neat rhetorical package. The extent of this rhetoric, and its intensity, speaks to 
the immense fear that Louis XIV and his unprecedentedly large armies inspired across Europe. 
But the specific iteration of this fear as the danger of cultural infiltration – the danger of 
becoming French – was more than just a reflection of prevailing anxieties. It was a conscious 
rhetorical strategy intended to stoke and cultivate fear to encourage diplomatic and military 
support against Louis XIV.234 And, best of all, it was just as useful in times of open conflict as in 
times of ostensible peace.  
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Rhetoric of cultural infiltration, as seen in the examples above, existed in the midst of the 
open conflict of the 1670s, but only as one of many rhetorical strategies that played on the 
loyalties and anxieties of the imperial audience. Pamphleteers also mobilized legal debate, fear 
of conquest and persecution, appeals to law, justice, morality, and decency. During the 1680s, 
the ostensible peace between France and the Holy Roman Empire made it more difficult to frame 
fear-based arguments on the threat of looming invasion and conquest. The decade extending 
from the end of the Franco-Dutch War (1678) to the start of the Nine Years War (1688) posed an 
interesting problem for opponents of Louis XIV, as there were no major declared Franco-
Imperial conflicts. There were, however, a series of other crises that both created intense anxiety 
about Louis XIV’s future plans and required the maintenance of anti-French support in a period 
of nominal peace. Few trusted Louis XIV to maintain the peace promised in the Peace of 
Nijmegen. The Ottoman invasion was cast as the work of France, to distract Europe while Louis 
XIV annexed choice imperial territories through his policy of “reunions.” Powers across Europe 
were horrified at Louis’s persecution of French Protestants after the revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes (1685). Even a twenty-year truce, signed in 1684, did little to ease suspicions of French 
intentions, illustrated by the formation of the League of Augsburg just two years later. Finally, 
all of these fears were legitimated when Louis attacked the Palatinate with little justification and 
no warning in 1688, sparking the Empire’s entry into the Nine Years War.235  
During this decade of anxiety and insecurity, the rhetoric of cultural infiltration grew in 
use and importance. The lack of open conflict during this decade, far from assuaging fears of 
France, only contributed to an atmosphere of anxiety over when - and most importantly how - 
the Sun King would strike next. Until the 1680s, the Sun King’s aggression had manifested itself 
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in the understandable context of outright warfare. Now, however, he pursued his interests by a 
variety of less straightforward, less predictable, and therefore far more “nefarious” means. 
Pamphlets urged readers not to be fooled by “the golden fruits of peace” that France so 
temptingly offered.236 It was important for the opponents of France to remain at the ready, which 
meant keeping the fires of opposition smoldering. The fear of cultural infiltration satisfied this 
need. German pamphleteers turned these crises into a tale about the danger of French cultural 
infiltration occurring right under the noses of unsuspecting Germans. After failing to achieve his 
ambitious desires through military might alone, the French king had simply enlisted culture as a 
foot soldier to sneak behind enemy lines and sabotage imperial defenses from within. By 
speaking French, consuming French commodities, and adopting French ways, these 
pamphleteers argued, imperial subjects were aiding Louis XIV in his cultural, and, therefore, his 
eventual military invasion. 
In part, this rhetoric was a response to the actual increase in consumption of French 
culture and goods that occurred in the late seventeenth century. It also mapped well onto 
previous critiques of Louis XIV as unscrupulous and insatiable. For a king already accused of 
using any means possible to achieve his desires, hiding military invasion in the guise of 
dressmakers and language tutors was hardly surprising. It was also, however, a convenient 
strategy to mobilize the member states of the Empire through a fear that sidestepped divisive 
questions of religion and dynastic politics. The Holy Roman Empire was always an extremely 
divided entity, politically and religiously. As much as some pamphleteers tried to make their 
religious arguments biconfessional, suspicions and confessional antagonisms continued to exist. 
Between the rock of imperial power politics and the hard place of religious divisions, uniting the 
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Empire behind anything was a challenge.237 With the rhetoric of Germanness, however, the 
pamphleteers found a trope that could ostensibly unite imperial inhabitants regardless of their 
particular family, history, confession or class.238 Without denying these other categories of 
identification, the rhetoric of cultural infiltration urged inhabitants of the Empire to put aside 
their quarrels and their suspicions for the specific and limited task of countering Louis XIV. The 
narrative of pervasive, covert corruption could maintain fear of, and therefore opposition to, 
France during a time of crisis and precarious “peace.” This fear – the danger of becoming French 
– appealed to a projected sense of cultural and linguistic Germanness that was inextricably linked 
with the future of the Empire as a political system. If Germans allowed themselves to be 
transformed into Frenchmen, French political and military conquest would be inevitable. 
To follow the logic of the pamphlets, if they allowed their shared Germanness to be 
destroyed, the entire structure of the Empire would inevitably crumble. To prove this, many 
pamphleteers looked to Rome and Greece as warnings. As Edward Gibbon would immortalize 
decades later in his multivolume study, many believed that the Roman Empire fell due to civic 
and moral decay from incorporating too much foreign culture, leading to a loss of military 
virtue.239 “Rome,” one pamphleteer explained, “as long as virtue was rewarded, achieved very 
great things in war; but after the rich and distinguished had access to the places of honor, 
                                               
237 On the difficulties of overcoming religious division in the Empire see Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman 
Empire, Volume II: The Peace of Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich, 1648-1806, 2:83–87, 439. 
238 The conceptual link between the Empire and Germany dates back to the late medieval period, Len Scales, The 
Shaping of German Identity: Authority and Crisis, 1245-1414 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). In 
relation to class or standing, much anti-French discourse arose from Hofkritik (criticism of the court), but 
pamphleteers repeatedly emphasized that the issue of cultural infiltration extended far beyond the courts, Der 
Abgezogene Frantzösischen Staats-Rock, unpag. pg. 27, 33; Teutsche Frantzoß, 39, 57, 76, 148; Das von 
Franckreich verführte Teutschland, 28; Das von teutschen Geblüth, 18; see also Bohanan, Fashion Beyond 
Versailles, 13. 
239 This is the argument that would be made famous by Edward Gibbon in the eighteenth century in his Edward 
Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 6 vols., 1776. 
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everything went topsy-turvy.”240 “As long as the Roman Republic remained by its old mores and 
customs,” the same pamphlet continued, “nobody could have threatened it, but as soon as they… 
embraced Asiatic splendor and excess, everything was flipped from top to bottom.”241 This tale, 
the author warned, “you want to take as an example, dear Germany; because these days almost 
everything domestic stinks to your nose, and everything must be French.”242 Indeed, one author 
even argued that, just like Louis XIV, cultural infiltration was a concerted effort by the Greeks 
and other conquered “Asiatic lands,” who, having failed to defeat Rome through force, worked 
to enervate the empire from within.243 This strategy proved so successful that, just as many had 
argued was the case in Germany, “in the end, even in Rome one could no longer find such brave 
Romans.”244 Even Alexander the Great was argued to have lost his empire after being corrupted 
by Persian culture.245 Foreign imitation, therefore, was far more than a cultural problem, but “a 
marked political mistake, by which we mean such French things and mimicry would be able to 
cause us severe damage or harm.”246 Germany needed to beware, lest it share the fate of such 
great ancient empires. 
If, like Greece and Rome, the Germans allowed foreign influences to corrupt their native 
ways, then their empire, too, would soon fall. The “dying fatherland” already “lay in mortal 
danger… through our greed and discord.”247 Collapse would then expose all to the whims and 
                                               
240 Trajani Boccalini Gespräch und Discursen, 424. 
241 Trajani Boccalini Gespräch und Discursen, 436.  
242 Trajani Boccalini Gespräch und Discursen, 436.  
243 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 6–7. 
244 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 8. 
245 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 63–64; Wagner von Wagenfels, Ehren-Ruff Teutschlands, x–xi. 
246 Das von franckreich verführte Teutschland, 93, see also 7-9, 94-100. 
247 Teutsche Wächter-Stimme, unpag. 13. See also, Der abgezogene frantzösische Staats-Rock, unpag. 28-29. 
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cruelties of Louis’s tyranny.248 Protestants could be sure of merciless persecution, while 
Catholics would have to live under an irreligious anti-Christ. All imperial states would fall one 
by one, becoming nothing more than slaves to France. In short, the threat of cultural infiltration 
was the fear that encompassed all fears. If the members of the Empire did not put aside their 
differences and come together as Germans to protect their fatherland against the French threat, 
then they would all be doomed.249 
 
                                               
248 Das neugierig und veränderte Teutschland, 443. 







CHAPTER 5: THE FRENCH COUNTERATTACK 
 
Many of the examples analyzed thus far has been one-sided. This is largely due to 
historical reality. While anti-French pamphleteers were warning of a grand French conspiracy to 
snatch German souls, there was no equal and opposite reaction from pro-French writers. The 
primary reason for this was that even at the lowest points of French military power in the Wars 
of Louis XIV, France itself was not in danger of invasion and conquest by German troops in the 
way that territories of the Holy Roman Empire were by French. The publication of pamphlet 
propaganda was closely connected to political context and need, but so were the rhetorical 
choices pamphleteers made. This was especially true of national rhetoric. 
The absence of equivalent rhetoric from pro-French writers does not, however, mean that 
national rhetoric and ideas were isolated to early modern Germany. Quite the opposite is true. 
Pro-French writers did engage with national rhetoric when it proved useful and necessary, but 
they did so in different ways. After reading so many negative critiques of the French in anti-
French pamphlets, one might expect the inverse in pro-French publications: extended critiques of 
the Germans as a foil to celebrations of the French. But this is not the case. Rather, the pro-
French use of national rhetoric displays a sophisticated level of understanding of the interrelated 
ideas of dynasty and nation in this period and how to best navigate between these layers to 





Pro-French Pamphlet Propaganda 
 
We have already seen how important timing and context were to the content and 
publication of political pamphlets. But the influence of timing and circumstance did not just 
affect how many pamphlets were published or not each month or year. It also affected broader 
attitudes towards the utility and value of pamphlet propaganda as a whole. For the majority of 
the Wars of Louis XIV, anti-French pamphlets greatly outnumbered pro-French ones.1 After a 
brief interest in published propaganda during the War of Devolution and early years of the 
Franco-Dutch War, Louis XIV and his ministers largely abandoned the practice.2 However, 
during the Nine Years War and into the War of Spanish Succession, under the direction of his 
new foreign minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy, the French again waded into the 
fray of pamphlets. This shift was in part due to the personal priorities of Louis XIV and his 
ministers, but it was also a response to political necessity. Pamphlet propaganda was a medium 
of utility – written and published for specific needs and purposes. Namely, pamphlet propaganda 
was used to rally public support and opinion. For decades, however, Louis XIV and his armies 
had reigned supreme in Europe, handily defeating their opponents. During this time, there was 
little need for the sort of public rallying that a pamphlet could accomplish. Nor was there much 
need to convince a public sphere of the legitimacy of the Sun King’s actions; his armies did that 
for him. During the last two conflicts of his reign, however, French armies lost much of their 
unrivaled superiority as they began to encounter more and more defeats. This raised the need to 
                                               
1 Interestingly, Peer Schmidt encountered the same imbalance in his study of pro- and anti-Spanish pamphlets during 
the Thirty Years War. In this instance as well, the Spanish monarchy largely chose not to respond to the vitriolic 
publications against them in the Holy Roman Empire, see especially Schmidt, Spanische Universalmonarchie oder 
“teutsche Libertet,” 393–439. 
2 As discussed above, publication in France was a far more centralized affair than in the Holy Roman Empire. 
Especially for publications promoting the interests of Louis XIV, almost every one would have needed royal 
permission to be published. See, Introduction. 
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secure their political interests in other ways, whether at the negotiating table, by boosting morale, 
or by rallying a wider public to the justice and legitimacy of the French position. Moreover, 
while in earlier conflicts Louis XIV had successfully secured alliances that usefully divided his 
enemies and bolstered his cause, in the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession, 
France was far more isolated. In short, in the last decades of Louis XIV’s reign, the French began 
to face the same needs of mobilizing military support, acquiring allies, and justifying the 
rightness of their cause that the Habsburgs had struggled with for decades. In response to this 
shift in fortunes, Louis XIV and Torcy reengaged in a campaign of pro-French pamphlet 
propaganda.  
The French were no strangers to printed propaganda. The many publications during the 
Reformation and Wars of Religion as well as, most famously, the Mazarinades that were printed 
in droves during the uprisings of the Fronde when Louis XIV was still a child, all attest that the 
French lacked neither familiarity nor ability in the realm of political pamphlets.3 Indeed, early in 
the Wars of Louis XIV, the French sponsored and published propaganda pamphlets, just like 
their opponents.4 Periods of ministerial consent also seem to have encouraged slightly less-
official publications, such as, notably, the work of Antoine Aubéry.5 Aubéry wrote to justify 
Louis XIV’s claims during the War of Devolution.6 Aubéry’s text was very legalistic, calling 
heavily upon the history of dynasties, alliances, and inheritance renunciations to prove the 
                                               
3 Sawyer, Printed Poison; Hubert Carrier, La Presse de La Fronde (1648-1653): Les Mazarinades (Geneva: Droz, 
1989); Hubert Carrier, La Fronde: Contestation Démocratique et Misère Paysanne. 52 Mazarinades., 2 vols. (Paris: 
EDHIS, 1982); Christian Jouhaud, Mazarinades: la Fronde des mots (Paris: Aubier, 1985). 
4 Klaits describes the extent of Colbert’s networks and initiatives, but also says that in terms of publications the 
return on his investments was disappointing, Printed Propaganda under Louis XIV, 87–89. 
5 Klaits claims that Aubery’s initial treatise was published against Colbert’s wishes, even landing Aubery a stay in 
the Bastille, but that it was received abroad as an official government statement and became much more influential 
than anything else Colbert did commission, 88n. 
6 Aubery, Des justes pretentions du roy sur l’empire. 
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legitimacy of Louis XIV’s claims to inherit the contested portions of the Spanish Netherlands.7 
Other early pro-French pamphlets responded directly to anti-French critiques. This included 
several pamphlets that countered the works of François Paul de Lisola, Habsburg agent and 
perhaps the most widely cited pamphleteer of the era.8 As such, the French sponsored several 
different pamphlets to argue against Lisola’s own legalistic arguments point by point.9 Other pro-
French authors responded to a variety of other anti-French pamphlets, usually mirroring the 
rhetoric and style of the original.10 One example from 1672 featured a response to the above-
cited pamphlet supposedly written by a Liègeois nobleman to the Liègeois burghers claiming 
that the city’s alliance with France was destroying the fatherland.11 The pro-French response to 
this pamphlet, purportedly written by one of the said burghers, countered these accusations and 
argued for Liège’s neutrality in the Franco-Dutch War.12 Neutrality was, of course, a position 
                                               
7 In this way the style of Aubery’ writing mirrors the legalistic argumentation other early anti-French pamphleteers, 
see Lisola, Bouclier d’éstat. 
8 On Lisola’s life and work see, Charles-Édouard Levillain, Le procès de Louis XIV: une guerre psychologique: 
François-Paul de Lisola, citoyen du monde, ennemi de la France, 2015. For examples of later pamphlets citing 
Lisola see, Réponse de Monsieur le Marquis, 56; Der Universal-Geist der Crone Frankreich, Als die Mißgeburth 
der Politic, 1745, 30–31; Politische Historie der Staats-Fehler, Welche die Europäische Machten in Betrachtung 
der Häuser Bourbon und Brandenburg begangen. Oder, Historische Untersuchung der Staats-Fehler, Als Ursachen 
von dem gegenwärtigen zerrütteten Zustand des Europäischen Staats-Systematis, und Anzeigung der Mittel, wie es 
könne wieder eingerichtet, auch die Herstellung eines gleichen Geewichts der Machen in Europa, Und dadurch die 
allgemeine Freyheit, Ruhe und Sicherheit erhalten werden, 1746, 14, 20; La France d’Apres Nature. Ouvrage tres 
utile pur bien se mettres au fait des intrigues des ministres de la cour de Versailles contre l’auguste maison 
d’Autriche (Cologne: Chez les heritiers de Pierre Marteau, 1747), 279–80; Franckreich Nach Seinen Natürlichen 
Eigenschafften Oder Das Entlarffte Franckreich (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1748), 18, 30. 
In the same letter cited below, Louis Verjus, French envoy to the Holy Roman Empire, specifically complained 
about the anti-French influence that Lisola’s writing had already caused by 1674, see Klaits, Printed Propaganda 
under Louis XIV, 91. 
9 Jant, La Meduse. Bouclier de Pallas; Le Politique du Temps. 
10 See for example Consideration Historique et Politique sur l’Estat present de la Chrestienté, bound together with  
Le Politique du Temps... et une dissertation historique, which was responding to a number of different pamphlets 
along with Lisola's. See also, Apologie pour les Francois; Manifestes de quelques princes de l’Empire. These 
pamphlets are not explicit about the works they counter, but self-consciously address opponents and critics in the 
opening pages.  
11 On the initial publication see, Chapter 2: Patriotic Duty to Nation and Emperor. 
12 Send-Schreiben eines Lüttischen Edelmans. 
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that benefited Louis XIV.13 Still other pamphlets chronicled current events, putting a pro-French 
spin on contemporary developments, or simply celebrated the greatness of Louis XIV, his 
armies, and France.14  
Yet, from the middle of the Franco-Dutch War until the early years of the Nine Years 
War, French engagement in pamphlet propaganda essentially ceased. Joseph Klaits emphasized 
the personal role of Louis XIV and his ministers in this shift. Klaits argued that Louis XIV’s 
interest in printed propaganda waxed and waned at several points over his reign. He identified 
three distinct phases in France’s relationship to printed propaganda between the Sun King’s 
assumption of personal power in 1661 and his death in 1715.15 The first, Klaits argued, continued 
until the end of the 1660s under the direction of Louis XIV’s masterful minister, Colbert. Colbert 
recruited and cultivated a wide range of foreign and French writers to create materials that 
supported, justified, and publicized the French point of view. The second phase extended from 
the collapse of Colbert’s efforts in the early 1670s through the next three decades until the end of 
the Nine Years War in 1697, though my own research also reveals a small increase in the late 
1680s and early 1690s at the beginning of the Nine Years War.16 Klaits attributes this lull 
partially to the differing priorities of Colbert’s successors and partially to Louis XIV’s own 
                                               
13 For a more detailed discussion of neutrality in the Wars of Louis XIV see, Chapter 2: Patriotic Duty to Nation and 
Emperor. 
14 Estat present des affairs d’Allemagne, et de Hollande, 1675; Die im Ursprung und Wachsthum prächtig und 
mächtig-stehende Lilje, Oder deß Königreichs Franckreich Anfang und Fortgang, Biß auff Jetzige Regierung Aus 
dem Frantzösischen in das Teutsche übersetzet, 1675; Martinet, Tombeau de M. de Turene, dedie a Monseigneur le 
Cardinal de Bouillon, Grand Aumosnier de France. Para M. Martinet, Ayde des Ceremonies (Paris: Claude Barbin, 
1675). 
15 Klaits, Printed Propaganda under Louis XIV, see esp. 86. 
16 Examples that fall outside of Klaits’ periodization may be due to a lack of evidence tying them to royal 
sponsorship, or they may have been produced through semi-official channels, either on behalf of other royal 
councilors or private individuals, perhaps publishing outside of France.  
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interest in other forms of propaganda and display.17 I would add that the lack of interest in 
political propaganda was also a symptom of France’s dominance in Europe. These decades 
correspond with the height of French power and the zenith of Louis XIV’s military and 
diplomatic victories. During the War of Devolution (1667-8) and Franco-Dutch War (1672-8), 
French armies achieved massive and swift victories. The Sun King emerged from the latter 
conflict in particular at the height of his power and prestige – with his reputation as an 
unpredictable and ambitious foe solidly established for the numerous controversies and crises of 
the fraught decade to follow.18 During these decades Louis XIV’s armies were so superior and 
his power so secure, that he had little need to court public opinion via political pamphlet, 
whether at home or abroad. Tellingly, this period also aligns with the height of anti-French 
pamphlet production. While Louis XIV sat secure in his superior military power, the Habsburgs 
were desperate to garner allies and support to try to stem the tide of French might.19 
French dominance began to falter during the Nine Years War and continued during the 
War of the Spanish Succession. John Lynn calls the former Louis XIV’s “Great Miscalculation” 
and describes how France merely “suffered and survived” the latter.20 The Nine Years War 
began as a strategic strike by France, but quickly expanded out of control to become a general 
European conflict. The brutal destruction of the Palatinate by France in the war’s opening years 
sparked universal outrage across Europe. Such condemnation was symptomatic of France’s new 
                                               
17 Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV; Ziegler, Der Sonnenkönig und seine Feinde die Bildpropaganda Ludwigs 
XIV. in der Kritik. 
18 Ian Dunlop, Louis XIV (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 304; Lynn, Wars of Louis XIV, 161; Martin Wrede, 
Ludwig XIV: Der Kriegsherr Aus Versailles (Darmstadt: Theiss, 2015), 68, 149–50. See also, Chapter 4: French 
Cultural Infiltration. 
19 Cooper, “Political Fear.” 
20 Lynn, Wars of Louis XIV, 191, 266, for an overview of the Nine Years War see 191-265, the War of the Spanish 
Succession see 266-360. 
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international position; in both of the next two conflicts, France was more isolated, with greater 
alliances ranged against it, than ever before. While French forces continued to prove victorious 
in battle in the Nine Years War, the long, expensive war strapped French finances – even forcing 
the Sun King to have the opulent silver furnishings of his newly complete Hall of Mirrors at 
Versailles melted down for coin. The economic, psychological, and human costs were 
exacerbated in 1693-4 by a devastating famine, during which France lost at least a tenth of its 
population in a few short months. This famine was by far the worst on record, until the one that 
struck just over a decade later in the midst of the War of the Spanish Succession (1708-9). By 
1696 the French state was tottering on the brink of bankruptcy and thus could ill afford the next, 
longer, and militarily far more devastating war. After half a decade of dominance on the 
battlefield, French forces lost battle after battle on multiple fronts, not least as they confronted 
imperial and Habsburg forces, recently triumphant against the Ottoman threat. Defeat combined 
with famine, a domestic, multi-year, protestant revolt in the war’s early years and the sudden 
death from illness of multiple generations of French royal heirs towards its end, to leave France 
significantly weakened and the Sun King’s luster undeniably tarnished.21 
 These challenges for France affected pamphlet publication in two ways. First, anti-French 
publications began to decrease in number and severity. After a large spike in the opening years 
of the Nine Years War, the rate of anti-French pamphlets experienced a marked drop-off that 
                                               
21 The Revolt of the Camisards was in large part a response to the forced conversions carried out on French 
protestants in the aftermath of Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Such a revolt had been feared 
throughout the Nine Years War as well, though it did not materialize. The revolt began in 1702 and was largely put 
down with brutal violence by 1704, but unrest continued until late in the war. Lynn, 277–79, 297–98. In April of 
1711, Louis XIV’s son and immediate heir, the Grand Dauphin, died of smallpox. Just ten months later, in February 
of 1712, Louis XIV’s grandson and next in line to the throne, the Petit Dauphin, also died, this time from measles, 
followed by Louis XIV’s great grandson in March of the same year from the same disease. Thus, within the span of 
eleven months the French royal family lost three generations of heirs and was left with the two-year-old, younger 
son of the Petit Dauphin, also sick with the measles and not expected to survive long. The toddler eventually made a 
miraculous recovery and would succeed his great grandfather at the age of five to become Louis XV.  
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continued to dwindle until the end of Louis XIV’s reign.22 In those that were published, 
beginning in the 1690s, one can see an increased sense of confidence among anti-French 
pamphleteers. As the French began to experience defeats and setbacks, the atmosphere of fear 
that had pervaded the empire since the end of the Franco-Dutch war lessened, as did 
pamphleteers need to convince imperial powers to join the fight. While during the 1680s, Louis 
XIV had seemed an invincible force trying to undermine a hopelessly divided Germany in 
countless nefarious ways, during the 1690s he increasingly returned to just another political and 
military foe of human proportions.23 As discussed above, Wagner von Wagenfels ended his 
pamphlet by assuring his readers that the empire was a biblically prophesied kingdom that would 
endure until the end of the world, and therefore could not be brought down by Louis XIV.24 A 
pamphlet from 1711 that campaigned for the restitution of Franche-Comté chastised Louis XIV 
for what the author saw as misguided confidence. The second part of the pamphlet was an open 
letter to Louis XIV warning him that his blustery rhetoric was fooling nobody and that “we see 
in all of the writings of your enemies nothing but justice and fairness.”25 This writer admonished 
the Sun King, saying, “your enemies, Sire, are far too noble, that their wise caution and 
circumspection should be abused… as often… as [it has been] with your Majesty.”26 Louis XIV 
may have deceived them all in the past, but he would not be able to again. This was a significant 
departure from the anxiety-ridden calls for Germany to wake up to the all-consuming threat of 
                                               
22 See Figure 1 in Introduction. 
23 For additional examples of pamphlets treating Louis XIV more with pity than with fear see, Schöne Raritäten, 33; 
Dialogue entre le Marechal de Turenne et le Prince d’Auvergne, 8–9, 21, 53. 
24 For more on this see, Chapter 3: Mobilizing History and Failing the Ancestors; Wagner von Wagenfels, Ehren-
Ruff Teutschlands, 606–42. 
25 Memoires pour la Franche-Comtée, 22. 
26 Memoires pour la Franche-Comtée, 31. 
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Louis XIV. Instead of shaming the Germans for forsaking their common interest and sacrificing 
the good of their nation, this author instead chastised Louis XIV for the same. “You would 
commit a disgraceful sin,” the author warned, “if you did not punish… a Frenchman, who 
wanted to bring about the demise and incineration of his nation [Nation] and his fatherland.”27 
And yet the Sun King himself was committed to a course of action that would, this pamphleteer 
confidently asserted, bring his own French nation to ruin. With increased confidence in other 
military and political spheres, not to mention a solid anti-French alliance, the reliance on printed 
propaganda in the anti-French camp simply decreased. 
The pro-French camp faced the opposite prospect. The French were suddenly faced with 
a new need to mobilize allies and support in ways their opponents had done for decades. The 
French, until this point, had successfully undermined the alliances arrayed against it through 
traditional diplomacy and other means, like subsidies. They courted neutrality and even active 
support from European powers and various imperial states. As France grew less dominant and 
more isolated, they faced the need to convince these former allies to lay down their arms and 
return to a state of neutrality or pro-French support. Moreover, now that the French could no 
longer rely solely on their military might to achieve a strong negotiating position, pamphlets 
provided a secondary means of courting public opinion during conflicts and in the lead up to 
important treaty negotiations. As Klaits described, the reengagement with pamphlet propaganda 
“signaled the ascendance of a new attitude toward pamphlet propaganda in the French 
government, an attitude which assumed that subsidies and armed might were no longer sufficient 
to carry out the Sun King's objectives.”28 Finally, with defeats mounting, domestic troubles, and 
                                               
27 Memoires pour la Franche-Comtée, 33. 
28 Klaits, Printed Propaganda under Louis XIV, 100. 
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the years of fighting dragging on, war weariness grew. Pamphlets provided a way to boost 
morale, both domestically and among the few allies and supporters abroad. As French fortunes 
waned, the French began to feel the need for the additional help that pamphlet propaganda could 
provide. 
The French were perfectly aware of the effects of pamphlet propaganda. In fact, during 
the Franco-Dutch War, Louis Verjus, French envoy to the Holy Roman Empire, warned of the 
pernicious effects of anti-French publications. In 1674, Verjus wrote a pleading letter to the 
foreign minister, Simone Arnaud de Pomponne. Verjus begged for increased sponsorship and 
encouragement of pro-French political propaganda. He emphasized in particular the 
effectiveness of anti-French tracts in stoking popular Francophobia and influencing the policies 
of German princes throughout the Empire. “Germans,” he complained, “are surely not preserved 
from such hatred [of the French] by the million screaming tracts they read, study and trust as 
scripture [which]… remaining unanswered… have aroused everyone against us.”29 He continued 
to note, “how much, for good and for bad… printed pamphlets count among the Germans and 
how much could sometimes be saved in subsidies and in troops by taking advantage of the 
passions and prejudices of peoples and thus influencing their attitudes.”30 Verjus urged the 
French government to engage in the war of words that accompanied the march of French armies 
across Europe.  
                                               
29 As cited in Klaits, 91. According to Klaits, Verjus also independently engaged in a writing campaign to defend 
French policies between 1672 and 1675, producing and circulating nearly a dozen French-, Latin- and German-
language tracts. Unfortunately, while he found references to these publications in diplomatic dispatches, Klaits was 
unable to identify Verjus’s writings by title. Interestingly, Verjus also asked Pomponne for funds to establish a 
French-controlled printing press in Germany, a request that was denied but which illuminates one strategy to address 
foreign audiences, see 90-91. 
30 Klaits, 91.  
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In 1692, in one of the first pro-French pamphlets to appear in decades, one P. Moret de la 
Fayolle again referenced the damage done by the many uncontested anti-French tracts. Fayolle’s 
pamphlet included an additional address at the end which appears to be a request for permission 
to publish.31 He referenced several negative publications written by Louis XIV’s enemies, and 
explained his own motivations to write:  
the enemies of the king are permitted to print and publish diverse, anonymous libels, 
which shock not only the glory of the king, but also the truth of ancient [and] modern 
history… that which makes poor impressions on ill-intentioned spirits, ignorant of the 
truth… It is this which incited the supplicant [Fayolle] to clear the accused and to clarify 
to those who have studied history less, in order that the foreigners and subjects have 
something ready to respond to these insincere writers.32  
 
This address sheds light on many aspects of the renewed pro-French pamphlet campaign. It was 
intended in large part to counter the arguments and rhetoric of years of anti-French publications, 
both within France and beyond. Fayolle and others intended to correct the record, to provide “the 
truth” about France and the French king, such that their own partisans could better defend and 
support them. And, of course, in the hopes that the number of said partisans might grow.  
The return to pamphlet propaganda began gradually during the Nine Years War and its initial 
reception faced significant obstacles. As one anti-French pamphlet described in 1689, “the 
French writers, who sometimes committed their writings to the press with the permission of the 
King in France, demonstrate clearly enough… how their current most powerful king’s great and 
insatiable ambition will not soon be satisfied.”33 Far from convincing anybody of the justness of 
the French position, French pamphleteers, when they did write, seemed to prove only how power 
hungry their king was, paying writers to dress up his blatant ambition in trappings of 
                                               
31 This request is addressed to the “Marquis de Chasteauneuf.”  
32 Fayolle, Le Paravent de la France, 203–4. 
33 Das wiederrechtlich von Franckreich gebrochene zwantzigjährige Armistitium, preface, unpag. i. 
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legitimacy.34 Others scoffed at what seemed to them perfectly transparent attempts by French 
authors to sow discord and disunity, “to inseminate distrust, jealousy and suspicion among the 
estates and members of the Empire, against their leader the [Holy] Roman Emperor.”35 The fears 
that Verjus had voiced over two decades prior had come true. While the French had disdained 
pamphlet propaganda, they had allowed anti-French sentiment to grow. Hundreds and thousands 
of political pamphlets published in Germany during the Wars of Louis XIV supporting the 
Habsburgs and their allies had successfully cultivated an anti-French “public predisposed in their 
favor” and “a general state of mind unsympathetic” to French actions. Not least, as Verjus had 
predicted, because those many pamphlets went unanswered and uncontested by the French.  
It was into this fray that pro-French authors again waded in the early years of the Nine 
Years War. In 1689, a second pamphlet signed by a “Martinet, Lieutenant and Aide of 
Ceremonies of France,” celebrated the greatness, strength and religiosity of Louis XIV, pushing 
back against the many critiques of the Sun King that had emerged and consolidated in the 
intervening years.36 In 1692, Fayolle again directly referenced the writings of anti-French parties. 
These “pasquinades,” Fayolle wrote, are “the productions of a lovely imagination and a good 
quill, which, in truth, have delighted several curious persons, [and] grieved many enemies with 
their ingenious sarcasms, and which have neither enlightened nor convinced anyone.”37 In 
                                               
34 The fact that the same was undoubtedly true on the anti-French side was, of course, ignored as many anti-French 
pamphleteers professed their perfect, unbiased neutrality. See for example, Des neulich-verkleideten... Götter-
Bothen Mercurii, 2; Der geropffte Hahn, 1. 
35 Teutschlandes Politischer Fliegen-Wedel, 34. See also, Rabenach], Halt Frantzmann!, unpag. 15; Das 
wiederrechtlich von Franckreich gebrochene zwantzigjährige Armistitium, 34–35. See also, Dumont], La Pierre de 
Touche de la Lettre a Monsieur le Marquis, 18–19. 
36 Martinet, A Louis le Grand, Protecteur de l’Eglise, 1689. A pamphlet from the Franco-Dutch War was also signed 
in the same manner, though its unclear whether this was a person’s real name and title or a pseudonym of some kind, 
Martinet, Tombeau de M. de Turene. On critiques of Louis XIV and their consolidation in the 1680s see, Cooper, 
“Inventing a French Tyrant.” 
37 Fayolle, Le Paravent de la France, preface unpag. ii. 
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contrast to what he saw as the calumnies of France’s enemies, Fayolle steadfastly defended the 
actions of Louis XIV, explaining, “I admit… that the furious tenacity of [our] enemies is 
unbearable to me and I am confounded that the heroic actions of the king are contested and 
disparaged by his enemies in his own estates, as if they had a design to debauch his subjects 
rather than to fortify their own partisans.”38 Fayolle’s pamphlet, like many of the pro-French 
responses, reprinted original quotations from the opposing pamphlet with his own remarks and 
counterpoints alongside. Initial French forays were predominantly reactionary and defensive.39 
During the Nine Years War, however, the French reengagement with pamphlet 
propaganda was still only partial. This was not the full-scale reinvigoration that would happen 
under Torcy at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but more likely tentative steps on the part 
of several French councilors to combat the massive deluge of anti-French material that emerged 
between 1688 and 1691.40 One other interesting example from this period encapsulates the 
continued ambivalence towards pamphlets on the part of the French. The aristocrat, Eustache Le 
Noble published almost thirty polemical pamphlets between 1688 and 1691, under the title La 
pierre de touche politique [The Political Touchstone], all of which became wildly popular, with 
relatively enormous press. Many of Le Noble’s satirical dialogues derided Louis XIV’s rivals 
and promoted the king’s own interests versus England, the Habsburgs, and the papacy, among 
others. Le Noble was, however, a politically rebellious figure who also at times questioned the 
idea of absolute monarchy and other political organizations in France. Klaits reports these 
pamphlets as being often attributed to government backing, though he finds no firm evidence of 
                                               
38 Fayolle, preface unpag. iii. 
39 See also, Antwort eines Freundes. 
40 Klaits, Printed Propaganda under Louis XIV, 96. See Figure 1 in Introduction. 
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this.41 Klaits also describes these works as “regarded as pleasantries by Louis’ diplomats, 
harmless perhaps but without much political value.”42 Kathrina Ann LaPorta, though, argues the 
works can be read as either supporting or subverting the French crown, a fact which landed Le 
Noble himself in prison on several occasions and eventually exiled in 1693.43 The confusing 
circumstances of Le Noble’s writing suggest that while the French once again engaged in 
pamphlet propaganda, they had not yet reestablished tight control of the operation. 
This all changed with the rise of Colbert de Torcy, nephew of the earlier, famed Colbert, 
as the new minister for foreign affairs in 1699.44 Under Torcy, the French approach to pamphlet 
propaganda lost all ambivalence. He was able to fully convince Louis XIV that the effectiveness 
Verjus had referred to could be used in France’s favor. From the late 1690s on, the rate of pro-
French political pamphlets spiked. Torcy’s own diplomacy was wide-ranging, covering many 
parts of Europe, and his correspondence reveals a deep concern with using printed propaganda to 
influence the views of foreigners and domestic audiences alike. Joseph Klaits has shown in detail 
the extent and results of Torcy’s propaganda initiatives, and his work with Jean de la Chapelle is 
both representative and exemplary of the care and attention Torcy devoted to the subject.   
 Jean de la Chapelle and Torcy collaborated on the production of a 48-issue series of 
pamphlets entitled the Lettres d’un Suisse [Letters from a Swiss]. Initially published 
anonymously in serial format between June 1702 and January 1709, each installment was 
presented as a letter written by a Swiss Catholic living in Paris, primarily to a French 
                                               
41 Klaits, 121. 
42 Klaits, 121. 
43 Kathrina Ann LaPorta, “‘The Truth about Reasoning’: Veiled Propaganda and the Manipulation of Absolutist 
Authority in Eustache Le Noble’s La Pierre de Touche Politique (1688-1691),” Cahiers Du Dix-Septième: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal XV, no. 1 (2013): 72–93. 
44 Much of Klaits’ study is centered around the work of Torcy to reinvigorate print propaganda in France, and the 
multiple strategies and avenues he takes to do that, see Printed Propaganda under Louis XIV. 
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correspondent living abroad. Through the persona of this fictional Swiss correspondent, La 
Chapelle discussed current events, directly countered critical publications published abroad, and 
made a variety of arguments from his ostensibly neutral perspective, all of which conveniently 
supported Bourbon interests. The French crown sponsored and directed the composition and 
publication of the Lettres. Indeed, Torcy took such a direct role in the project that he often wrote 
to La Chapelle with fully-sketched out outlines for future pamphlets, reviewed each proposed 
Lettre draft, and carefully edited the content as he saw fit. As Klaits described, these pamphlets 
did more than reflect French interests, “they amplified and deepened diplomatic campaigns.” 
Torcy himself “hid behind the mask of the anonymous Swiss to argue publicly in ways which 
Louis XIV forbade to his diplomats.”45 This is especially interesting as La Chapelle’s pamphlets 
more closely resembled the polemic style of their anti-French counterparts than they did the legal 
and political explanations of earlier pro-French writings. Each pamphlet was short, accessible, 
published anonymously, and discussed politics and current events in a manner befitting 
discussion between friends, with history, emotion, current events - and national rhetoric - all 
mixed together. That we know how closely involved Louis XIV’s foreign minister was in 
constructing these polemic discussions sheds light on how effective and important even the top 
diplomats in France considered national rhetoric to be. 
 
National Rhetoric in Pro-French Pamphlets 
 
 The French, like their opponents, used a wide variety of rhetorical strategies in their 
pamphlets and, also like their opponents, one of these strategies was the mobilization of national 
rhetoric. Pro-French authors appealed to positive understandings of Frenchness and ideas of 
                                               
45 Klaits, 123. 
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patriotic love and duty to counter anti-French critiques and boost morale. But, unlike their 
opponents, this positive French rhetoric was not accompanied by vilification of the Germans as a 
national enemy. Rather, most pro-French pamphlets had quite positive things to say about the 
German nation. The enemy that was vilified over and over was, instead, the Habsburgs as a 
dynasty. 
The frequent use of dynastic language in pro-French pamphlets proved, for some, that 
this was indeed a pre-national age. David Bell, for example, briefly compared the writings of La 
Chapelle with the mass of pro-French literature produced during the Seven Years War and 
remarked that the former “presented the war as a war of kings, of royal houses,” not, as later 
works did, “as a war of nations.” This conclusion is based on the fact that La Chapelle 
“consistently attacked the perfidies and infamies of the ‘House of Austria’ and the ‘Emperor,’ 
not of Austrians” as a nation.46 This conclusion is symptomatic of the strictures that the 
modernist thesis of nations and nationalism has imposed on scholars of the early modern era. 
First, because national ideas have been defined as exclusively modern, scholars have only looked 
for evidence of those same modern iterations. Thus, Bell’s expectation that national ideas in the 
War of the Spanish Succession would be voiced in terms of “Austria” – a modern nation, yes, 
but one which only became so as a result of the contingencies of nineteenth and twentieth 
century politics. Instead, we need to understand what ideas of nation meant in each specific 
historical context in which they appeared. In doing this, we realized that in the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries “Austria” was primarily a dynastic, not a national, category that 
referred to the house of Austria, the Habsburgs. The national category the house of Austria 
belonged to at the time was, of course, Germany. Armed with the appropriate historical 
                                               
46 Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 90. 
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understandings it becomes clear that there were many national categories – French and German, 
but also Dutch, Spanish, English, Portuguese, Swiss, Hungarian, etc. – used in pro-French 
pamphlets.47  
The second assumption underlaying Bell’s brief comment is the idea that dynasty and 
nation are mutually opposed. Scholars have long understood the eighteenth century as a linear 
transition from dynastic to national politics – a shift nicely illustrated by the contrast between 
Louis XIV’s absolute monarchy at the century’s opening and the national republicanism of the 
French Revolution at its close. This theory generally suggests that nations and nationalism 
emerged as politically important ideas only with the “decomposition” of traditional cultural 
systems, such as old-regime dynasty.48 As a blanket statement, this assumption is historically 
inaccurate even for many modern ideologies of nationalism, but it is especially wrong for pre-
modern ideas of nation.49 Throughout the medieval and early modern periods ideas of nation 
were often used to buttress premodern dynasties, especially during times of crisis or weakness.50 
For the rest, dynasty and nation simply coexisted peacefully as overlapping and often entangled 
layers of identification. These pamphlets are no exception. As seen above, anti-French 
pamphleteers effectively linked ideas of dynasty and nation as they mobilized rhetoric of 
patriotic and national duty to the Habsburg emperors and Germany. 
                                               
47 For example see just the variety of national categories employed by La Chapelle over the course of his forty-eight 
installments, La Chapelle, Lettres d’un Suisse, 1704. All citations are taken from the six-letter collected volumes 
printed between 1704 and 1710. 
48 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised 
Edition (London: Verso, 2006), 12. 
49 Many modern nation-states and nationalist movements were perfectly compatible with dynastic monarchies, the 
most obvious example being Great Britain as Linda Colley shows in Britons. For a more detailed exploration of the 
relationship between dynasty and nation in the eighteenth century see, Cooper, “Power and Politics.” 
50 For an extended list of examples see, Introduction. 
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I argue that the frequent use of dynastic rhetoric in pro-French writings was a response to 
this twinned national-dynastic discourse of emperor and nation. This was an intentional 
persuasive technique used by pro-French pamphleteers to isolate the Habsburgs from their 
imperial allies. By constantly referring to the Habsburgs using exclusively dynastic rhetoric, 
pamphleteers attempted to construct a linguistic distinction between the Habsburg dynasty and 
the German nation – to which the rest of the powers of the Holy Roman Empire belonged. This 
strategy built on the much older rhetoric of the “despotic” Habsburgs as being opposed to 
“German liberty” and it tried to counter decades of pro-Habsburg rhetoric that had constructed a 
unifying idea of the emperor as the head of the German nation.51 In this way pro-French authors 
were actually trying to resurrect old understandings of Germany, imperial patriotism, and anti-
Habsburg sentiment that Leopold I and his agents had successfully rewritten – largely in the face 
of the threat from France. Pro-French writers knew that France needed to keep the majority of 
the imperial powers either neutral or on their side to keep the conflicts limited and thus increase 
the chances of a French victory. Insulting the entire German nation, therefore, was 
counterproductive. Instead, pro-French authors carefully navigated between negative dynastic 
stereotypes of the house of Austria and positive national stereotypes of the German nation in 
order to undermine the Habsburg position and isolate them from their imperial allies, while not 
rousing all of Germany against France. The use of dynastic rhetoric, therefore, was not proof that 
pro-French writers did not understand national ideas, but rather that they understood them so 
well as to be able simultaneously mobilize both dynasty and nation in order to best serve their 
own political needs. 
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Pro-French authors did mobilize French pride and patriotism. They employed the same 
broad, emotional appeals to national ideas their opponents used. For pro-French pamphleteers, 
however, this often came as a response to anti-French critiques of Louis XIV and his 
countrymen. One of the rebuttals to Lisola’s work addressed his commentary specifically to 
those interested in “the affairs of their patrie.”52 The author then countered Lisola’s discussion of 
the weaknesses of France by praising “the natural love that the French have for their king,” and 
by assuring the French of the many positive traits of their national character.53 The author of a 
pamphlet published in 1670 forcefully countered the many negative stereotypes of France that 
their opponents already began voicing. The author proclaimed his “bravery” in “defending an 
always triumphant nation [nation]” against its critics and claimed that he wrote  
to make clear to everyone that [France] is not fickle, inconstant, or superficial, to draw 
the curtain from before the eyes of these blind, headstrong, malicious or entirely ignorant 
people, and finally to make them naively confess that there is nothing more solid, nothing 
more stable, and nothing more constant than this nation [nation].54 
 
In 1675, Martinet published a pamphlet eulogizing the famed French commander, Turenne. 
Martinet praised the commander’s “zeal for his king [and] his care for the patrie,” which he “had 
always cherished more tenderly/ than his own interest & his own blood.”55 These ideas of 
national sacrifice read very similarly to the anti-French celebrations of the dukes who faced 
Turenne’s forces.56 In 1692, Fayolle again praised the French character, proclaiming that “the 
                                               
52 Le Politique du Temps, preface unpag. v. 
53 Le Politique du Temps, quote 92, see also 492-3, 502-3. On national characteristics of the French see also, Die im 
Ursprung und Wachsthum prächtig und mächtig-stehende Lilje. 
54 Apologie pour les Francois, 4. 
55 Martinet, Tombeau de M. de Turene, 1. 
56 See, Chapter 2: Patriotic Duty to Nation and Emperor. 
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French spirit” was immune to timidity, being bold by nature, a response to the countless anti-
French pamphlets painting the French character as weak and cowardly.57  
The French, however, did not have the same need as those in the Holy Roman Empire to 
use national pride to promote unity and action. France was not made up of various independent 
entities all with the ability to decide their own foreign policy. Unlike the emperor, Louis XIV did 
not need to rally a host of semi-autonomous princes to his cause. France was a relatively unified 
country under the control of a theoretically absolute monarch. These examples of French pride 
and patriotism were more likely methods of boosting morale than a necessary strategy for 
mobilizing military support. 
This role as morale booster emerges clearly in La Chapelle’s own use of French national 
ideas in his Lettres. One of the most remarkable facts about the Lettres d’un Suisse is that Torcy 
intended it for both international and domestic audiences. For the latter audience, La Chapelle 
mobilized a shared understanding of Frenchness to encourage continued support and loyalty 
during the long and difficult War of the Spanish Succession. The Swiss persona of the Lettres, 
carefully chosen by Torcy and La Chapelle, had the advantage of being both an outsider – as he 
repeatedly reminded his readers he was Swiss, not French – and an insider – he was residing in 
Paris and writing for the most part to a French correspondent.58 From this long exposure to the 
French nation, La Chapelle’s Swiss was able to confidently describe the French as a people with 
unique levels of sensitivity and refinement, who especially “love their king and their patrie” and 
                                               
57 Fayolle, Le Paravent de la France, 27. 
58 La Chapelle also used French national rhetoric for a second purpose: to bolster claims for the authenticity of the 
Swiss mask against critiques that the supposedly Swiss narrator was actually a hired French pen. He asserted 
immutable differences between the characters of a Frenchman and a Swiss, which, he argued, should prove to any 
reader the “authenticity” of the entirely fabricated Swiss persona. See, La Chapelle, Lettres d’un Suisse, 1708, 
2:Letter 12 (May 1703): 179-180. 
 
 236 
“the honor of their nation [nation].”59 In his first pamphlet he reassuringly asserted that the 
French prospects in the current conflict were no cause for concern. “A good Frenchman can 
sleep tranquilly and without worry for the fortune of his patrie,” La Chapelle wrote, suggesting 
that this worry might otherwise be a cause of many sleepless nights for a good, patriotic 
Frenchman.60  In 1704, after the disastrous defeat at Blenheim, La Chapelle’s Swiss admonished 
his French correspondent for the latter’s pessimism about the French war effort – combining both 
dynastic and national virtues in his compliments. “I have never believed that a Frenchman would 
need a foreigner to place back in front of their eyes the immense resources of a powerful 
monarchy, which cannot be exhausted by even the largest of disasters,” La Chapelle’s Swiss 
exclaimed, “Do you not recognize the “genius of your nation [nation]” in its resilience and 
strength?61 The noble, brave, loyal French were not to be so easily defeated; they could always 
return to their reserves of French character to see them through any setback.62 Amid military 
defeat, domestic revolt, economic hardship and unprecedented famine, Torcy explicitly tried to 
boost domestic opinion by having La Chapelle’s Swiss flatter the French character and rouse 
national pride.  
But La Chapelle’s Lettres and Torcy’s explicit attempts to address domestic audiences 
were unique. Until the War of the Spanish Succession, most French pamphlets were written for 
an external audience, trying to convince enemies and allies alike of the justness of the French 
cause. Thus, while similar examples of the mobilization of positive ideas of Frenchness existed, 
                                               
59 Jean de La Chapelle, Lettres d’un Suisse à un François ou l’on voit les véritables interests des princes et des 
nations de l’Europe qui sont en guerre, vol. 3 (Basel, 1710), Letter 15 (October 1703): 95. 
60 La Chapelle, Lettres d’un Suisse, 1704, 1:Letter 1 (September 1702): 5.  
61 Jean de La Chapelle, Lettres d’un Suisse à un François ou l’on voit les véritables interests des princes et des 
nations de l’Europe qui sont en guerre, vol. 5 (Basel, 1705), Letter 26 (September 1704): 50.  
62 See also La Chapelle, Lettres d’un Suisse, 1708, 2:Letter 7 (December 1702): 24-25; La Chapelle, Lettres d’un 
Suisse, 1705, 5:Letter 30 (February 1705): 239. 
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pro-French pamphleteers did not use them to the same extent as their German counterparts. 
Instead, due to their international focus, pro-French pamphleteers more often mobilized national 
rhetoric of other nations to manipulate their opponents and, in particular, to undermine alliances 
arrayed against them. To stick with the example of La Chapelle, his works display this strategy 
in action numerous times over the years.  
One goal of Torcy’s diplomacy during the War of the Spanish Succession was to detach 
England and the Netherlands from the Grand Alliance. Towards this end, La Chapelle spent a 
number of pamphlets arguing that the Netherlands had no national interest in the present war and 
would receive no national advantage through their involvement. La Chapelle played upon 
stereotypes of the Dutch character to argue that pursuing the war in Spain was detrimental to 
their interests as a nation, and a violation of their national character. The “wise and modest 
Dutch, who are nourished by the good faith of commerce, pride themselves on being true in their 
word and simple in their conduct, without fraud, without finesse, without ambition, and content 
to preserve the liberty of their provinces and of their commerce, [they have] acquired the esteem 
of all nations through [their] unembellished integrity.”63 The Dutch national interest, so La 
Chapelle claimed,  was to maintain commercial ties and active trade in as many places as 
possible, for which their natural, honest, unembellished character was advantageous. The success 
of Dutch commerce was not so much the result of technology or contingency, but due to the 
respect they garnered through their virtuous and hardworking national spirit. The present war, 
however, was disrupting trade and diverting Dutch resources from commerce to the military, all 
while forcing them to act in ways that were wholly unbecoming to their otherwise natural 
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integrity. The Dutch were becoming ever more concerned with military conquest and 
aggrandizement, in a grave departure from their natural proclivities and interests as a nation. 
Moreover, by virtue of their opposition to the French, the Dutch had been forced into an 
unnatural and detrimental alliance with England. La Chapelle portrayed the Anglo-Dutch rivalry 
as one with an important basis in commercial competition, but which transcended economics. 
The animosity between the two nations ran deep, “excited by however many cruel and odious 
injuries.” “In vain” do sovereigns try to paper over such “ancient” aversions and “force the two 
nations [nations] to march under the same standard” for the purposes of dynastic convenience.64 
“Times and interests change; princes die or are reconciled: [but] the people are immortal and 
rarely forgive,” warned La Chapelle.65 While recognizing that dynastic interests could change 
rapidly conflict to conflict, La Chapelle posited another layer to international politics: a layer that 
was deeper, more durable, and could run counter to short-term dynastic aims. The participation 
of the Dutch in the Grand Alliance against France was presented as a betrayal of the Dutch 
ancestors and the glory of the Dutch nation. “They are no longer,” declared La Chapelle, “the 
same Dutch.”66 Between their unnatural cooperation with England and their abandonment of 
commerce, the Dutch were not just temporarily acting against their national interests. Their very 
national character was being corrupted. The only hope of redemption was to repudiate the Grand 
Alliance and end their participation in the war. 
Both La Chapelle and anti-French publications applied national rhetoric to the issue of 
the Spanish as well. Anti-French publications centered on the claim that the Bourbon succession 
in Spain was illegitimate and therefore illegal. From this fundamental proposition, one anti-
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French publication appealed to the “noble” and “faithful” character of the Spanish, encouraging 
the Spanish nation to support the allied troops landing in Spain in order to restore their “true” 
monarch.67 An imperial manifesto appealed to the Spanish as “such a gallant and faithful nation 
[nation]” who would naturally rally to the “sure support of its legitimate sovereign” – meaning 
the Habsburg claimant.68 La Chapelle’s response to this manifesto cultivated a sense of injured 
incredulity:  
It is under the faith of a declaration constructed with such art, dressed up in the most 
specious of colors, and presented with such finesse, that they promise themselves that the 
Spanish nation [la Nation Espagnolle], the most wise of people, the most sensitive of 
spirits, the most courageous and virtuous in the world, would be weakened and quickly 
lead into a general revolt against a king that they have unanimously acclaimed and 
recognized.69  
 
La Chapelle and his opponents mobilized similar positive stereotypes of the Spanish character, 
demonstrating a rhetorical consensus with his enemies about the content of national ideas of 
Spain. But both sides turned that rhetoric to suit their own interests and position. Since, from La 
Chapelle’s perspective, it was in fact the Bourbon king who was the legitimate heir, the naturally 
faithful and loyal Spaniards would then, obviously, side with the French.70 To do otherwise was 
to act against their character and to betray their nation. Any Spanish who supported the 
Habsburgs and their allies then became “traitors and rebels to their [true] king and to their 
patrie.”71  
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supplementary documents referenced by La Chapelle – at times these were legitimate publications to which La 
Chapelle was responding, at other times these were fake documents written by La Chapelle himself to provide a 
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 Of course, in the War of the Spanish Succession as earlier, France’s most consistent 
opponent was Leopold I and his Habsburg heirs to the imperial crown. The Habsburgs had 
mobilized ideas of a shared Germanness that united the emperor and empire for over three 
decades. On their behalf, pamphleteers mobilized diplomatic and military opposition to France in 
the service of a larger “German” ideal, including the Habsburg emperors not only as leaders of 
the imperial political apparatus, but as the protectors and sole proponents of the “true German 
interest.” To ally with the Habsburgs against Louis XIV, this propaganda argued, was to serve 
this shared German interest. To do the opposite was to betray not just the Emperor, but the entire 
German nation. This rhetoric portrayed imperial politics, not in terms of dynastic power 
dynamics, but as a question of morality and national duty. National rhetoric portrayed Habsburg 
interests as indivisible from the rest of the Empire, from the rest of Germany. The fear of cultural 
infiltration that emerged most prominently in the 1680s agonized over Imperial consumption of 
French goods, clothing, and food, the adoption of the French language in elite circles, and the 
embrace of French pastimes. By turning away from all things “German,” members of the Empire 
were sacrificing their national character and virtues, thereby facilitating French conquest. All 
those who embraced French culture and goods were denounced as having been unwittingly 
seduced into collusion with the enemy. They were doing the Sun King’s dirty work by 
destroying Germany from within. This extensive, multi-faceted, and detailed discourse of the 
Habsburgs as “fathers” of the German nation developed, largely uncontested, for decades. It was 
precisely this association between the Habsburgs and the German interest that pro-French writers 
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tried to disrupt with their own use of dynastic and national rhetoric. La Chapelle and others used 
ideas of Germanness, but did their best to disrupt the imperial relationship by rhetorically placing 
the Habsburg dynasty outside of and in opposition to the German nation.  
For the first part of this strategy, pro-French pamphleteers mobilized positive German 
stereotypes. One author from 1675 praised “the tenderness that German officers have for their 
country.”72 In 1692, Fayolle celebrated “the valiant Germans” and their famous virtues.73 Fayolle 
and other pro-French authors also mobilized positive ideas of the German ancestors, describing a 
“glorious” German past.74 In 1711, an author wrote that “Germany is powerful, she has a great 
number of men ready for war, she has many grand and large cities, she has nothing to fear from 
outside enemies.”75 Another author writing in 1711 celebrated “the German princes” for their 
wisdom and magnanimity and praised the Imperial Diet, as a counterpoint to the Habsburg 
Emperor, by claiming “it is incapable of being animated by inspirations other than those of love 
and the good of the patrie.”76 La Chapelle described the inhabitants of the empire as 
“descendants of those noble & magnanimous Germans, of the savage virtue of which Cornelius 
Tacitus left us such a marvelous image.”77 He praised them for the fact that  
their country has never been… invaded by conquerors, they have never mixed their blood 
with those of other nations [Nations] through foreign marriages, never corrupted the 
purity of their ancient mores by blending with other people… [They are] a people so 
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participation des autres Princes, & Etats du S. Empire. [Avec] Lettre de Monsieur D*** A Monsieur le Docteur 
W*** touchant le Royaume de Bohême, 1711, 11, 15, 6. 
77 La Chapelle, Lettres d’un Suisse, 1705, 5:Letter 24 (July 1704): 260-261. 
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generous and so free [that they] do not recognize as their masters anybody other than 
their Gods.78  
 
This mobilization of the rhetoric of Tacitus flattered the Germans as honorable, virtuous, martial, 
and thriving. All of this rhetoric should by now be familiar. Like with their discussion of the 
Spanish, both pro- and anti-French writers mobilized similar stocks of national ideas. But 
whereas anti-French authors had used Germany’s history of freedom to argue for resistance to 
the invading conqueror, Louis XIV, La Chapelle and other pro-French writers used rhetoric of 
German freedom to emphasize that German princes should never submit to any higher earthly 
power – such as an emperor. 
This praise of Germany ensured that pro-French writers did not alienate any of France’s 
current or potential imperial allies, but it was also an attempt to show that Germanness was not 
under attack from the French, as countless anti-French authors had argued. In fact, numerous 
pro-French pamphleteers did their best to portray France as a friend of the empire and of 
Germany.79 Already in 1667, Aubéry wrote of a “close and inviolable relationship between the 
French and the Germans.”80 “One observes,” Aubéry explained, “that ordinarily, between nations 
[nations] who are in league with each other, jealousies, envy, antipathy, and diverse other 
passions are excited, which degenerate most often into hatred and open and declared enmity.” 
Aubéry continued his argumentation, “and yet, none of these inconveniences have ever 
interrupted, ever troubled, the ancient and perfect union of the French and the Germans… as they 
have always been, the one to the other, something more than neighbors and allies… [and] such 
                                               
78 La Chapelle, 5:Letter 24 (July 1704): 261. See also, Legrand], Discours sur ce qui s’est passé dans l’Empire... 
[Avec] L’Allemagne menacée, 26–27; “L’Allemagne menacée,” 11–12.  
79 Fayolle, Le Paravent de la France; Manifestes de quelques princes de l’Empire.  




ardor, as that of the French nobility to defend the borders of Germany, has never been seen.”81 
This rose-colored view of history was obviously a departure from much of the reality of Franco-
German relations, even if one only looked as recently as the Thirty Years War. But still, again 
and again pro-French writers appealed to France’s status as guarantor of the Treaty of 
Westphalia, painting the actions of Louis XIV not as aggressive aggrandizement, but simply as 
protecting German interests.82 Others argued, especially during the War of the Spanish 
Succession, that France was simply trying to maintain the balance of power in Europe and 
prevent the Habsburgs from gaining too much power at others’ expense.83  
Instead, pro-French pamphleteers argued, if anyone was responsible for difficulties 
Germany might currently be facing, it was the Habsburgs. For, as everybody knew, manipulation 
by the house of Austria was nothing new. Pro-French authors also appealed to history to support 
their claims, referring back primarily to examples of controversy and polemic from the century 
and a half of religious strife between Catholics and Protestants in the empire. In 1668 a pamphlet 
critiqued the Habsburgs, conflating the Spanish and Austrian branches as two heads under one 
crown and referred to collectively as “the house of Austria.”84 This pamphlet directly countered 
the political maxims that Lisola attributed to the Bourbons with maxims of his own that he 
attributed to the Habsburgs. These included manipulating the imperial powers with leagues and 
                                               
81 Aubery, Des justes pretentions du roy sur l’empire, 45. 
82 Le Politique du Temps, 38; Manifestes de quelques princes de l’Empire, 11–12.  
See also, Manifestes de quelques princes de l’Empire, 11–12; [Louis Rousseau de Chamoy], Réponse de Mr. de…… 
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alliances that they pretend were for the protection of Germany, but which really served their own 
personal interests; a dogged pursuit of power, legitimately or not; and aggrandizement through 
the conquest or confiscation of lands rightfully belonging to others, including imperial princes.85 
In light of such behavior, the author lamented, “how many [German] princes today would be 
under the slavery of the house of Austria, without the protection of France.”86 An author from 
1670 wrote of how the Habsburgs “usurped” the imperial throne and a writer in 1674 agreed that 
the Habsburgs would do better to concern themselves with the well-being of Germany rather 
than pursuing their own dynastic interests and dragging the empire into a war against its own 
interests.87  
In 1675, a French-language pamphlet purported to be a “manifesto” written by several 
imperial princes. Entitled, Manifesto of Several Princes of the Empire on the Present State of 
Germany [Manifestes de quelques princes de l’Empire sur l’estat present de l’Allemagne], this 
author argued that the Habsburgs “do not take action so much to defend the Empire, as grasp this 
false pretext to throw them [imperial princes] into a ruinous war and to put them, in this way, in 
a state of being then more easily oppressed by the house of Austria.”88 The French could not 
possibly be the aggressors, this pamphlet argued, for one need simply “look at who has the 
greater interest that the princes of the empire go to war, the emperor or the Most Christian King, 
and who could profit the most from their division.”89 This argument was particularly bold 
                                               
85 Jant, La Meduse. Bouclier de Pallas, preface unpag. ix-xxx. 
86 Jant, 41. 
87 Apologie pour les Francois, 15; Le Politique du Temps, 445–46. On the pursuit of war as personal 
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88 Manifestes de quelques princes de l’Empire, 14. 
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coming, as it did, in the midst of the Franco-Dutch War – a conflict started when Louis XIV 
brutally invaded the Netherlands unprovoked. Yet still, the pamphleteer continued, the 
Habsburgs had already practiced for “the oppression and complete subjugation of the entire 
empire” when they did the same to Hungary and Bohemia, turning those regions into their 
personal hereditary dominions.90 All their current efforts to mobilize the imperial powers in truth 
aimed only to “reduce Germany to an absolute monarchy and to establish there a completely 
despotic government.”91 Meanwhile, France and Louis XIV had “never solicited anything 
against the good, the repose, and the honor of the empire.”92 This author even countered the 
patriotic rhetoric of anti-French pamphleteers who had argued that those princes allied with 
France were traitors to their patrie. Instead, the pro-French author suggested, it was those same 
princes who did their patriotic duty by opposing the Habsburgs. As this author described, all “the 
princes and estates of the empire who love their patrie,” had allied with Louis XIV.93 Later, the 
same author argued that it was the Habsburgs, not the French, who were trying to conquer and 
subdue “all of Germany.”94 Indeed this had been their goal since at least the reign of Ferdinand II 
and “one could say that we are, above all in this present time, on the point of seeing entirely 
accomplished these grand and perpetual designs of Ferdinand II and his descendants on the 
liberty of Germany.”95 The author even went so far as to cite a precedent from the thirteenth 
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century when the electors had deposed the emperor. The offense was nothing less than 
embroiling the empire in a war against France, “who had always been their defenders and their 
most loyal allies.”96 Such a step had happened before, the pamphlet not-so-subtly suggested; the 
electors would be justified in doing so again now. 
This author referenced other pro-French pamphlets, all telling of “the true causes of the 
empire’s troubles,” and argued that they were very well received “in Germany” by “all of the 
honest people and all those who love their patrie.”97 But, the author continued, “it should not 
surprise that they have irritated several Austrian ministers.”98 Through this construction the 
author suggested that the Austrians did not love their patrie. In addition, this author contrasted 
the natural German love of truth and honesty with a very un-German, Habsburg preference to 
spread lies and deceit to achieve their own interests.99 He cast the Austrian Habsburgs, not the 
French nation, as the perfidious foils to natural German candor. Everything that the Habsburgs 
did was “opposed to the genius, to the maxims, to the laws and the interests of Germany.”100 
Throughout the pamphlet, the author contrasted the Habsburgs and their agents with “true 
Germans,” with those “who love their country.”101 
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In 1692, Fayolle again claimed that France had always defended Germany. He argued 
that by arming themselves against France in Nine Years War, the imperial princes had simply 
fallen for the house of Austria’s “ruses” which had always proved “the most dangerous and most 
effective for tyranny.”102 Fayolle went even further, to chastise the German princes for their lack 
of action in countering such ruses. He again mobilized the same rhetoric of the noble German 
ancestors when he asked “where is the German virtue… where is that solidity so famous in times 
past” which should inspire resistance against “the tyranny of the house of Austria.”103 Part of 
what Fayolle and others had to counter was the fact that more imperial powers allied with the 
Habsburgs against France in the Nine Years War than in any previous conflict. Louis XIV’s 
violent aggression and the rallying of anti-French sentiment had finally achieved the imperial 
unity so many anti-French pamphleteers clamored for. But this was not how Fayolle painted the 
situation. While “France had aided the princes of Germany multiple times against the attacks of 
the house of Austria,” he wrote, those same “princes today arm a party against France in order to 
prop up the unjust pretentions of the house of Austria.”104 Regardless of what the dozens of 
celebratory pamphlets portraying him as protector of Germany might have said, “Emperor 
Leopold,” Fayolle insisted, “is not tormented with this tenderness for Germany.”105 Fayolle, too, 
appealed to history to show how little the Habsburgs cared for Germany and to exhort “that the 
princes do justice to their glorious ancestors and to those, who have suffered nothing but 
                                               
102 Fayolle, Le Paravent de la France, 12, see also 7, 26-27, 36-37, 59-61, 103, 105-6, 149-151. 
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degradation under the house of Austria.”106 Ally with France to contain the Habsburgs and 
thwart their insatiable ambition. 
A pamphlet from the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession, also sponsored by 
Torcy but written by Baron Karg von Bebenburg, chief minister of the French-allied Joseph 
Clement of Cologne, warned of the dangers of relying on the Habsburgs for protection or 
prosperity.107 This pamphlet, and several others, held up the example of the Elector of Cologne, 
whose lands had been seized as punishment for his alliance with France. Not only was the 
current war against the laws of the empire, Karg argued, but the elector was being unjustly and 
illegally punished for asserting his right to pursue his own foreign policy. This was all just 
another front for Habsburg tyranny and self-aggrandizement.108 Again in 1712 a pamphlet 
explained that it was not new to see the house of Austria working for its own good, but what was 
new was “to see the principal members of the empire work towards their own destruction in 
contributing to the success of their [the house of Austria’s] ambitious projects.”109 The 
Habsburgs manipulated “hatred against France,” this pamphleteer argued, until it acted like a 
“blindfold over the eyes of the majority of imperial princes,” allowing them to be led astray from 
their own interest.110 
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La Chapelle, too, argued that the historical relationship between the Habsburgs and the 
Holy Roman Empire was one of oppression, deception, and enslavement. In fact, twenty of his 
forty-eight installments featured anti-Habsburg themes.111 La Chapelle repeatedly argued that the 
true Habsburg goal was to turn the empire into a hereditary despotism, by gradually destroying 
German liberty and taking all power for themselves. Here again, La Chapelle forwards an older 
understanding of “German liberty” that had been dominant as recently as the Thirty Years War 
and which was defined in opposition to Habsburg tyranny.112 When one looks at the history of 
the Habsburg dynasty, La Chapelle’s Swiss explained, one realizes that “the spirit of usurpation 
has animated the house of Austria from the first day that they were born into sovereignty.”113 La 
Chapelle then deployed a host of dynastic stereotypes associated with the house of Austria. He 
accused them of “infidelity, fraud, low tricks, secret conspiracies, public violations of treaties 
and of the most sacred rights, even crimes, treasons, murders, assassinations, poisonings.”114 As 
he explained, “the ambition in their souls… renders anything legitimate.”115  
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While the ambition of the Habsburgs knew no bounds, the most common target of their 
machinations, La Chapelle and others argued, had always been Germany. The Habsburgs used 
German armies to fight battles that served only the house of Austria and consistently led the 
Germans astray. Despite their own claims, the Habsburgs were the ones who represented 
everything anathema to Germanness. They were “the disruptors of the repose of the [German] 
patrie.”116 One author writing in 1675 lamented the division and disunity of the Germans in 
language almost identical to that found in anti-French pamphlets of the time.  
Germany, almost completely reduced under the yoke of a subjugation, the designs and 
efforts of which it has fought for many years… [is now] abandoned by its neighbors, 
divided in itself, ransacked by foreigners and barbarians, and so much weakened, that it 
resembles nothing more than a body without a soul.117  
 
Another pamphleteer again employed the same ancestor rhetoric of anti-French pamphlets, 
bemoaning that “the reflections that I have often made on the dire and unhappy state in which 
Germany finds itself, have committed me to look with care for the principal [causes] of this 
disorder, and the causes which have gradually ruined the liberty of these people, and which have 
so terribly degenerated the virtue of their ancestors.”118 Yet, while the language was similar, the 
cause of these misfortunes was different. While their anti-French counterparts blamed France for 
everything; for these pro-French pamphleteers the blame fell to the Habsburgs. The latter 
pamphlet, purportedly written by a German motivated by “the pain which I feel at the 
degradation of Germany, my patrie,” explained that the various “usurpations of the emperor” 
were wholly “to the prejudice of the liberty of their patrie.”119  
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Instead of the Habsburgs being the supreme protectors of the German national interest, as 
the emperors’ own propaganda portrayed them, La Chapelle described a Germany that existed 
despite a long history of Habsburg machinations.120  
The Germans are dazzled by the happy and continual reign of the house of Austria over 
the course of three centuries, [they] have, without realizing it… almost forgotten their 
freedom, which [was] cut down by this long, continuous domination according to the 
very maxims [of the house of Austria]. They [the Germans] have been gradually driven to 
respect and complaisance for this reigning house, even to a form of servitude. I am not at 
all astonished, it is the work of time, which has often changed into deserts the most 
flourishing cities, extinguished entire peoples and destroyed the most superb empires.121 
 
If nothing changed, it would be only a matter of time before the already corrupted and enslaved 
Germany faded away entirely into the pages of history, like so many other once-great empires. 
This echoed the same fears of imperial collapse and German national erasure seen in the 
previous chapter, but squarely targeted the Habsburgs as the perpetrators. Just a few years later, 
Joachim Legrand described the Germans as having no outside enemies to fear, “but they have 
one inside against which neither fortresses nor armies will be able to defend… [Germany] carries 
its poison in its blood.”122 This poison was the house of Austria itself, to which power “the cities, 
the citadels, the treasures of Germany, its armies, all its forces could fall.”123 
In 1712 the same author who claimed to be a patriotic German, summarized all these 
points and came to a dire conclusion: “it is then necessary that all of Germany take up arms to 
overthrow, down to the foundations, this ambitious house which has done them such harm, 
which has so oppressed [their] liberty and which has never done anything but for its own 
                                               
120 Schumann, Die andere Sonne. 
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interests.”124 The author invoked yet another intellectual authority when he continued to assert 
“if it is true what Machiavelli said, that in each republic there are deadly houses, who find their 
elevation only in the ruins of their patrie… Austria is without a doubt this in regard to Germany, 
where from a rather lowly emergence, it has elevated itself to an almost absolute authority.”125 
The house of Austria had done everything they possibly could to undermine Germany, despite 
the fact that they were indebted to the same for everything they possessed. This destruction had 
impacted not only the state of the empire, but the virtue of the Germans themselves. Employing 
once again the ancestor rhetoric of anti-French pamphlets, this author once again inverted the 
cause.  
But if, on the other hand, one casts an eye to the empire, one finds that, under the 
emperors of the house of Austria, it has greatly degenerated from the virtue and the 
fidelity for which the ancient Germans were so honored. [The empire] has often seen its 
tranquility disturbed by internal wars, which [the house of Austria] has sparked there, 
[the empire] has lost the greater part of its liberty through their enterprises and their 
usurpations, a large part of its grandeur, of its strength and its expanse, through their lack 
of effort towards [the empire’s] true interests.126  
 
Neither a lack of patriotism, nor a lack of unity, nor the influence of French cultural infiltration 
caused the loss of such honorable and ancient German virtues. The root of German national 
decline lay at the feet of the house of Austria. Germany’s only hope, so this pamphlet insisted, 
was to get rid of them entirely.127 Again mimicking the rhetoric of opposing pamphlets, this 
writer urged the various German powers to forget their differences, both political and religious, 
and to sacrifice their personal interests “to the public good.”128 But this time it was not France 
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who was the threatening outsider. Only by uniting could Germany “resist” the threat posed by 




The rhetorical manipulation of pro-French writers allowed the French to isolate and 
denigrate the Habsburgs, while simultaneously uniting the powers of the empire in terms of a 
common German interest. In doing so these writers undermined Habsburg claims to represent 
that interest by rhetorically excluding them from Germany altogether. Just as it had for their 
opponents, national rhetoric allowed the French to appeal across confessional divides, personal 
antagonisms, and political quarrels to unite the empire behind a shared idea of Germanness. But, 
in the French case, this was an idea of Germanness defined in opposition to Habsburg legitimacy 
and authority.  
Pro-French pamphleteers were just as aware of the existence and utility of national 
rhetoric as their opponents. Like their opponents, pro-French writers knew how to wield these 
ideas to best achieve their political and rhetorical goals. For their anti-French opponents, this had 
meant collapsing the national and the dynastic, to argue that the Habsburg emperors represented 
Germany, and deploying layer after layer of negative French stereotypes and national critiques, 
to argue the French were dangerous and untrustworthy. Pro-French pamphleteers engaged with 
national rhetoric in a very different way, to try to manipulate the alliances of their opponents and 
isolate their Habsburg rivals from the idea of Germany altogether. The inconsistencies in this use 
of national rhetoric, both across time and between the French and German sides, do not show a 
failure of these ideas or their lack of importance. On the contrary, these inconsistencies are proof 
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of the very precise and important role national rhetoric and national ideas played in this precise 
historical moment. 
It should be obvious by now that national ideas were nothing new at the end of the 
seventeenth century. Pamphleteers on both sides clearly operated within a well-developed and 
familiar atmosphere of national thinking. So much so that writers could effectively mobilize 
national rhetoric when it was politically and rhetorically useful, manipulating the message and 
modulating the frequency to better suit the context. But they also dropped these ideas in favor of 
others when the circumstances required. Thus, this evidence of early modern national ideas is 
quite different from modern ideologies of nationalism. These examples do not show a universal 
or all-encompassing understanding of the national. The national does not demand primacy or 
constant devotion. But to judge these examples for failing to achieve those standards makes as 
much sense as judging an early modern carriage for not traveling as fast as a train. Instead, the 
examples from the Wars of Louis XIV show that pamphleteers appreciated national rhetoric as 
one tool among many in their efforts to shape public political opinion. Anti-French writers used 
this tool to support the dynastic interests of the Habsburgs and rally the divided imperial states 
behind ideas of national duty, national heritage, and national protection. Pro-French 
pamphleteers, too, used positive ideas of Frenchness to boost morale and support their king. But 
they also deftly navigated between levels of national and dynastic categories, pitting one against 
the other to conceptually isolate their enemies while appealing to potential allies.  
All of this shows that not only were these pamphleteers masters at using and manipulating 
national rhetoric, but also, in this historical moment, it was not a question of either dynastic or 
national understandings. Rather all of these ideas coexisted as overlapping levels of 
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identification. In response to political context and to each other, contemporary pamphleteers 












EPILOGUE: EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY TRAJECTORIES 
 
Far from living in ignorance of national ideas in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, pamphleteers operated within an incredibly diverse and well-developed atmosphere of 
national thinking that often supported, but at times undermined, dynastic claims. They mobilized 
ideas of national characters to explain the political and military agendas of monarchical state. 
Anti-French writers argued that following the Holy Roman Emperor into battle would fulfil 
one’s patriotic and national duty to fatherland and nation. Authors mobilized constructed 
imaginings of an ancient German past to justify territorial claims in their wars against France, 
and then used that ideal past to shame contemporaries for their “disloyalty.” At the height of fear 
of Louis XIV’s power, pamphleteers even argued that German souls were being corrupted into 
French ones through fashion, culture, and even tennis! Finally, pro-French writers turned much 
of this rhetoric around to use it against their opponents as they constructed their own ideal of 
Germany that excluded their Habsburg rivals. All of these examples support the claim that 
national ideas were widespread and served important roles for centuries prior to the modern age 
of nationalism and nation states. Those ideas and those roles simply existed in different forms 
from what we recognize in the modern era. 
The current historiographical narrative of the necessary modernity of national ideas posits 
a relatively smooth, linear trajectory from an early modern dynastic to a modern national age, 
with those two concepts held in opposition to each other. But, as has been shown, this 
interpretation rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the role that national ideas played in 





national ideas, like all ideas, were never constant. They were and are in perpetual states of flux as 
they are used again and again, as they bump up against contexts which require their reassessment 
and reinvention, and as they are altered in response to new intellectual or political needs. Modern 
ideas of nation are as much a product of their specific historical and intellectual context as their 
early modern counterparts. With a longer and wider scope of view, scholars can better 
understand these changing ideas and their contextual differences. 
Let us look at the trajectory of German national ideas through the eighteenth century, for 
example. While plenty of ideas of Germany and the German nation circulated prior to the Wars 
of Louis XIV, during that era these ideas changed. Through years of successful propaganda and 
image-making, Leopold I and his supporters promoted ideas of Germany and the German nation 
in opposition to France more strongly than ever before. Contemporaries defined Germanness so 
strongly against Frenchness that they saw the influence of French culture as a threat to the 
German national character, the German way of life, and the German imperial structure. 
Pamphleteers also fused German national ideas with the person of the emperor that princes who 
followed their legal prerogative to ally with France were accused of betraying their German 
ancestors and were denounced as traitors to the fatherland. Even the French acknowledged the 
strength of the imperial and national association in Germany as their pamphleteers tried their best 
to rhetorically dismantle it.  
The War of the Spanish Succession ended in 1714 and Louis XIV died in 1715. With the 
close of this period of conflict, the immediate need for rhetorical mobilization of national ideas 
also ended. For the next three decades there reigned relative peace between France and the Holy 
Roman Empire. The understanding of German national ideas as developed during the Wars of 





Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the Seven Years War (1756-1763). When that test did 
come and the potential need for national ideas emerged again, the internecine context of these 
largely intra-German wars made it almost impossible to mobilize German national ideas as they 
had been understood under Leopold I and Louis XIV.  
The political context of the War of the Austrian Succession differed significantly from 
that of any of the Wars of Louis XIV.1 Coming out of the latter, German national ideas had 
coalesced around two principles: a close association with the imperial crown, and a deep 
opposition to France. In the War of the Austrian Succession, the chief belligerents were the 
Habsburg, Maria Theresa - who had lost any claim to the imperial crown by virtue of being a 
woman – against the feeble, embattled Wittelsbach emperor, Charles VII - the first non-
Habsburg emperor in three hundred years - and his close ally, France. The Habsburg party could 
and did use anti-French rhetoric to argue that Charles VII had forfeited German interests by 
inviting this historical enemy into the empire, but the full weight of the imperial-national 
association would have only served their enemies.2 Meanwhile, Charles VII could only weakly 
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attempt to promote national-imperial duty since, despite the imperial crown, he faced widespread 
criticism as little more than a French pawn.3 Plus, the fact of his French alliance foreclosed all 
possible appeals to rally against France, the national “Other.”  
These complications continued, albeit in different shades, during the Seven Years War. 
Again, France supported the emperor. Through Maria Theresa’s husband, the newly crowned 
Francis I, the Habsburgs (now Habsburg-Lorraine) had regained the imperial throne, but without 
significant German ancestral territories of his own and overshadowed by his competent and 
forceful wife, Franz-Stephan did little to reanimate the role of the emperor, whether in favor of 
the Habsburgs or not.4 In fact his reign signaled the beginning of a growing divide between 
imperial and Austrian politics.5 In addition, the Habsburgs had put aside centuries of dynastic 
rivalry with the Bourbons in a stunning reversal of alliances known as the Diplomatic 
Revolution. France was now allied with Austria fighting against its former ally, Prussia. So, 
while the dynasty had reclaimed the imperial title, the Habsburgs could still not fully embrace 
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national rhetoric in all its earlier valences while working with the national enemy.6 Moreover, the 
Seven Years War in Germany primarily pitted Maria Theresa and Frederick II against each other. 
Francis I supported his wife’s side, but as emperor he was technically supposed to act as a higher 
authority to mediate between inter-imperial disputes such as this.7 While the empire did declare 
war against Prussia, it did so not in support of Habsburg demands for the restitution of Silesia, 
but rather only in the limited role of protesting Prussia’s invasion of Saxony. Prussia, on the 
other hand, tried to mobilize anti-French rhetoric to argue that Prussia was the protector of 
German interests, but having just fought a war in Germany with France’s help less than a decade 
prior, this argument proved a very wobbly leg to stand on.8 In both of these conflicts parties on 
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both sides did attempt to use national rhetoric to bolster their own positions, but the force of this 
rhetoric always ended up hamstrung due to a variety of complications and entanglements. No 
party managed to mobilize the full force of national ideas as those ideas had been understood 
during the Wars of Louis XIV. 
In the face of these hurdles, ideas of the German nation and German national interest 
changed again. As Charles VII, Maria Theresa, and Frederick II all attempted to lay claim to 
parts of the German national idea, other members of the empire increasingly saw the interests of 
Germany as falling with none of these powers. Already in the early years of the Seven Years 
War, onlookers weary of further conflict caused by the growing Prusso-Austrian rivalry began to 
argue that their true national duty was to remain neutral and thereby limit the destruction to their 
fatherland.9 The military impact of the war proved devastating and sparked a “wide-ranging 
                                               
Feldzugs Sr. Majestät des Königs in Preußen, von der Roßbacher Bataille, bis zum Ende des 1758sten Jahres 
(Frankfurt und Leipzig, 1759). 
9 Großväterliche Erinnerungen über das Schreiben eines Vaters an seinen Sohn den gegenwärtigen Zustand in 
Sachsen betreffend, 1757; Relation vom Kriek in kute Deutscheland die swar schon albe Welt iß fort bien bekannt 
Doch als da Teuf iß kahr mit helle Lüge los nach Wahreit proponir ein arme Deutschefransos (Dresden, 1757); 
Schreiben eines Franken an einen seiner Freunde in Schwaben von einigen derer gefährlichsten Zeitläuften 
Teutschlandes, 1757; Der Neutrale Philosoph by dermaligen Kriegerischen Zeiten, 1757; Stille Betrachtungen eines 
Einsielders über die vorhabende Achtserklärung Ihro Königl. Majestät in Preusen als Churfürsten von 
Brandenburg, 1757; Unpartheiische Gedanken eines Holländers bey dem gegenwärtigen deutschen Kriege 
(Rotterdam, 1757); Wichtiges Pro-Memoria über die Veränderung, so in dem Teutschen politischen System seit dem 
Aachener Frieden vorgefallen (Lüttich [Liège], 1757); Ohnmasgeblicher Vorschlag zu einer bei gegenwärtigem 
Kriege gemeinschaftlichen Einigkeit des heiligen römischen Reichs, wie solche zwischen den Catholischen und 
Protestanten leicht zu befördern, aus Liebe zur Wohlfahrt Deutschlandes mit unpartheyischer Feder entworfen, 
1758; Politischer Beweis, daß eine eingeschränkte monarchische Regierungs-Form vor einer absoluten Monarchie 
den Vorzug behaupte, in so ferne derselbe durchd ie Geschichte des gegenwärtigen Krieges bestätiget wird, 1758; 
Schreiben an einen Rechtsgelehrten in Ingolstadt, über die Frage, of die Teutsche Freyheit bey den gegenwärtigen 
Zeitläuften in Gefahr stehe?, 1758; [Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi], Wohlgemeynte Vorschläge eines die 
jetzigen unglücklichen Zeiten beseufzenden Menschenfreundes auf was vor Bedingungen die jetzo in Krieg 
befangenen Mächte zu einem dauerhaftigen und ihrem allerseitigen Interesse gemässen Frieden gelangen könnten 
zur Aufmunterung ganz Deutschlandes, 1760; Welcher Theil der hohen Krieg führenden Mächte darf sich auf einen 
vortheilhaften Frieden Hofnung machen; und was hat besonders das Römische Reich für Gewinn oder Verlust 
davon zu erwarten? Aus der gegenwärtigen Verfassung der Staaten, gleichwie auch der Lage der Sachen und ihren 
Folgen, nach wahrscheinlichen Gründen, der unpartheyischen Welt patriotischen vor Augen geleget, 1761; 
Unpartheyische Prüfung der Schrift, unter dem Titul: Erweiß, daß die Cronne Frankreich und Schweden auf das 
vollkommenste berechtiget sind, in dem gegenwärtigen teutschen Kriege die übernommene Garantie des 





debate about reform and renewal” of the empire and the nation.10 By the end of the conflict 
imperial onlookers blamed Austria and Prussia for the same thing Leopold’s supporters had 
blamed Bavaria and Cologne for in the 1670s: sacrificing the good of the German nation for their 
own personal ambitions.  
Throughout much of Europe, the outcomes of the Seven Years War combined with 
emerging crises of traditional dynastic politics to fundamentally shake previously-held ideas of 
the relationship between nation, crown, and sovereignty.11 In Germany, as in France and Britain, 
older national understandings became increasingly inadequate amid new political and intellectual 
contexts. Add in the endless questioning and need for definition that characterized 
Enlightenment thought and, throughout Europe, by the second half of the eighteenth-century, 
intellectuals began to ask what precisely the “nation” meant in ways they never had before. This 
was the moment when, for the first time, national ideas became the focus of anxious debate and 
intense scholarly reflection. Intellectuals proposed a variety of different answers, including the 
idea, influenced by other Enlightenment thought, that perhaps the people, not divine right 
monarchies, constituted the basis of political sovereignty and the nation.12  
In the Holy Roman Empire, the combination of decreased imperial authority and 
increased disillusionment with the roles of Prussia and Austria meant that many questioned the 
idea of the empire and the emperor as the foundation stones of the German nation.13 In the years 
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following the Seven Years War, a heated debate emerged among German intellectuals asking 
whether a German “national spirit” even existed, and, if so, how to define it. The writer who 
sparked this debate, Friedrich Carl von Moser, had forwarded a more traditional idea of “nation,” 
recycling arguments for Germanness, nation, and imperial unity familiar from the Wars of Louis 
XIV and linking the nation closely with emperor and empire.14 But, by 1765 when Moser wrote, 
intellectuals no longer took this close link for granted. Moser’s work sparked considerable 
backlash from writers who questioned or entirely disputed these traditional associations, instead 
arguing for more democratic understandings of nation as bases from which to reinvigorate 
German national feeling.15 Different writers argued over whether “national spirit” was the 
reserve of the elite, or if it could be found in the entire population, and on which side of that 
spectrum it originated. Similar debates took place among intellectuals in France and elsewhere.16 
Read within this longer context, the writings of even the most luminary of national thinkers, such 
as Herder, Goethe, and Fichte, appear as further attempts to define and resituate national ideas 
towards new, less-dynastic foundations, in order to then launch their own projects of national 
renewal, defense, or cooperation.17 As Nicholas Vazsonyi described, this period was “a historic 
moment of transition in which a new way of thinking emerges in the midst of the old.”18 
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One of those new ways of thinking continued to associate national ideas of Germany with 
the empire, but not with the Habsburg emperors. Some scholars have referred to this as the idea 
of a “third Germany.”19 Already in the early years of the Seven Years War, many of the 
pamphlets that most forwarded ideas of patriotic or national action advocated for the neutrality of 
the rest of the imperial states. As one author described, “all true Germans must submit to God 
sincere and reverent desires for the restoration of peace,” for the ones that would have to pay the 
ultimate price of war were not Austria or Prussia but the empire itself.20 In a passage of 
clearheaded realism, the author enumerated the realities of war even for non-combatant members 
of the empire. 
Where then now is the meeting place of these foreign and national armies [National-
Armeen]; of these six or seven hundred thousand fighters…? In the German empire. Who 
will feed them? The same empire. What sort of territory will the partisans and… troops 
ravage/devastate? The German empire. Of which cities and which fortresses has one 
made plans to lay siege to and demolish their walls? Those of the empire… Does not the 
abundance of armies always bring shortage and at times famine in the lands which must 
take their maintenance upon themselves, in the lands through which they march, in the 
lands where they set up their camps/quarters? How many people would, not for one 
person who the war makes rich, be made poor, even utterly ruined?21 
 
The war resulted from Austria and Prussia’s disagreements, but it was the “German empire” that 
would ultimately bear the brunt of destruction, expense, and suffering. Another writer in the 
same year facing such a prospect instead simply exclaimed, “Prussia and Austria are each 
powerful enough; let them conclude their [own] quarrels.”22  
By 1760, Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi lamented the war-torn state of the empire by 
writing that, “one cannot possibly be a German, one cannot possibly have feelings of compassion 
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and human kindness, if one is not stirred in the most vivid way by the current miserable state of 
our fatherland.”23 Justi continued to blame this pitiable state on a lack of duty and love for their 
fatherland. Appealing to those same honorable German ancestors, Justi wrote that the “words 
freedom and love of the fatherland, which our ancestors valued so highly… were these concepts 
smothered by so many other ideas and designs, that very few anymore remember, what they owe 
to the common fatherland?”24 Instead, he continued, all of the parties involved in the present war, 
Austria and Prussia chief among them, sought to advance their own interests at the expense of 
the fatherland’s well-being. By 1760, Justi also lamented that Germany was stuck in a disastrous 
conflict to serve the colonial interests of Austria and Prussia’s allies - France and England. Do 
“the German courts have so little feeling of patriotic sentiments and true love towards our 
fatherland,” that they allow the empire to be thus destroyed?25 Justi answered:  
No! If our Fürsten feel a true drop of German blood in their veins; if they want to take 
the sorrow of Germany to heart; so, would it be one of the foremost conditions of the 
coming peace, that they stipulate a complete neutrality for Germany, and that all of the 
currently warring German courts unite, to prevent foreign troops all entry into 
Germany.26  
 
Germans - specifically Austria and Prussia - needed to reclaim their patriotic and national duty to 
the well-being of the empire and nation by abjuring their foreign alliances and rescuing Germany 
from the trampling boots of foreign soldiers, foreign ambition, and personal interests. All of this 
was a far cry from the Wars of Louis XIV, when the Austrian Habsburg emperors were so 
thoroughly equated with patriotic and national interest that not following them into war 
constituted an act of treason in the minds of many pamphleteers. Instead, due to the political 
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tribulations of the mid-eighteenth century, by 1761 even a pamphleteer who ultimately, 
seemingly reluctantly, sided with Prussia, made sure to end his pamphlet by saying “I have… 
written neither as an Austrian, nor as a Prussian, but rather as a German, to whose heart 
penetrates the sorrow and misery of his nation [Nation].”27 And as a German, a category distinct 
from Austrian and Prussian interests, he only sought “the naked truth” of the harm their actions 
inflicted upon Germany “to reach the courts of the great [powers] into the cabinets, indeed: into 
their hearts: so will the cloud of fervor quickly vanish.”28 
This new strain of national understanding, one loosened from the person of the emperor 
and that rejected the increasingly personal power politics of both Austria and Prussia, replaced 
those understandings that had predominated during the Wars of Louis XIV. Brian Vick has 
shown that still amid the Congress of Vienna (1814) this new understanding of nation prevailed 
throughout Germany. German delegates to the congress argued that strong national sentiment did 
not derive from the emperor or great powers, but instead emerged from the various local and 
regional structures of the empire. Any attempts to strengthen the larger members of the empire at 
the expense of the smaller, they argued, would undermine German national spirit and identity.29 
The “third Germany,” that which existed outside of the Austro-Prussian rivalry, had claimed 
itself as the foundation and protector of the German nation.  
This understanding of nation at the Congress of Vienna clamored for the maintenance of 
many of the complicated and decentralized structures that had characterized the then recently 
defunct Holy Roman Empire, those same structures that later German nationalists abhorred as 
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impediments to German national “awakening.” Thus it clearly constituted a very different idea of 
nation and national identity than the Prusso-centric understanding of a centralized German 
nation-state in 1871, nor yet the populist, ethnically-driven desire for national self-determination 
of 1919.30 Nor was this the only understanding of nation in existence even at the turn of the 
nineteenth century.31 It certainly differed from the understandings of nation that anti-French 
pamphleteers had so vociferously mobilized throughout the Wars of Louis XIV.  
Christopher Krebs described ideas as resembling viruses, in their ability to spread rapidly 
through social groups and across generations, but also in their ability to transform and mutate in 
response to new environments.32 National ideas are not different simply because at one point in 
their cycle of mutation they became vaunted as a hallmark of modernity. To pin down that one 
iteration and hold it up as an inert, never-changing example, is to ignore a florid past of alternate 
variations, and to miss an inevitable future in which these ideas will continue to transform. Some 
scholars hailed the end of the Cold War as the death of the national past and the dawning of an 
international, supra-national, or globalist future. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now 
definitively say that this was a mistaken prediction. But it was a prediction influenced by the idea 
that the “national” is and only ever will be one thing. Instead, we find ourselves three decades 
later shocked by the renewed virulence of national rhetoric, while scrambling to figure out how 
nobody recognized these new mutations developing.33 From economic, to liberal, to anti-
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globalist, national ideas are simply continuing their long history of change and reinvention. 
Perhaps one day they may lose their political and cultural relevance, to be replaced by a new set 
of ideas, but as long as we continue to live in a world dominated by nation-states, that day will 
not be soon. If we can understand that national ideas have had a long history of mutation, and 
will continue to have a long future, we can better manage, harness, and even shape the political 







An die Allerhöchste und unendliche Majestät Himmels und der Erden, Den Drey-einigen 
Hochgelobten GOtt, Allerunterthänigste und wehmütigste Klage und Bitte, derer in 
verschiedenen Chur-Fürstenthümern, Landen und Herrschafften, sonderlich in der Chur-
Fürstlichen Pfalz, im Hertzogthum Würtenberg, denen Badenischen Fürstenthümern, und 
Reichs-Städten Speyer, Worms, Offenburg, samt denen, so am Neckar sind, nunmehro zu 
Grund, und zwar auf das jämmerlichste verderbten und zugerichteten vieler tausenden 
armen Christen-Menschen, aus höchst-gedrungener Noth gestellet wider den grausamen 
Ludwig den XIV. König von Franckreich und dessen un-menschliche, ja! fast über-
teuffliche Frantzosen, in Sachen, wie innen ausführlich gemeldet, 1689. 
Antwort eines Freundes, auf einen Brieff, Betreffend die Rechte des allerchristlichst. Königes die 
Ihm in dem Elsaß zugestanden seyn, 1697. 
Apologie pour les Francois. Ou verification de leur constance. Cologne: Pierre du Marteau, 
1670. 
Aubery, Antoine. Des justes pretentions du roy sur l’empire... Paris: Chez Antoine Bertier, 1667. 
Beantwortung Des von der Chur- und Fürstlich- Bayerische Gesandschafft Du Franckfurth den 
17. Martii 1744. Ubergebenen Memorialis, 1744. 
Beantwortung einiger besonderer Fragen, welche den gegenwärtigen Krieg zum Vorwurf haben 
und eine grosse Aufmercksamkeit und Nachsinne verdienen, von Germano Sincero, 1758. 
Becher, Johann Joachim. Machiavellus Gallicus: Das Ist: Verwandelung Und Versetzung Der 
Seele Des Machiavelli in Ludovicum XIV. Dem König von Frankreich, Vogestellet Durch 
Hundert Politische Frantzösische Axiomata, In Welchen Der Frantzosen Staats- Und 
Kriegs-Maximen Und Practicquen, Welcher Sie Sich Gebrauchen, Jedem Offentlich Zu 
Sehen Vorgestellet Werden, 1675. 
Bericht was die Königl. frantzösische Guarnison zu Heydelberg, unterm Commando deß 
Brigadiers, Comte de Melac, in denen um selbige Churfürstl. Residentz-Stadt gelegene 
Städtlein, Flecken und Dorffschafften, vom 28. Januar. bis den 3. Feb. 1689. vor 
erschröckliche Grausamkeiten verübet, 1689. 
Betrachtungen eines deutschen Patrioten über einige Umstände des jezigen Kriegs, nebst einem 
Auszuge aus des berühmten Everhardi Wassenbergii eröfneten udn wieder 
verschlossenen Goldgrube, woraus zu ersehen, wodurch Frankreich so mächtig worden, 
daß es mit fast unzählichen Kriegsheeren Deutschland so oft und hauptsächlich 
gegenwärtig überschwemmen können, mit besondern Anmerkungen über gewisse Stellen 







Conference Infructueuse de Windisgratz, ou Violence de la France, à Retenir la Lorraine. Avec 
ces qui s’est passé là dessus de plus remarquable. Treuhertzige Warnung an Alle 
Christliche Potentaten und Stände Europae uber die vom Aller Christlichsten König in 
Franckreich bißherige gewaltsame Vorenthaltung deß Hertzogthums Lothringen..., 1672. 
Considerations politiques sur la prochaine election d’un Empereur. [Avec] Si l’Empereur peut 
soûmettre au Ban de l’Empire quelqu’un des Electeurs ou Princes d’Allemagne, du 
consentement du College Electoral seul, sans la participation des autres Princes, & Etats 
du S. Empire. [Avec] Lettre de Monsieur D*** A Monsieur le Docteur W*** touchant le 
Royaume de Bohême, 1711. 
Courtilz de Sandras, Gatien de. L’Alcoran de Louis XIV. ou le testement politique du Cardinal 
Jules Mazarin... Maurino, 1695. 
Curieuser Anhang und eröffnete Staats-Bedancken, über den zu Regenspurg und Haag mit 
Franckreich auffgerichteten Zwantzig-Jährigen Stillstand..., 1685. 
Curieuser Staats-Mercurius, welcher Der vornehmsten Staate in Europa weit-außsehende 
Maximen, Und insonderheit Den gefährlichen Zustand Deß H. Römischen Reichs, Allen 
Teutsch-gesinneten Patrioten, zu reiffern Nachsinnen, eilfertigst entdecket durch 
Fridericum Sincerum. Auff dessen eigene Unkosten., 1684. 
Curiosorum, nec non politicorum, vagabundi per Europam... Vols. 1.1-2.4. Nürnberg: Leonhard 
Loschge Buchhändlern 1678-1680. 
Das ähnliche verhalten derer gegenwärtigen mit denen vergangenen Zeiten wurde an dem 
feindseeligen Betragen der Crone Frankreich gegen Teutschland bey dem jetzigen 
innerlichen Krieg mit patriotischer Feder entworfen von Sincero Germano, 1758. 
Das an der Teutschen Colica Danieder liegende Franckreich, Worinnen... der merckwürdigsten 
Intrigues des Frantzösischen Hofes aufgelöset und vorgestellet werden... Durch den 
Mercurius im Traum entdeckt Dem Musastraeo dell Montunione. Freystatt, 1689. 
Das Blätlein wendet sich: Das ist, Offenbahre Verruckung, Deren von an. 65. bis auf dieses 1674 
Jahr Frantzösischer Seitz geführten Concepten Offenhertzig an Tag gegeben von 
Germanico Hanenfeind, 1674. 
Das Gedämpffte Hahn-geschrey, als des Großmächtigsten Königs in Franckreich seine in 
Deutschland eingedrungene Waffen durch den Käyserl. Osterreichischen und der Hohen 
Aliirten Teutschen Fürsten rühmlichen Gegenstand, Insonderheit des Durchläuchtigsten 
Fürsten und herrn, H. Georg wilhelms zu Braunschw. Lüneburg preißwürdige Kriegs-
Actiones und dem Teutschen Reich geleistete Hocherprießliche Beyhülffe Gestutzet und 
geschwächet worden, Zumahl durch die mit dem grossen Marechal de France und 
mutigem General Duc de Crecquy gehaltenen Schlacht und Eroberung der Stadt Trier 
vor Hochgedacht S. Fürstl. Durchl. als seinem gnädigsten liebsten Landesfürsten zu 







Das neugierig und veränderte Teutschland, Worinnen gehandelt wird von dessen Reichthum... 
Absonderlich aber von desselben verschwenderischer Neugierigkeit in Ausländische 
Dinge... Auch wie diesem verderblichen Wesen abzuhelffen sey, 1684. 
Das politische Ma- und Microscopium des gegenwärtigen Kriegs und das algemeine System des 
römischen Reichs betreffend, 1758. 
Das Regiersüchtige Franckreich. Worinnen Der Europäischen Welt, sonderlich aber 
Franckreichs Regiersucht, und dahero entstehende vielfältige Kriege... &c. von langen 
Zeiten her unpartheyisch vorgestellet werden..., 1684. 
Das Siegende Klee-Blatt in Niedersachsen, by dem, Gott gebe ferner! glücklichem Fortgange der 
Waffen Sr. Königl. Hoheit, des Printzens Heinrichs von Preussen, Sr. Durchl. des 
Herzoges Ferdinands von Braunschweig-Wolffenbüttel, und Sr. Durchl. des Erb-
Printzens Carls von Braunschweig-Wolffenbüttel, wieder die Französische Armee 
daselbst, begleitet mit unterthänigstem Wunsche H.M. Berlin: I. C. F. Spranger [??], 
1758. 
Das Verkehrte Glücks-Spiel Europäischen Alliantzen... vorgestellet, 1685. 
Das verwirrte Cölln, oder die geschwächte Cöllnische Chur-Würde., 1688. 
Das von Franckreich verführte Teutschland, worinnen klärlich vorgestellet wird, Wie 
Franckreich... Sonderlich... die Teutschen, Durch allerhand Ankörnungen, Galanterien, 
und andere ersinnliche Staats-Streiche, an sich gelocket, nachgehends verführet, und 
nicht nur um das Geld, sondern auch zum Theil um ihre Länder und Freyheit endlich 
gebracht, dagegen aber seine Monarchische Herrschafft erweitert hat. Franckfurt und 
Leipzig: Christian Weidmann, 1686. 
Das Von Teutschen Geblüth und Frantzösischen Gemüth Leichtsinnige Frauen-Zimmer... I. In 
ihren übermühtigen Kleider-Pracht... II. Die hochgethürnete Fontange: Und III. Die 
Schandloß-geblösten Brüste. Auß welchen allen die Hindansetzung der einem jeden von 
Natur eingepflantzten Schamhafftigkeit, und der hiedurch zugleich mit angenommenen 
Leichtsinnigkeit Sonnen-klahr abzunehmem. Allen denen, so diesen Eitelkeiten ergeben, 
zum sonderbahren Abschrecken vorgestellet durch B.C.B.T.A, 1691. 
Das wiederrechtlich von Franckreich gebrochene zwantzigjährige Armistitium... Anno 1684... zu 
Regenspurg getroffenen zwantzigjährigen Stillstand der Waffen... Item waß für 
Feindseeligkeiten von Franckreich wider das Heil. Röm. Reich dadurch verübet und waß 
vom Heil. Röm. Reich dagegen sey fürgenommen..., 1689. 
Dem Durchleuchtigsten Fürsten und Herren, Herren Georg Wilhelmen, Hertzogen zu 
Braunschweig, Lüneburg Regierenden herzogen zu Zelle, Seinem gnädigsten Fürsten und 
Herren, über die Bey und in Trier erhaltene Siegreiche Schlacht und Eroberung 






Der Abgezogene Frantzösischen Staats-Rock, und Teutsche Schutzmantel. Das ist Der bißhero 
der gantzen Welt verkauffte, nunmehro aber redlich entlarvte Frantzösische Blaue Dunst 
und Deß fast schwachscheinenden Teutschlands Erhaltungs-Kunst, 1675. 
Der bey Roßbach zerrißene Französische Plan. Ingleichen der fernere Erfolg des Feldzugs Sr. 
Majestät des Königs in Preußen, von der Roßbacher Bataille, bis zum Ende des 1758sten 
Jahres. Frankfurt und Leipzig, 1759. 
Der Erfährte Hahn, oder Kurtze Vorstellung des jenigen, was muthmassentlich von dem außgang 
dieses blutigen Kriegs zu hoffen, ob Franckreich sein vorgesetztes Ziel erreichen werde? 
Entworffen durch Ernst Friderich von Teutoburg. Cassiodor. Var. III, 3. Superbiam 
divinitati exosam persequi debet generalitatis assensus. Freystatt, 1678. 
Der Frantzösische und das Heil. Röm. Reich, verderbende grausame Greuel und Abgott Ludwig 
der vierzehende, König in Frankreich. Bern, 1689. 
Der Gedoppelte Blas-Balg der appigen Wollust, nemlich die erhöhete Fontange und die blosse 
Brust, mit welchen das Alamodische und die Eitelkeit liebende Frauenzimmer in ihren 
eigenen, und vieler unvorsichtigen Manns-Persohnen sich darin vergaffenden Hertzen 
ein Feuer der verbothenen Liebes-Brunst anzündet... zu guter Warnung und kluger 
Vorsichtigkeit vorgestellet, und zum Druck befordert... Ernestum Gottlieb, 1689. 
Der Geropffte Hahn von Einem ohnparteyischen Eydgenossen D.F.A. Seinem guten Freunde 
H.R.D.S. Zu Gefallen abgebildet, 1677. 
Der Hoch-Teutsche Reichs-Secretarius, Erwegend und überlegend die heutig-gefährliche 
Kriegs-Zeiten des Ober- und Nieder-Teutschlands. Neben einem vortheiligen Rath, 
welcher Gestalt das Reich wider alle Feinde beschützet, und das alte Vertrauen zwischen 
Haupt und Gliedern ergäntzet werden möge. Nach alt-Teutscher Auffrichtigkeit an Tag 
gegeben von Bonfidio Tuiskon, 1673. 
Der Neutrale Philosoph by dermaligen Kriegerischen Zeiten, 1757. 
Der... Straßburgische Staats-Simplicius... Mit den... Reyse-Relationen... Wegen restituirung der 
importantesten Reichs-Stadt Straßburg, observiret..., 1684. 
Der Teutsche Frantzoß, Worinne Mit sinnreichen Lehren und lustigen Exempeln gründlich 
vorgebildet wird, der Teutschen allzubegierigen Nachahmung in denen Frantzösischen 
Sitten, Kleydung, Sprache, Reisen, und andern Vanitaeten; So dann Der Nutz und 
Verlust, Welcher dem Römischen Reiche Teutscher Nation hierauß erwachsen, 1682. 
Der Universal-Geist der Crone Frankreich, Als die Mißgeburth der Politic, 1745. 
Der unvergeßliche Zehnte Sieg Friedrichs des Großen, welcher über die ganze Rußische Armee 
bey Zorndorf den 25sten August 1758. erfochten wurde, wird patriotisch besungen von 






Der Verkleidete Götter-Both, Mercurius, Welcher durch Europa wandern, einige wichtige 
Discoursen... und Meynungen... warhafftig der Welt zum Nachricht entdecket, und 
verlässet, 1674. 
Des aller-christlichsten Königs unchristliches Bombardiren und Mordbrennen, oder die 
grausamste vielfältig wiederholete frantzös. Tyranney Ludwig des Großen. Freyburg im 
Brißgau: Gronemann, 1689. 
Des Grossen Herrschers Jupiters und der gesammten Götter-Schaar geheimer Rath-Schluß und 
Un-Muth, über des freveln trotzigen und verwegenen Vogels des Haanen, wider einen 
muhtigen und siegreichen Adler und starcken Löwen, gethane vermessene und 
unverschämte Proposition; Das ist: Wie daß der wohl proportionirte und 
unvergleichliche practickische stoltze Mist-Vogel der Haan, mit seinem geitzigen und 
unersättlichen Kropffe den grossen Reichs Raht nach vielen gaucklerischen Ceremonien 
endlich vorgelassen und erschienen in Gestalt eines berühmten Klop-Fechters in 
Europa., 1674. 
Des in der Welt zum Vierdtenmal verschickten und verkleideten Götter-bothens Mercurii, 
abgestattete Erzehlung, Was Er in der Europaeischen Welt, Zeit seiner herrumreise vor 
Gutachten und Muth-massungen wegen des jetzigen Krieges vernommen, 1675. 
Des neulich-verkleideten ietzo abermahl in der Welt verschickten Götter-Bothen Mercurii, 
fortgesetzte Erzehlung, worinnen er, nach durchgewanderter Welt, die wichtigsten 
Discoursen, Muthmassungen, und Meynungen, so bey denen Teutschen, als einigen 
Benachbarten des Welt-Theils Europä begriffenen, und in jetzigem Kriege mit-
interessirenden Höffen und Ständen, unter vornehmen und geringen Standes-Persohnen 
vernommen, der Welt zum Nachricht abermahl entdecket, und verlässet, 1674. 
Dialogue entre le Marechal de Turenne et le Prince d’Auvergne, Dans les Champs Elysiens, Sur 
l’Etat des Affaires Générales de l’Europe, vers la fin de cette Année 1710. Cologne: 
Pierre Marteau, 1710. 
Die Entdeckung deß unter dem Fuchs hervor-gläntzenden Wolffs-Peltzes, oder: Dulcis Fistulae 
Tourenicae Anatomen, daß ist: Der verstimbte Widerschall der Sieß-klingenden Pfeiffen, 
Denen deß Schwäbischen Crayses zu Ulm versambleten deputirten In dem, deß jetzigen 
1674. Jahres den 18. Junii vorgetragenen Tourenischen Schreiben repraesentiret, Denen 
Herrn schwaben zum besten vorgestellet, und zu besserer Verstehung mit deutlichen 
Erklärungen kürtzlich durchgegangen von einem recht-teutsch-Patriotischen Medico, 
1674. 
Die Freundschafft derer Teutschen mit denen Franzosen Du nuzlichem Gebrauch unserer Zeiten 
entworfen. Strasbourg, 1757. 
Die im Ursprung und Wachsthum prächtig und mächtig-stehende Lilje, Oder deß Königreichs 
Franckreich Anfang und Fortgang, Biß auff Jetzige Regierung Aus dem Frantzösischen 






Die mit lebendigen Farben Abgemahlte, und mit der verführischen Blossen Brust 
vergesellschafftete Eitele Fontange des heutigen Frauen-Zimmers. Samt angehengter 
kurtzer Vorstellung deroselben Neuer Hoffart. Durch Waremundum von Frauenstadt, 
1690. 
Die unteutsche Freyheit, Oder Teutsche Gefangenschaft Etlicher Französisch gesinten Subtilen 
Teutschen, Durch Ein plumpe teutsche Warheit von Einem unfranzösischen Plumpen 
Teutschen Plump, untereinander vorgetragen, 1674. 
Die Waagschale der Frantzosen, oder das auff die Schaubühne gestellte Franckreich, darinne... 
dieser beschriebenen Nation grosse Untreue, erschröckliche Gottlosigkeit, 
Höchststraffbarer Meyneyd, Hochmuth, Tyranney, und andere dergleichen abscheuliche 
Haupt-Laster... Woraus der bevorstehende Untergang Ludewigs des XIV. oder Bösen 
gantz leichte zu vermuthen... Allen auffrichtigen Teutschen Patrioten, zu Liebe und 
Nachricht in den Druck gegeben, 1689. 
Drey Ehrliche Teutsche, Wahrlieb, Freymund, und Guthertz Reden miteinander Lustig, 
verträulich, nachdencklich, Historisch, Politisch, wahrhafft und Satyrisch, Von der 
Vergangenen, gegenwärtigen und Zukünfftigen Zeit. Zu Paris aus einem Manuscript 
gedruckt, so sich unter denen sub Hasta verkaufften Mobilien der gestorbenen 
Frantzösischen Reputation befunden. Allen bey diesen bösen Krieg gebliebenen, und 
noch lebenen Frantzosen dedicirt von einem tapfern Engelländer. Mit Bewilligung der 
Gallicanischen Groß-Sprecherey. Auf Unkosten der Spanischen Dona Grandezza. Im 
Verlag des Machiavelli aus dem Reich der Todten. Die Exemplaria werden von denen 
Hussaren- und Panduren- Marquetendern umb einen billigen Preyß verkaufft. Mit gantz 
besondern Aristotelisch- und Platonisch kräfftigen Privilegiis, nicht diebisch 
nachzudrucken und dergleichen lauffende kleine Schrifften liederlich zu verpfuschen, 
1745. 
[Dumont, Jean]. La Pierre de Touche de la Lettre a Monsieur le Marquis de *** Sur un Livre 
Intitulé les Soupirs de l’Europe. Dont on fait voir ici plusieurs Nouveaux Motifs, joints à 
l’Examen de toute la Matiére de cette Lettre Anonime, qui n’est point de bon Aloy, 
comme on le démontre sur cette Pierre de Touche, par un Discours qui est aussi en 
Forme de Lettre, & muni de Preuves irrefragables, 1712. 
Estat present des affairs d’Allemagne, et de Hollande, 1675. 
Europaeische Rath-Stube, oder Curiöse Beschreibung des gegenwärtigen Staats von Europa. 
Franckfurt und Leipzig: Moritz Weidmann, 1686. 
Europäischer Glücks-Topf, oder das spielende Glücke der im Kriege und Frieden interessirten 








Faes, Johannes. Sieg-Prangende Palmen welche dem durchleuchtigsten Fürsten und Herrn Hn. 
Gerog Wilhelm Hertzogen zu Braunschweig und Lünäburg als deroselben Hoch-Fürstl. 
Durchleuchtigkeit durch die Siegreiche Hülffe des Himmels mit denen Holzen-
Donfoederirten Armeen, so vor Trier gelegen, wider den Frantzösischen Marschall 
Mons. de Crequi bey Conzingerbrücke and der Saar, denn 11 August. stil. n. des 
iztlauffen CICICCLXXV Krist-jahrs eine völlige Victorie erhalten inn fligender Eile auff 
der Hochfürstlichen Julius Universität-Helmstät entworffen, dessen Unterthänigst-
Demühtigster Diener zubezeugen seiner hirob geschöpfften Freude inn tieffester 
Unterthänigkeit am 15. Tage des August Monats, als dessen erfreuliches Gedächtniß 
hochfeierlichst begangen ward, vortragen wollen Johannes Faes aus Lünäburg. 
Helmstädt: Jacob Müllern, 1675. 
Fayolle, P. Moret de la. Le Paravent de la France contre le vent du nord. Ou Reflexions sur un 
Livre Anonime, Intitulé, le vray interest des Princes Chrestiens, depuis le changement 
arrivé en Angleterre par l’Elevation du Prince & de la Princesse d’Orange sur le 
Thrône. Avec les Avantages que les Princes Chrestiens recevrons de cette revolution, 
laquelle selon toutes les apparences ne sera funeste qu’à la France... Poitiers: Jean 
Fleuriau, 1692. 
Fernere Continuation abgestatteter Relationen des verkleideten Götter-Bothens Mercurii, 
Darinnen enthalten, was sich in denen Monathen, September, October, November, u[sw]. 
am Ober-Rhein-Strom biß zu Außgang des 1674. Jahres notables zugetragen, 1675. 
Franckreich Nach Seinen Natürlichen Eigenschafften Oder Das Entlarffte Franckreich. 
Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1748. 
Franckreich schäme dich! Das ist: Heimlich und unverhoffte Entdeckung derer Französischen, 
fast an allen Europoeischen Höfen geschiedeten, und sehr übel gelungenen Rathschlägen 
lesens-würdig der Curieusen Welt vor Augen gestellt, 1685. 
Franckreichs Betrügliche Friedens-Mascarade, wie solche bey diesen annoch fortwährenden 
Krieg zu verschiedenenmahlen... zu dem Utrechtischen Congress, auf eine sehr 
unverschämte und hochmüthige Weiß von oben-ermeldter Cron gespielet worden... 
Cologne, 1712. 
Franckreichs hinckende, stinckende und sterbende Fama, bey seinen bißhero geführten 
unrechtmäßigen und unglücklichen Kriegen, 1705. 
Frantzösis. Ratio Statûs, oder Rasender Staat deß Ehrsüchtigen ruch verlohrner Lilien Königs, 
Beruhend Auff 43 Grund-Säulen... der von ihm dermalen in lauter Confusion und Unruhe 
gesetzten gantzen Ehrbaren Welt... entdecket und vorgestellet von Teutschmann von 
Waremund, 1702. 
Frantzösische Verstörung der Alten Statt Hagenaw, welche im Januario dieses 1677. Jahrs 







Französischer Warsager, An des Heil. Römsch. Reiches Fürsten Abgeschicket dem Deutschem 
Leser zum bestem, auß dem zu Frybourg im Jahr Christi 1671. gedrucketem 
Lateinischem Exemplar auffs eigentlichste verdeutsched, und zum Druck gebracht in 
selbigem Jahre, 1671. 
Französisches Lehrgebäude und Verhalten. Aus dem Französischen übersetzt. Altona, 1757. 
Funcke, Friderich. Triumfirender Lorbeer-Krantz, mit welchem der Gerecht-Kriegende und 
Gnädigst-Siegende herr und Gott Zebaoth, den Durchläuchtigsten, Hochgebohrnen 
Fürsten und Herrn, H. Georg Wilhelm Hertzogen zu Braunschweig und Lüneburg, durch 
Ritterliche Uberwindung des Fürsten Crequi und glücklichen Eroberung der Chur-
Fürstlichen Residentz-Stadt-Trier, als einen Tapffern und Keyser-Treuen Creiß-Obristen, 
Glücklich beehret und rühmlich beschencket hat... Lüneburg, 1675. 
Gemüthes-Rede Deutsch Landes, worin... das die Gemüther derer Stände des Heil. Römischen 
Reiches nicht fein zusammen halten, seinen Untergang Ihme selbst gleich als im Bilde 
zuvorher darstellet..., 1672. 
Germani Aletophili Prüfung der Schrift, so betitult: Die Freundschaft der Teutschen mit denen 
Franzosen zur Warnung bey jetzigen bedenklichen Zeiten ans Licht gestellt. Rosbach und 
Lissa, 1758. 
Gibbon, Edward. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. 6 vols., 1776. 
Grand, Joachim le. Memoire touchant la succession a la couronne d’Espagne. Traduit de 
l’Espagnol. [Avec] Reflexions sur la lettre a Mylord, sur la nécessité & la justice de 
l’entiere Restitution de la Monarchie d’Espagne. [Avec] Extraits de divers Auteurs, 
servant de preuves à ce Memoire, 1711. 
Großväterliche Erinnerungen über das Schreiben eines Vaters an seinen Sohn den 
gegenwärtigen Zustand in Sachsen betreffend, 1757. 
Gründliche Anzeige Warum Die Krohn Frankreich in so Mächtigem Flor Das Römische Reich 
Auf Dem Falle Und Die Vereinigte Niederlande Auf Dem Verlust Durch Einen Übel 
Getroffenen Frieden Stehen. Endekket Durch Polidorum Warmund. Freiburg, 1683. 
Hanß Knorr. Der Teutsche, Quackerius. Der Engeländer, Fitzliputzli. Das Frantzmännichen, 
und der Holländische Muff. Uber die gegenwärtige Unruhe am Nieder-Rhein-Strohm. 
Der Haag, 1684. 
Heilsame Artzeney-Mittel wieder die Haupt-kranckheit der Fontangen, welche als eine 
alamodische Seuche unter denen Frauen und jungfrauen graffiret, aber dieselbe vor 
GOTT, Engeln und Menschen prostituiret und verstellet, auß Christlicher Liebe gegen 
solche Patienten wohlmeinentlich fürgeschrieben von Gottlieb Lasterfeind von 







[Hoernigk, Philipp Wilhelm]. H.G.D.C. Francopolitae Wahrer Bericht von dem alten Königreich 
Lothringen und Klarer Beweiß Daß die frantzösische von denen Carolinischen 
Franckischen Königen anmaßlich hergeführete Sprüch auff die Uber-Rheinische Reichs-
Länder allerdings nichtig und untuchtig seyen: Ferner auch Wann ihnen einige Krafft 
zugelegt werden sollte, sie als dann zugleich das gesampte dießeitige Teutschland 
nebenst Italien, Schweitz und denen Vereinigten Niederlanden nach sich ziehen müsten, 
1682. 
Interets des princes D’Alemagne. Où l’on voit ce que c’est que cet Empire, la Raison d’Etat 
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